cryptographic-failures
Skill23 starsChanged 7 months agoMITView on GitHub
Detect, audit, and remediate A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures in Python web applications (FastAPI and Flask). Use this skill whenever the user asks about crypto security, password hashing, JWT configuration, TLS/SSL verification, weak randomness, hardcoded secrets, or any code using hashlib, random, ssl, jwt, passlib, or cryptography modules. Also trigger when the user wants to audit security, scan for OWASP A04 issues, fix crypto bugs, or review authentication-related cryptographic code. If there's any chance a crypto weakness is involved — trigger this skill.
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2 other projects use a version of this.
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Most recently taken up by
- thejefflarson/soundchecktheir own version, first seen Jul 31, 2026
- swapniltamse/claude-security-engineertheir own version, first seen May 25, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
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Wrote their own version · 2
- thejefflarson/soundcheck★ 20same name
- swapniltamse/claude-security-engineer★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository9 other files it gives its agents.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
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0
Very specific
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- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 40
Run Bandit — the primary Python SAST tool for catching crypto issues automatically:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
A04:2025 — Cryptographic Failures
OWASP Rank: #4 (dropped from #2 due to improved TLS adoption) Incidence: 3.80% of applications, 1.6M+ occurrences, 32 CWEs
Cryptographic Failures cover the absence, misuse, or weakness of cryptography protecting data at rest and in transit. In Python, there is a distinctive set of pitfalls that differ from Java/.NET.
What This Skill Covers
| Area | Key Risk | Python-Specific Pitfall |
| Password hashing | Weak/missing algorithm | Using hashlib.md5/sha1 instead of bcrypt/Argon2 |
| Randomness | Predictable values | import random instead of import secrets |
| Hardcoded keys | Key leakage | SECRET_KEY = "..." literals in source |
| TLS/SSL | Cert bypass | verify=False in requests/httpx |
| JWT secrets | Key strength/algorithm | Weak secret, missing algo pinning |
| Symmetric encryption | Deprecated modes | ECB mode, no authenticated encryption |
Step-by-Step Audit Workflow
1. Static Scan with Bandit
Run Bandit — the primary Python SAST tool for catching crypto issues automatically:
pip install bandit
bandit -r . -t B303,B304,B305,B306,B311,B324,B501,B502,B503,B504,B505,B506 -f json -o bandit_crypto.jsonKey Bandit test IDs for cryptographic failures:
| Bandit ID | What It Catches | Severity |
| B303 | MD5/SHA1 usage | Medium |
| B304/B305 | Weak cipher modes (ECB, DES) | High |
| B311 | random module in security context | Low |
| B324 | Hashlib use of weak hash | Medium |
| B501 | verify=False in SSL context | High |
| B502/B503/B504 | Insecure SSL/TLS versions | Medium–High |
| B105/B106 | Hardcoded password/secret | Medium |
2. Manual Code Pattern Review
Work through these patterns in priority order:
🔴 CRITICAL — Password Hashing
# BAD — MD5/SHA1 for passwords: CWE-328, CWE-759, CWE-916
hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
hashlib.sha1(password.encode()).hexdigest()
hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() # also bad — no salt, no stretching
# GOOD — use passlib with bcrypt or argon2
from passlib.context import CryptContext
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["argon2"], deprecated="auto")
# OR
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], bcrypt__rounds=12, deprecated="auto")
hashed = pwd_context.hash(plain_password)Check for:
- Any
hashlib.*call used to hash a password or token - Missing salt (hash of raw password without
hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac) - bcrypt with
rounds < 12— should be ≥12 to resist brute force
🔴 CRITICAL — Weak Randomness (CWE-330)
# BAD — random is NOT cryptographically secure
import random
token = random.randint(100000, 999999) # predictable OTP
reset_key = random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) # guessable
# GOOD
import secrets
token = secrets.randbelow(900000) + 100000 # secure OTP
reset_key = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) # secure reset token
session_id = secrets.token_hex(16) # secure session IDCheck for: Any random.random(), random.randint(), random.choice(), random.shuffle()
in code paths involving tokens, OTPs, session IDs, keys, or nonces.
🔴 HIGH — Hardcoded Cryptographic Keys (CWE-321)
# BAD — key in source code
SECRET_KEY = "my-super-secret-key"
JWT_SECRET = "hardcoded_jwt_secret_123"
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = "flask_secret"
# GOOD — load from environment
import os
SECRET_KEY = os.environ["SECRET_KEY"] # raises KeyError if missing (intentional)
SECRET_KEY = os.getenv("SECRET_KEY") # returns None silently (verify it's not None)Minimum key lengths:
- Flask
SECRET_KEY: ≥32 random bytes (usesecrets.token_hex(32)) - JWT HMAC secrets: ≥32 characters
- AES keys: 128, 192, or 256 bits (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
🔴 HIGH — TLS/SSL Certificate Bypass (CWE-295)
# BAD — disables certificate validation entirely
requests.get(url, verify=False)
httpx.get(url, verify=False)
ssl._create_unverified_context()
urllib3.disable_warnings() # companion to verify=False
# GOOD
requests.get(url) # verify=True is the default
requests.get(url, verify="/path/to/ca-bundle.crt") # custom CA🟡 MEDIUM — JWT Configuration (CWE-327)
# BAD — algorithm confusion attacks
jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=["none"]) # NEVER allow "none"
jwt.decode(token, key) # no algorithm pin = vulnerable
# BAD — weak secret loaded without validation
JWT_SECRET = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "default") # fallback default is dangerous
# GOOD
JWT_SECRET = os.environ["JWT_SECRET"] # fail hard if missing
assert len(JWT_SECRET) >= 32, "JWT secret too short"
jwt.decode(token, JWT_SECRET, algorithms=["HS256"]) # explicit allowlistAlso check:
- Token expiry (
expclaim) — access tokens should be 15–30 min audandissclaims are validated on decode
🟡 MEDIUM — Deprecated Symmetric Encryption (CWE-327)
# BAD — ECB mode leaks patterns in data
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
# BAD — no authentication = vulnerable to tampering
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
# GOOD — authenticated encryption
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
aesgcm = AESGCM(key)
ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext, associated_data)
# ChaCha20-Poly1305 is also acceptableFastAPI-Specific Checks
# 1. Verify OAuth2/JWT middleware algorithm pinning
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer
from jose import JWTError, jwt
ALGORITHM = "HS256" # must be explicit, not a variable that could be overridden
# Check: is ALGORITHM loaded from config where it could be tampered with?
# 2. Verify password hashing in user creation/login endpoints
@router.post("/register")
async def register(user: UserCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
hashed = pwd_context.hash(user.password) # must NOT store plain or MD5
# 3. Token generation for password resets / email verification
def generate_reset_token() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32) # GOOD
# NOT: str(uuid.uuid4()) — UUID v4 uses os.urandom, acceptable but secrets is preferred
# NOT: random-based anythingFlask-Specific Checks
# 1. Session cookie signing uses SECRET_KEY — must be strong
app.secret_key = os.environ["SECRET_KEY"] # GOOD
app.secret_key = "dev" # BAD — common in tutorials, dangerous in prod
# 2. Flask-Login password verification
from flask_bcrypt import Bcrypt
bcrypt = Bcrypt(app)
bcrypt.generate_password_hash(password, rounds=12) # rounds≥12
# 3. HTTPS enforcement via HSTS
from flask_talisman import Talisman
Talisman(app, force_https=True) # adds HSTS headerKey CWEs Reference
| CWE | Name | Common Manifestation |
| CWE-327 | Use of Broken/Risky Crypto Algorithm | MD5, SHA1, ECB, DES, RC4 |
| CWE-328 | Reversible One-Way Hash | MD5/SHA1 for passwords (reversible via rainbow tables) |
| CWE-330 | Insufficiently Random Values | random module for tokens/keys |
| CWE-321 | Hard-coded Cryptographic Key | Secrets in source code |
| CWE-759 | One-Way Hash Without a Salt | hashlib.sha256(password) — no salt |
| CWE-916 | Password Hash With Insufficient Effort | bcrypt rounds<12, PBKDF2 iterations<600k |
| CWE-295 | Improper Certificate Validation | verify=False in HTTP clients |
Remediation Checklists
Minimum Viable Crypto Stack (Python 2025)
Password hashing: passlib[argon2] or passlib[bcrypt] (rounds≥12)
Token generation: secrets module exclusively
Symmetric crypto: cryptography library, AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305
JWT: python-jose or PyJWT, algorithm pinned, secret≥32 chars
TLS: verify=True always; pin CA bundle where needed
Config/secrets: os.environ (fail-hard) or a secrets manager (Vault, AWS SSM)
HSTS: flask-talisman (Flask) or custom middleware (FastAPI)Quick Regex Patterns for Code Search
# Find weak hashing
grep -rn "hashlib\.md5\|hashlib\.sha1\|hashlib\.sha224" --include="*.py"
# Find insecure random
grep -rn "import random\b" --include="*.py"
grep -rn "random\.randint\|random\.choice\|random\.random()" --include="*.py"
# Find hardcoded secrets
grep -rn "SECRET_KEY\s*=\s*['\"]" --include="*.py"
grep -rn "verify=False" --include="*.py"
# Find ECB mode
grep -rn "MODE_ECB\|AES\.MODE_ECB" --include="*.py"See Also
references/owasp-a04-full.md— full OWASP A04:2025 spec and extended CWE list- For supply chain crypto issues (pinned dependency hashes), see the
software-supply-chainskill - For JWT-related auth logic beyond crypto (expiry, claims), see the
authentication-failuresskill
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