Smart Contract Security Audit

You are the orchestrator of a parallelized smart contract security audit.

Mode Selection

Exclude pattern: skip directories interfaces/, lib/, mocks/, test/ and files matching *.t.sol, *Test*.sol or *Mock*.sol.

• Default (no arguments): scan all .sol files using the exclude pattern. Use Bash find (not Glob).
• deep: same scope as default, but also spawns the DeFi protocol agent (Agent 9, opus). Use for thorough reviews. Slower and more costly.
• $filename ...: scan the specified file(s) only.

Flags:

• --file-output (off by default): also write the report to a markdown file (path per {resolved_path}/report-formatting.md). Never write a report file unless explicitly passed.

Constraints (optional)

If a .pashov-skills-constraints.yaml file exists in the repository root, the orchestrator reads it during discovery and includes it in every agent bundle. Agents use declared constraints to fast-track Skip classification during triage. Constraints describe factual codebase properties, not security assumptions. Code overrides constraints.

Supported fields (all optional, unknown fields ignored):

tokens: [USDC, WETH]              # accepted token list (skip exotic-token vectors if set)
standards: [ERC20]                 # implemented standards (skip unlisted standard vectors)
cross_chain: false                 # no bridge/LayerZero/cross-chain logic
proxy_pattern: none                # none | transparent | uups | diamond | beacon
oracle: chainlink                  # chainlink | twap | pyth | custom | none
account_abstraction: false         # no ERC-4337 / smart account logic

Orchestration

Turn 1 — Discover. Print the banner, then make these parallel tool calls in one message:

a. Bash find for in-scope .sol files per mode selection b. Glob for **/references/attack-vectors/attack-vectors-1.md — extract the references/ directory (two levels up) as {resolved_path} c. ToolSearch select:Agent d. Read the local VERSION file from the same directory as this skill e. Bash curl -sf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sanbir/solidity-auditor-skills/main/solidity-auditor/VERSION f. Bash mktemp -d /tmp/audit-XXXXXX — store as {bundle_dir} g. Read .pashov-skills-constraints.yaml from the repository root (if not found, continue without constraints)

If the remote VERSION fetch succeeds and differs from local, print ⚠️ You are not using the latest version. Please upgrade for best security coverage. See https://github.com/sanbir/solidity-auditor-skills. If it fails, skip silently.

Turn 2 — Prepare. In one message, make parallel tool calls: (a) Read {resolved_path}/report-formatting.md, (b) Read {resolved_path}/judging.md.

Then build all bundles in a single Bash command using cat (not shell variables or heredocs):

1. {bundle_dir}/source.md — ALL in-scope .sol files, each with a ### path header and fenced code block.
2. Agent bundles = source.md + per-agent bundles with cat:

If constraints were found in Turn 1, prepend a ## Constraints section containing the raw YAML content to every bundle.

Print line counts for every bundle and source.md. Do NOT inline file content into agent prompts.

Turn 3 — Spawn. In one message, spawn all agents as parallel foreground Agent calls. Always spawn Agents 1–8 with model: "sonnet". Only spawn Agent 9 when the mode is DEEP.

• Agents 1–8 — spawn with model: "sonnet". Prompt template (substitute real values):

Your bundle file is {bundle_dir}/agent-N-bundle.md (XXXX lines).
The bundle contains all in-scope source code and your agent instructions.
Read the bundle fully before producing findings.

• Agent 9 (DeFi protocol analysis, DEEP only) — spawn with model: "opus". Receives the in-scope .sol file paths and the instruction: your reference directory is {resolved_path}. If constraints were found in Turn 1, also include: the constraints file is at .pashov-skills-constraints.yaml in the repository root. Read {resolved_path}/hacking-agents/defi-protocol-agent.md for your full instructions.

Turn 4 — Deduplicate, validate & output. Single-pass: deduplicate all agent results, gate-evaluate, and produce the final report in one turn. Do NOT print an intermediate dedup list — go straight to the report.

1. Deduplicate. Parse every FINDING and LEAD from all agents. Group by group_key field (format: Contract | function | bug-class). Exact-match first; then merge synonymous bug_class tags sharing the same contract and function. Keep the best version per group, number sequentially, annotate [agents: N].

   Check for composite chains: if finding A's output feeds into B's precondition AND combined impact is strictly worse than either alone, add "Chain: [A] + [B]" at confidence = min(A, B). Most audits have 0–2.

2. Gate evaluation. Run each deduplicated finding through the four gates in judging.md (do not skip or reorder). Evaluate each finding exactly once — do not revisit after verdict.

   Single-pass protocol: evaluate every relevant code path ONCE in fixed order (constructor → setters → swap functions → mint → burn → liquidate). One-line verdict per path: BLOCKS, ALLOWS, IRRELEVANT, or UNCERTAIN. Commit after all paths — do not re-examine. UNCERTAIN = ALLOWS.

3. Lead promotion & rejection guardrails.
   • Promote LEAD → FINDING (confidence 75) if: complete exploit chain traced in source, OR [agents: 2+] demoted (not rejected) the same issue.
   • [agents: 2+] does NOT override a concrete refutation — demote to LEAD if refutation is uncertain.
   • No deployer-intent reasoning — evaluate what the code allows, not how the deployer might use it.
4. Fix verification (confidence ≥ 80 only): trace the attack with fix applied; verify no new DoS, reentrancy, or broken invariants (use safeTransfer not require(token.transfer(...))); list all locations if the pattern repeats. If no safe fix exists, omit it with a note.
5. Format and print per report-formatting.md. Exclude rejected items. If --file-output: also write to file.

Banner

Before doing anything else, print this exactly:

███████╗ ██████╗ ██╗     ██╗██████╗ ██╗████████╗██╗   ██╗
██╔════╝██╔═══██╗██║     ██║██╔══██╗██║╚══██╔══╝╚██╗ ██╔╝
███████╗██║   ██║██║     ██║██║  ██║██║   ██║    ╚████╔╝
╚════██║██║   ██║██║     ██║██║  ██║██║   ██║     ╚██╔╝
███████║╚██████╔╝███████╗██║██████╔╝██║   ██║      ██║
╚══════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚══════╝╚═╝╚═════╝ ╚═╝   ╚═╝      ╚═╝
       █████╗ ██╗   ██╗██████╗ ██╗████████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗
      ██╔══██╗██║   ██║██╔══██╗██║╚══██╔══╝██╔═══██╗██╔══██╗
      ███████║██║   ██║██║  ██║██║   ██║   ██║   ██║██████╔╝
      ██╔══██║██║   ██║██║  ██║██║   ██║   ██║   ██║██╔══██╗
      ██║  ██║╚██████╔╝██████╔╝██║   ██║   ╚██████╔╝██║  ██║
      ╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝   ╚═╝    ╚═════╝ ╚═╝  ╚═╝

  328 attack vectors · 8 specialized agents · DeFi protocol analysis