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slilbudgetslilbudget/knowledge-delta-skills/skills/security/js-obfuscation/SKILL.md

js-obfuscation

Skill3 starsChanged 49 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use when obfuscating JavaScript, building anti-detection layers, evading Google Safe Browsing, hiding payloads from scanners, adding anti-bot/anti-DevTools protection, or preparing phishing/red-team pages for deployment

1 other project uses a version of this.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Does NOT work: client-side blocking of safebrowsing.googleapis.com — checks happen at browser level before page JS.

    line 49
  2. Distinctive:

    No mouse check — sandboxes bypass webdriver but don't move mouse

    line 76

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

JS Obfuscation & Anti-Detection

Architecture: Defense-in-Depth Layers

Request arrives
  ├─ L1: Server-side cloaking (IP/ASN/GeoIP) → anti-bot.md
  │   ├─ L2: CAPTCHA gate (Turnstile) → anti-bot.md
  │   │   ├─ L3: JS anti-bot (webdriver, fingerprint, behavior) → anti-bot.md
  │   │   │   ├─ L4: Encrypted payload (AES/XOR/Unicode) → encryption.md
  │   │   │   │   └─ L5: Obfuscated JS (javascript-obfuscator) → obfuscator-configs.md
  │   │   │   └─ L6: One-time URLs (single use, then 404)
  │   │   └─ Anti-DevTools → anti-devtools.md

Without L1 everything else just delays detection. With L1, site can live weeks.

Quick Decision Guide

ScenarioLayers
Quick red team pageL5 (balanced) + anti-DevTools
Production phishing with longevityAll 6
Landing page (BitB popup)L3 + L5 + anti-DevTools
Cloudflare WorkerL1 (ASN via CF) + L4 + L5
Email attachment HTMLL4 (AES, key in URL fragment) + L5 (max) + anti-DevTools

Evasion Checklist (Safe Browsing / VirusTotal / PhishTank / CF WAF)

  1. Server-side IP/ASN/GeoIP filter — crawlers never see payload
  2. CAPTCHA gate (Turnstile) — scanners can't solve; CF sees "protected site"
  3. JS anti-bot — headless/sandbox detected and redirected
  4. Encrypted payload, RC4/AES — never raw base64, atob() is a detection signature
  5. Obfuscated JS — no eval(atob(, password, known-kit signatures in source
  6. domainLock — code breaks on wrong domain (VirusTotal, sandboxes)
  7. One-time URLs — reported link is already 404
  8. Domain rotation — flagged → reserve; aged domains (.com, 2+ years) flagged slower
  9. Delayed execution — setTimeout 3–5s; scanner budgets are short
  10. Interaction-gated — real click/scroll required before payload
  11. Polymorphic mutation — same code for every visitor → signatures
  12. Email whitelist (Cephas pattern) — serve only if email matches target list
  13. Legit hosting (.workers.dev, .pages.dev, .netlify.app) = high reputation; Workers/Pages get less scrutiny

Does NOT work: client-side blocking of safebrowsing.googleapis.com — checks happen at browser level before page JS.

What to Obfuscate

Yes: tracking scripts, form handlers, exfil logic, CF Worker code, custom frontend JS. No: server-side code, Nginx/HAProxy configs, CSS, HTML structure, proxied content, Docker internals.

One-Time URLs

active = {}

@app.route('/<token>')
def land(token):
    if token in active:
        del active[token]
        return render_page()
    return '', 404

Common Mistakes

  1. Obfuscation without server-side filtering
  2. base64 instead of RC4/AES — atob() is a signature
  3. Hardcoded URLs in source — construct dynamically or decrypt at runtime
  4. No domainLock — code runs on VirusTotal → flagged
  5. renameGlobals: true without testing — breaks external scripts
  6. No mouse check — sandboxes bypass webdriver but don't move mouse
  7. Static CAPTCHA — if cached forever, scanner reuses session
  8. Same code for every visitor — polymorphic mutation prevents signatures

Reference Files

  • obfuscator-configs.md — javascript-obfuscator presets (balanced/max/light), CLI, options
  • anti-bot.md — anti-bot, anti-sandbox, CDP detection, server-side cloaking, Turnstile
  • anti-devtools.md — 7 methods, disable-devtool npm
  • encryption.md — AES-256-GCM, XOR, invisible Unicode, DOM cloaking, polymorphic JS
  • phaas-reference.md — 11 PhaaS kits (2025-2026), techniques, stats

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