idonthavespotify
sjdonado/idonthavespotify/AGENTS.md
Bun + TypeScript server that converts a streaming-service link into links on other platforms. SSR pages via nano-jsx, fragment updates via htmx, small Stimulus controllers for client behavior. CI: PRs run tests.yml (loads .env.test into env, then test:ci, plus asset/binary/edge build, native-import audit, and binary smo
AGENTS.md1.9k starsChanged 11 days ago
- Reads credentials
What's in it
- IDHS (I Don't Have Spotify) — agent instructions
- Directory map
- Prerequisites
- Commands (run from repo root)
- Conventions and easy-to-miss constraints
- Workers operations (public instance only)
- Abuse-gate decisions (do not re-derive without new evidence)
# IDHS (I Don't Have Spotify) — agent instructions
Bun + TypeScript server that converts a streaming-service link into links on other platforms. SSR pages via nano-jsx, fragment updates via htmx, small Stimulus controllers for client behavior.
## Directory map
- `src/index.ts` — HTTP server (`Bun.serve` with `routes`): `GET /`, `POST /search` (htmx HTML fragment), `POST /api/search`, `POST /api/auth/request-code`, `POST /api/auth/verify-code`, `GET /api/status`, `GET /verify` (Cloudflare challenge landing that redirects back), static fallback for `public/`.
- `src/parsers/` — identify the incoming link's platform, extract normalized metadata + search query.
- `src/adapters/` — turn the query into outbound links per destination platform. `invidious.ts` is the exception: it derives a `redirect.invidious.io` link from the YouTube result and makes no upstream call.
- `src/abuse/` — public instance gate: stateless OTP (`otp.ts`), email policy (`email.ts`), Plunk client (`plunk.ts`), session tokens (`session.ts`, cookie-only, no bearers), per-email quota (`quota.ts`), Durable Object (`quota-do.ts`), gate checks + auth route handlers (`gate.ts`, `routes.ts`).
- `src/services/` — `search.ts` orchestration, in-memory `cache.ts`, `metadata.ts` helpers, `musicbrainz.ts` fallback (fills missed adapters from curated streaming relations).
- `src/schemas/` — zod route schemas (`auth.schema.ts` covers the gate endpoints); `src/config/` — enums, constants, env.
- `src/utils/` — `http-client.ts` (all outbound HTTP goes through `impit` here), logger, scraper, service guard (per-service upstream budgets + circuit breaker).
- `src/views/` — nano-jsx components/layouts/pages (`components/gate.tsx` is the inline OTP panel), `controllers/*.js` (Stimulus, plain JS), `css/index.css` (Tailwind).
- `tests/` — integration tests (`api`, `page`, `abuse/gate`), unit tests (`parsers`, `search`, `utils`, `abuse`, `spotify-totp`); `tests/utils/http-mock.ts` stubs `HttpClient` statics (non-2xx mocks carry a body snippet, mirroring production `HttpClientError.body`); `tests/mocks/` holds HTML/JSON snapshots.
- `scripts/fetch-snapshots.ts` — regenerates `tests/mocks/` from live URLs (network).
- `build.config.ts` — Tailwind CLI + browser JS bundling for `public/assets/`.
- `API.md` — public API contract (includes the gate auth endpoints; cookie session, no bearer flow — programmatic clients target self-host); `README.md` — user/operator narrative.
## Prerequisites
- Bun 1.4.2 is the locally installed runtime (`bun --version`). Note the toolchain floats: Dockerfile builds on `oven/bun:1-alpine` and CI uses `oven-sh/setup-bun@v1` with no version input, so CI may run a newer Bun than local.
- `bun install` before anything else (Dockerfile uses `--frozen-lockfile`). Never read `.env` values; the variable *names* are listed in `.env.test`, and README links the portals that issue the real values.
## Commands (run from repo root)
| Command | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `bun run dev` | asset watcher + `bun run --watch src/index.ts` (port `PORT` or 3000) | defined, not run here |
| `bun run build` | production CSS + browser JS into `public/assets/` | defined, not run here |
| `bun run build:prod` | `--compile` single binary at `dist/idonthavespotify` | defined, not run here |
| `bun run build:workers` | edge bundle at `dist/workers.js` (fetch backend, console logger) | defined, not run here |
| `bun run typecheck` | `tsc --noEmit` (self-host) + workers tsconfig | verified passing |
| `bun run lint` | eslint over `src` and `tests` | verified passing |
| `bun run test` | `NODE_ENV=test bun test` (offline via `HttpMock` + local snapshots) | verified passing |
| `bun run test:ci` | regenerates snapshots from live URLs, then tests | defined, not run here (needs network; snapshots are gitignored but present in a set-up tree) |
CI: PRs run `tests.yml` (loads `.env.test` into env, then `test:ci`, plus asset/binary/edge build, native-import audit, and binary smoke); pushes to `main` run `deploy.yml` (typecheck, lint, edge build + audit, `wrangler deploy`).
## Conventions and easy-to-miss constraints
- Import alias `~/*` maps to `./src/*` (see `tsconfig.json`); keep it in new imports.
- JSX is nano-jsx classic runtime (`jsxFactory Nano.h`); client controllers stay plain `.js`.
- htmx is pinned via a CDN script tag in `src/views/layouts/main.tsx`; Stimulus is bundled into `public/assets/index.js` by `build.config.ts`.
- `public/assets/*.js|css` are build artifacts and gitignored; never edit them, rebuild instead.
- `tests/mocks/**/*.html|json` are gitignored snapshots: if tests fail with missing-mock errors on a fresh clone, run `bun run test:mocks:fetch` (live network) before `bun run test`.
- Always run tests through `bun run test`, not bare `bun test`.
- The sample track (`SAMPLE_LINK` in `src/views/pages/home.tsx`) is always a Spotify URL, and the README screenshot (`docs/screenshot.png`) is always that sample track's result card. Change both together when the sample changes.
- Outbound HTTP must go through `HttpClient` so tests can stub it; no direct `fetch`/`impit` calls in adapters or parsers.
- Upstream error bodies must reach the logs: `HttpClientError` carries a 500-char `body` snippet, and adapters log it. Never swallow a non-2xx without its body.
- Tidal has no outbound adapter: its search API needs a portal-granted entitlement that was refused (`invalid_scope` on the token, `INVALID_RESOURCE_ID` on every query), and its search pages sit behind a bot wall. Tidal links resolve through the MusicBrainz fallback instead (`src/services/musicbrainz.ts`, polite UA plus ~1s pacing per its rate rules); do not re-add a Tidal adapter without portal access. For songs the fallback looks up `/ws/2/isrc/<isrc>?inc=url-rels` first, with the ISRC taken from the verified Deezer hit (`isrc` on `SearchResultLink` is internal and never reaches responses): title searches return an arbitrary slice of equal-score recordings (71 matches, 28 tied, for the sample track on 2026-10-01). The title search remains the backup, and its relation lookups stop after `MB_BUDGET_MS` (3 s).
- Env access is centralized in `src/config/env.ts` (lazy proxy over edge bindings, `Bun.env`, `process.env`); read new vars there, not inline. Never read `ENV` at module scope in `src`: the first read freezes the lazy cache, which breaks per-file test env assignments the same way `tests/utils/shared.ts` does. Read it per request instead. Abuse vars: `PLUNK_API_KEY` (non-blank marks the public instance, which disables `/api/search`; it no longer sends mail), `SESSION_SECRET`, `PLUNK_TEMPLATE_ID` (both dormant, kept for the future API-key feature), `PLUNK_API_URL` (optional, defaults to `https://next-api.useplunk.com`). `IDHS_API_KEY_BETA` stays dormant (read, never used); do not build auth logic on it.
- `tests/utils/shared.ts` reads `ENV` at module-eval time, which freezes the lazy env cache for the whole test file. Any test file that sets `process.env` per-file (e.g. the gate suite) must not import it; inline the endpoint builder instead. Use `||=`, not `??=`, for per-file keys: `.env.test` declares some vars blank, and blank is not nullish.
- Production image (`Dockerfile`) ships the compiled binary plus a `public/` copy; static assets resolve from disk at runtime, not from inside the binary.
- `public/llms.txt` is a public contract read by external agents: any change to routes, auth, URLs, adapters, or response shapes must update it in the same commit as `API.md`/`README.md`. It rots silently because nothing executes it.
- Markdown voice rule: `.md` files guide a stranger, so they use full explanatory prose. Terse style stays in code, comments, commit messages, and PR text. Never write terse checklist-style markdown.
## Workers operations (public instance only)
- Deploy is CI-owned (`deploy.yml` on push to `main`); manual equivalent is `bun run build:workers` then `bunx wrangler deploy` from a logged-in account. `wrangler.toml` pins `nodejs_compat`, a compatibility date, Workers Assets for `public/`, and the dormant `QUOTA_DO` Durable Object binding plus its `v1` migration.
- Worker secrets (names only, values never in repo; set with `bunx wrangler secret put`): `PLUNK_API_KEY` (its presence marks the public instance and disables `/api/search`; it no longer sends mail). `SESSION_SECRET` and `PLUNK_TEMPLATE_ID` are dormant, kept for the future API-key feature. Kill-switch is blanking or deleting the `PLUNK_API_KEY` secret: open API access without redeploy (self-host posture).
- Every non-optional `readEnv` key in `src/config/env.ts` (base URLs, API keys, app IDs) must also exist as a worker secret or var; a missing base URL makes that adapter request `undefined/...` on the edge. `APP_URL` must be the custom domain (`https://idonthavespotify.sjdonado.com`), never the `workers.dev` host, because share links are built from it. `bunx wrangler secret list` lists secret names only; vars belong in `wrangler.toml` under `[vars]` (none today), so check both.
- GitHub deploy secrets: `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`, `CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID`.
- Edge deltas vs self-host: platform `fetch` instead of TLS impersonation (guarded sources may answer differently; Spotify metadata resolves via `__NEXT_DATA__` embed pages on both runtimes; Apple Music resolves via the same-host catalog chain with no audio preview), per-isolate in-memory cache (service-guard budgets stay the shared quota protection), no URL shortener (share links are always plain app URLs), no per-IP limiting in the app, and platform CPU and memory limits.
- Edge abuse protection is Bot Fight Mode plus one WAF Managed Challenge rule (the Free plan allows five custom rules; this deployment uses one), because only the edge can judge all isolates together. Create it under Security > WAF > custom rules:
- Rule name: `idhs-search-challenge`
- Expression: `(http.host eq "idonthavespotify.sjdonado.com" and http.request.uri.path in {"/search" "/api/search" "/verify"})` (host-scoped so other hostnames in the zone stay untouched)
- Action: Managed Challenge (suspicious traffic faces an automatic challenge, interactive or not by signal; humans pass through)
- `/` is deliberately not challenged, even though `?id=` share loads run full searches. Observed on iOS Safari (2026-09-30): after a challenged load of `/`, a reload following a search prompts to resubmit a form, and the resubmission reached the worker as `GET /` without `?id=` (seen in `wrangler tail`), so the page came back empty. A local reproduction with a POST-loaded page re-POSTed on reload after both `history.replaceState` and `pushState`, so switching the htmx URL header does not help.
- `/verify` exists for flagged visitors: a challenge page cannot be solved inside an htmx request, so on a `cf-mitigated: challenge` response to `/search` the page navigates to `/verify?next=<current path>`. The WAF rule challenges that GET, and the route redirects back to the same-origin `next`, which keeps the history entry a plain GET. Before leaving, the page stores the typed link in `sessionStorage` (`idhs:resume-link`); on return to that same path within two minutes it refills the input and resubmits once. If that resumed search is challenged again, the page shows a toast instead of a second `/verify` trip; later searches on the page go through `/verify` normally.
- Share links load in two phases (`src/app.ts`, GET `/`). The page goes out after only the source metadata (non-Spotify sources also run the Spotify adapter to fill a missing cover or audio preview; the MusicBrainz fallback stays off there, because its title search could put a wrong recording's cover and preview in the meta tags), so link-preview crawlers get title, image, and `og:audio` without waiting for every service; an in-card loader then fetches `/?id=<id>&rows=1`, which runs the full search and returns only the rows. Both requests stay on `/`, outside the WAF rule. On the edge the second request may land on another isolate and refetch the source metadata (per-isolate cache); that cost is accepted.
- Floods die at the edge before consuming worker quota or subrequests; per-service circuit breakers stay the final fuse for upstream quotas. Keep Bot Fight Mode on (free) for known-bot junk, and tighten or add Under Attack Mode only as incident response.
## Abuse-gate decisions (do not re-derive without new evidence)
- The email wall is retired: web search and shared links are open, `/api/search` is disabled on the public instance (403 `auth: "api-key"`), auth endpoints answer 410. The `src/abuse/*` modules (OTP, session, email policy, quota, Plunk client, quota DO) stay untouched for the future header-key API feature; the `QUOTA_DO` binding stays dormant because removing a migration is riskier than an idle binding. Flip condition: abuse persisting past the edge challenge means a Turnstile widget on the search form, not reviving the email wall.
- Dormant module design (applies when the API-key feature revives them): stateless OTP and session tokens (HMAC with `SESSION_SECRET`, 5-min windows with ±1 tolerance, 30-day cookie TTL, no bearer scheme). No stored codes, no KV writes; any isolate verifies. Single-use spent-cache only if abuse appears (YAGNI until then).
- Provider allowlist is a checked-in const in `src/abuse/email.ts` (one-line change to adjust); plus-aliases rejected before any send; Plunk `/v1/verify` backstops disposables/MX/typos and fails open when unreachable (OTP still costs one inbox).
- Emails are abuse-prevention data only: never marketing, codes sent with non-persistent Plunk template data. Say this in user-facing docs wherever email handling is mentioned.
- Spotify TOTP uses WebCrypto (`crypto.subtle` HMAC-SHA1), never `node:crypto`/`Buffer` in `generateTotp` (async). The decimal-concatenated secret quirk is preserved byte-identically and pinned by `tests/spotify-totp.test.ts` against a `node:crypto` reference.
More agent context in sjdonado/idonthavespotify
One other file this repository gives its agents.
llms.txt
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