new-tool
Skill1 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Add a new MCP tool server to this stack end-to-end — scaffold, trust posture, egress allowlist, wiring, tests, verification. Use when asked to add/build/wire a new tool or MCP server into this repo, or to research candidate tools and implement one.
- Reads credentials
5 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- TobiasMue91/tobiasmue91.github.iotheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- jamesmccomish/mp-mcptheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
- OpenC3/cosmostheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
- ShenSeanChen/waku-agenttheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
- QBT-Labs/openmm-mcptheir own version, first seen Mar 28, 2026
Other versions5 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 5
- ShenSeanChen/waku-agent★ 2.2ksame name
- OpenC3/cosmos★ 268same name
- TobiasMue91/tobiasmue91.github.io★ 59same name
- QBT-Labs/openmm-mcp★ 3same name
- jamesmccomish/mp-mcp★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 5 edited versions we read keep these.
0
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 25
Only data the user or their own systems produce (market data, backtests, control-plane state) → trusted: plain serve(mcp, port=port).
- Very specific: line 65
Write the real server.py (replace the ping stub).
- Very specific: line 76
Verify live: the verify skill (run the server + sidecar locally, drive real MCP HTTP).
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 5 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Add a new tool to the mcp-tools stack
The stack's shape is fixed; a new tool is a set of decisions plus mechanical
wiring. Make the decisions FIRST (ask the user anything you can't determine),
then scaffold, then wire until pytest security/test_stack.py is green — it
names anything still missing, and CI enforces it on the PR.
The decisions (in order)
1. Trust posture — the one that matters. Does ANY tool on this server return content authored by third parties (messages, posts, emails, docs, comments, search results, web pages)? Screening is per-SERVER, not per-tool: one middleware screens every result, so a single untrusted-returning tool makes the whole server untrusted.
- Yes →
serve(mcp, port=port, untrusted_output=True), plus the compose untrusted kit (below). When unsure, choose untrusted — a wrongly-trusted server passes injection to the model; a wrongly-untrusted one only pays a scan per call. - Only data the user or their own systems produce (market data, backtests,
control-plane state) → trusted: plain
serve(mcp, port=port).
2. Engine strategy. Smallest owned wrapper surface wins (the operator's standing preference):
- An existing MCP server/engine exists → wrap or import it behind
serve()(see tools/workspace for native import, tools/telegram for a vendored stdio child behind a fastmcp proxy). VENDOR the source if PyPI trust is unclear — the telegram engine's PyPI name was a squat; check the real repo. - Otherwise implement directly against the upstream API, tools kept thin.
- Either way: pin exact versions in requirements.txt, hash-lock (step 2 of the flow). Engines doing their own HTTP behind the egress wall may need SOCKS support (pysocks/httplib2 gotcha from the workspace build).
3. Egress domains. Enumerate what the server must reach; that list IS
security/egress-proxy/allowlist/<name>.txt (leading dot = subdomains). Start
minimal — misses show up as TCP_DENIED in
docker compose exec egress cat /var/log/squid/access.log, add from there.
Google OAuth hosts are needed only if listed in the stub's comment.
4. Secrets and prerequisites → the deploy manifest. For each secret the
tool needs: key, human label, and where-to-get hint into deploy.json's
secrets (that drives the in-chat staging form) and env.example. Browser
steps the user must do first (enable an API, add an OAuth redirect URI) go in
prerequisites; image-size/RAM warnings in notes.
5. Port and name. Port = next free MCP port (check existing
tools/*/deploy.json ports + gatekeeper's 8065). Subdomain defaults to the
name. Lowercase, hyphens ok.
The flow
scripts/new-tool.sh <name> <port> # scaffold + compose service + allowlist stubThen, guided by its printed checklist (squid listener, tunnel route + posture block, CI matrix + dependabot entries) and the decisions above:
- Write the real
server.py(replace the ping stub); apply the trust posture. Untrusted also means, in docker-compose.yml:MCP_UNTRUSTED_OUTPUT: "1",GUARDRAIL_URL,GUARDRAIL_ENABLED,guardrailinNO_PROXY, the profile name appended to the guardrail service'sprofileslist, andMCP_UNTRUSTED_OUTPUT: "1"in the tunnel overlay's posture block. - Lock:
uv pip compile tools/<name>/requirements.txt --generate-hashes --python-version 3.12 -o tools/<name>/requirements.lock. - Wire until green:
uv run --with pytest --with pyyaml -- pytest security/test_stack.py -q— every failure message names the missing piece. - Tests:
tools/<name>/test_<name>.py(thin server tests; copy a sibling's shape) + the CI matrix and dependabot entries from the checklist. - Verify live: the
verifyskill (run the server + sidecar locally, drive real MCP HTTP). For a first smoke:docker compose up -d --build <name>and checkdocker compose pshealth. - PR (branch + auto-merge; never commit secrets — env.example carries keys, never values).
After merge (deployment — the user drives)
Deploys are manual, per docs/deploy/local.md: fill tools/<name>/.env, add the
profile to COMPOSE_PROFILES, up -d --build with both -f files. Remind the
user of prerequisites browser
steps and to add the connector: https://<subdomain>.<domain>/mcp in
claude.ai, plus the OAuth redirect URI on the shared Google client. A changed
squid.compose.conf needs docker compose restart egress; a new tunnel route
needs a cloudflared --force-recreate.
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