incident-response
Skill9 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Security incident response, breach containment, evidence preservation, and recovery verification. Use when a breach, compromise, or security incident is detected or suspected.
- Deletes or force-pushes
84 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- AshrafDurjoy/genai-shared-patternstheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- drvoss/everything-copilot-clitheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- lengrufeng2008/dsh-skill-librarytheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- Cure-Consulting-Group/ProductEngineeringSkillstheir own version, first seen Nov 12, 2026
- anuragsarkar97/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- tigu77/tiguclawtheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
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Other versions84 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 84
- anthropics/knowledge-work-plugins★ 36ksame name
- microsoft/hve-core★ 1.6ksame name
- hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude★ 401same name
- duyet/clickhouse-monitoring★ 305same name
- kid-sid/claude-spellbook★ 190same name
- irahardianto/awesome-agv★ 157same name
- harness/harness-skills★ 134same name
- nahid-sparktales/agent-dispatcher★ 59same name
- drvoss/everything-copilot-cli★ 49same name
- Happy-Technologies-LLC/happy-platform-skills★ 41same name
74 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository8 other files it gives its agents.
- .claude/CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- auth-implementationSkill
- kiro-railsSkill
- review-guideSkill
- spec-archiveSkill
- spec-implementSkill
- spec-proposeSkill
- spec-verifySkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 71 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 8
When a security incident is detected or suspected, follow this structured response.
- Distinctive: line 53
Do NOT speculate - only state confirmed facts
- Distinctive: line 72
Verify no persistence mechanisms remain (backdoors, new accounts, scheduled tasks, modified code)
- Distinctive: line 77
Before declaring "all clear":
- Distinctive: line 90
Root cause: - not just "how" but "why our defenses didn't catch it"
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 71 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Incident Response Checklist
When a security incident is detected or suspected, follow this structured response. Do NOT improvise - skipping steps destroys evidence or widens the breach.
Phase 1: Immediate Containment (first 15 minutes)
- Confirm the incident - distinguish a real breach from a false alarm. Check: unauthorized access logs, unexpected data exfiltration, credential exposure, malware indicators, customer reports.
- Stop the bleeding - contain without destroying evidence:
- Revoke compromised credentials (API keys, tokens, passwords) - rotate, don't delete
- Block attacker IPs/ranges at WAF or security group level
- Disable compromised user accounts (suspend, don't delete)
- Isolate affected systems (remove from load balancer, restrict network access)
- Preserve evidence BEFORE remediation:
- Snapshot affected EBS volumes, RDS instances, container filesystems
- Export CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, application logs for the incident window
- Screenshot or export any attacker-visible artifacts (defacement, unauthorized changes)
- Record timestamps of discovery and each containment action
- Do NOT reboot, redeploy,
git reset, delete logs, or destroy state until evidence is preserved.
Phase 2: Scope Assessment
- Determine blast radius:
- Which systems were accessed? (check auth logs, session records)
- What data was exposed or exfiltrated? (check DB query logs, API access logs, S3 access logs)
- How long was the attacker present? (earliest indicator → containment time)
- Were other accounts/tenants affected? (cross-tenant leakage check)
- Identify the entry point:
- Credential compromise (which credential, how obtained)
- Vulnerability exploitation (which endpoint, which CVE)
- Social engineering / phishing (which user, what access)
- Supply chain (which dependency, which version)
- Document in
docs/security/INCIDENT-{YYYY-MM-DD}.md:- Timeline of events
- Systems affected
- Data potentially exposed
- Entry point and attack vector
Phase 3: Communication
Internal (within 1 hour of confirmation):
- Engineering lead and security team
- Product/business owner of affected systems
- Legal counsel (if PII or regulated data involved)
Customer notification (if required):
- Determine regulatory obligation: GDPR (72h), HIPAA, state breach laws
- Draft factual notification: what happened, what data affected, what we're doing, what they should do
- Do NOT speculate - only state confirmed facts
Template:
Subject: Security Incident Notification - [Date]
What happened: [factual description of the incident]
When: [discovery time] - [containment time]
What data was affected: [specific data types, NOT "all your data"]
What we've done: [containment and remediation actions taken]
What you should do: [password reset, monitor accounts, etc.]
Next update: [specific time commitment]Phase 4: Remediation
- Patch the vulnerability or close the attack vector
- Force credential rotation for all potentially affected accounts
- Deploy additional monitoring for the attack vector
- Verify no persistence mechanisms remain (backdoors, new accounts, scheduled tasks, modified code)
- Restore from known-good state if integrity cannot be verified
Phase 5: Recovery Verification
Before declaring "all clear":
- Attack vector confirmed closed
- All compromised credentials rotated
- No unauthorized accounts, API keys, or SSH keys remain
- No scheduled tasks, cron jobs, or Lambda functions added by attacker
- No code modifications outside normal git history
- Monitoring in place to detect recurrence
- All affected systems restored to known-good state or verified clean
Phase 6: Post-Incident Review
Within 5 business days, create a post-incident review covering:
- Timeline - from initial compromise to full remediation
- Root cause - not just "how" but "why our defenses didn't catch it"
- What worked - detection mechanisms that fired, containment that was effective
- What failed - gaps in monitoring, slow response, missing runbooks
- Action items - specific changes to prevent recurrence (with owners and dates)
- Store in
docs/security/POST-INCIDENT-{YYYY-MM-DD}.md
Anti-Patterns (BANNED during incidents)
- ❌ Rebooting or redeploying before preserving evidence
- ❌ Deleting attacker accounts/data (preserves evidence of their actions)
- ❌
git reset --hardon production (destroys audit trail) - ❌ Communicating publicly before confirming facts
- ❌ Blaming individuals in written communications
- ❌ Assuming scope is limited without verifying
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