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search-atlas-groupsearch-atlas-group/amm-founding-circle/skills/founding-circle-ai-security/SKILL.md

founding-circle-ai-security

Skill0 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Operate a measurable security baseline for AI agents.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

8 rules. About 0 are common, 8 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈8

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    No package install or API key is required.

    line 38
  2. Distinctive:

    Verify boundaries: Check deny-by-default permissions, isolated execution, scoped secrets, egress controls, connector write approval, and …

    line 45
  3. Distinctive:

    Instrument: Verify logs for model calls, tool calls, approvals, denials, secret leases, routing, memory writes, and policy changes.

    line 46
  4. Distinctive:

    Test: Run prompt-injection, malicious-update, secret-exfiltration, connector-abuse, memory-poisoning, and sandbox-boundary tests in a …

    line 47
  5. Distinctive:

    Report: Update the register and open the dashboard.

    line 48
  6. Distinctive:

    Respond: If compromise is suspected, disable the skill, revoke credentials, preserve logs, identify affected data, and document recovery.

    line 49
  7. Distinctive:

    Default-deny network egress with logging.

    line 55
  8. Distinctive:

    Read-only data can still contain secrets or prompt injection.

    line 87

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Founding Circle AI Security

A self-contained, cross-platform operating skill for reviewing AI-agent skills, tools, connectors, models, credentials, browser sessions, and persistent memory. It works as written in Hermes, Claude Code, Gemini, Cursor, Codex, and Board.

This package creates governance and visibility. It does not itself sandbox a process, broker secrets, enforce network policy, or approve external actions.

Use when

  • onboarding or updating an agent, skill, connector, model, or browser workflow
  • preparing a security readiness review
  • responding to prompt injection, credential exposure, or tool abuse
  • establishing a shared baseline across a team

Quick start

From this skill directory:

1. Copy templates/security-register.json to your working location.
2. Edit owners, statuses, dates, and evidence links.
3. Run scripts/validate_register.py against the register.
4. Open dashboard/agent-security-dashboard.html and import the register.

No package install or API key is required. The dashboard is a standalone HTML file. Keep secrets and sensitive payloads out of the register.

Procedure

  1. Inventory. Record every executable skill, tool, connector, model/provider, secret class, browser profile, memory store, and execution environment. Completion: no unknown production item remains.
  2. Classify. Assign an owner, data classification, risk tier, capability set, source URI, version, and artifact hash. Completion: every item has all fields populated.
  3. Gate skills. Review provenance, dependencies, shell/filesystem/network/browser/connector behavior, and external instructions. Completion: critical findings block approval; accepted exceptions have an owner and expiry.
  4. Verify boundaries. Check deny-by-default permissions, isolated execution, scoped secrets, egress controls, connector write approval, and protected memory/configuration. Completion: evidence is attached for each control; policy text alone does not count.
  5. Instrument. Verify logs for model calls, tool calls, approvals, denials, secret leases, routing, memory writes, and policy changes. Completion: one complete action timeline can be replayed.
  6. Test. Run prompt-injection, malicious-update, secret-exfiltration, connector-abuse, memory-poisoning, and sandbox-boundary tests in a disposable environment. Completion: each test has pass/fail, evidence, and a remediation owner.
  7. Report. Update the register and open the dashboard. Completion: status, due dates, evidence links, and next actions are visible.
  8. Respond. If compromise is suspected, disable the skill, revoke credentials, preserve logs, identify affected data, and document recovery. Completion: containment and revocation timestamps are recorded.

Minimum baseline

  • 100% of executable skills registered, owned, versioned, and hash-pinned.
  • Zero ambient host credentials.
  • Default-deny network egress with logging.
  • Isolated terminal and browser workers.
  • Human approval for destructive or external writes.
  • Append-only, attributed memory changes.
  • Tamper-evident audit logs.
  • Global kill switch tested quarterly.

Included files

  • templates/security-register.json — starter control register.
  • templates/skill-manifest.yaml — least-privilege manifest.
  • templates/incident-record.json — incident record.
  • scripts/validate_register.py — standard-library validator.
  • dashboard/agent-security-dashboard.html — local register dashboard.
  • README.md — installation and operating notes.

Verification

Run:

python3 scripts/validate_register.py templates/security-register.json

A valid register reports the control count. A control marked complete must have evidence. Confirm the dashboard imports the same JSON before sharing it.

Pitfalls

  • A Git repository is not proof of trust.
  • A hash proves identity, not benign behavior.
  • A prompt is not an access-control boundary.
  • A container with host sockets or broad mounts is not an adequate sandbox.
  • Read-only data can still contain secrets or prompt injection.
  • Logging without alerting and response ownership is weak assurance.

Download now (ZIP)

Does it work?

Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.

No reviews yet

People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.

  • It worked
  • Partly
  • It didn't
What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.

Your trail

Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.

Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.

Now do this for your own.

Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.