golang-security
Skill0 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).
- Installs packages
15 other projects use a version of this, 9 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- aiproxer/aiproxertheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- TeddyAlbina/skillsedited, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- samber/cc-skills-golangword for word, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- poizoncoded/skillsedited, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- klawisha012/agentsyncedited, first seen Oct 25, 2026
- alexderz/agentic-toolboxtheir own version, first seen Oct 17, 2026
Other versions15 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- samber/cc-skills-golang★ 3.9k100% same
- unxed/f4★ 261100% same
Edited · 9
- alexastrum/skl★ 1194% same
- klawisha012/agentsync★ 1094% same
- tstapler/dotfiles★ 8100% same
- poizoncoded/skills★ 292% same
- TeddyAlbina/skills★ 294% same
- rockcookies/skills★ 196% same
- VerifiedOrganic/onboard★ 195% same
- guynhsichngeodiec/cc-skills-golang★ 092% same
- jniltinho/llama-model★ 094% same
Wrote their own version · 4
- aiproxer/aiproxer★ 24same name
- alexderz/agentic-toolbox★ 5same name
- jkeddari/go-skills★ 1same name
- reagin/agent-skills★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository45 other files it gives its agents.
- golang-benchmarkSkill
- golang-cliSkill
- golang-code-styleSkill
- golang-concurrencySkill
- golang-contextSkill
- golang-continuous-integrationSkill
- golang-databaseSkill
- golang-data-structuresSkill
- golang-dependency-injectionSkill
- golang-dependency-managementSkill
- golang-design-patternsSkill
- golang-documentationSkill
- golang-error-handlingSkill
- golang-google-wireSkill
- golang-goplsSkill
- golang-graphqlSkill
- golang-grpcSkill
- golang-how-toSkill
- golang-lintSkill
- golang-modernizeSkill
- golang-namingSkill
- golang-observabilitySkill
- golang-performanceSkill
- golang-pkg-go-devSkill
- golang-popular-librariesSkill
- golang-project-layoutSkill
- golang-refactoringSkill
- golang-safetySkill
- golang-samber-doSkill
- golang-samber-hotSkill
- golang-samber-loSkill
- golang-samber-moSkill
- golang-samber-oopsSkill
- golang-samber-roSkill
- golang-samber-slogSkill
- golang-spf13-cobraSkill
- golang-spf13-viperSkill
- golang-stay-updatedSkill
- golang-stretchr-testifySkill
- golang-structs-interfacesSkill
- golang-swaggerSkill
- golang-testingSkill
- golang-troubleshootingSkill
- golang-uber-digSkill
- golang-uber-fxSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 2 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
2
Common
Most of the 13 edited versions we read keep these.
0
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Common: line 50
Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:
- Common: line 69
Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.
- Very specific: line 78
When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by …
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 13 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.
Thinking mode: Reason as thoroughly as possible for security audits and vulnerability analysis — security bugs hide in subtle interactions and deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses. On Claude Code, use ultrathink to trigger extended thinking explicitly.
Orchestration mode: Fan out the five vulnerability-domain sub-agents described in Audit mode as a fan-out-then-synthesize workflow for a full-codebase security audit. Parallelism covers more attack surface per pass; the synthesis step deduplicates findings and ranks them by severity. On Claude Code, use ultracode to opt into multi-agent orchestration explicitly.
Modes:
- Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
- Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents, each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity. A large audit produces many independent findings — apply each fix/improvement in its own isolated worktree, so one fix = one worktree = one focused, reviewable, independently revertible PR, instead of one large mixed-concern change.
- Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.
Dependencies:
- govulncheck:
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
Go Security
Overview
Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.
Security Thinking Model
Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:
- What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
- What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
- What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)
Severity Levels
| Level | DREAD | Meaning |
| Critical | 8-10 | RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately |
| High | 6-7.9 | Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint |
| Medium | 4-5.9 | Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint |
| Low | 1-3.9 | Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically |
Levels align with DREAD scoring.
Research Before Reporting
Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.
- Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
- Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
- Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
- Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.
Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.
When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.
Threat Modeling (STRIDE)
Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.
For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.
Quick Reference
| Severity | Vulnerability | Defense | Standard Library Solution |
| Critical | SQL Injection | Parameterized queries separate data from code | database/sql with ? placeholders |
| Critical | Command Injection | Pass args separately, never via shell concatenation | exec.Command with separate args |
| High | XSS | Auto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JS | html/template, text/template |
| High | Path Traversal | Scope untrusted file access to an allowed root | Go 1.24+: use os.Root. Pre-Go 1.24: use filepath.IsLocal + filepath.Rel + separator-aware checks; never rely on filepath.Clean + strings.HasPrefix alone. |
| Medium | Timing Attacks | Constant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leaks | crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare |
| High | Crypto Issues | Use vetted algorithms; never roll your own | crypto/aes, crypto/rand |
| Medium | HTTP Security | TLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacks | net/http, configure TLSConfig |
| Low | Missing Headers | HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacks | Security headers middleware |
| Medium | Rate Limiting | Rate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustion | golang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts |
| High | Race Conditions | Protect shared state to prevent data corruption | sync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state |
Detailed Categories
For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:
- Cryptography — Algorithms, key derivation, TLS configuration.
- Injection Vulnerabilities — SQL, command, template injection, XSS, SSRF.
- Filesystem Security — Path traversal, zip bombs, file permissions, symlinks.
- Network/Web Security — SSRF, open redirects, HTTP headers, timing attacks, session fixation.
- Cookie Security — Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite flags.
- Third-Party Data Leaks — Analytics privacy risks, GDPR/CCPA compliance.
- Memory Safety — Integer overflow, memory aliasing,
unsafeusage. - Secrets Management — Hardcoded credentials, env vars, secret managers.
- Logging Security — PII in logs, log injection, sanitization.
- Threat Modeling Guide — STRIDE, DREAD scoring, trust boundaries, OWASP Top 10.
- Security Architecture — Defense-in-depth, Zero Trust, auth patterns, rate limiting, anti-patterns.
Code Review Checklist
For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.
Tooling & Verification
Static Analysis & Linting
Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-lint skill for configuration and usage.
For deeper security-specific analysis:
# Go security checker (SAST)
go get -tool github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
go tool gosec ./...
# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go get -tool golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
go tool govulncheck ./...To check the known CVEs of a specific module or version without scanning the whole tree (e.g. when vetting a dependency on pkg.go.dev), → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-pkg-go-dev skill.
Security Testing
# Race detector
go test -race ./...
# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=FuzzCommon Mistakes
| Severity | Mistake | Fix |
| High | math/rand for tokens | Output is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand |
| Critical | SQL string concatenation | Attacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate |
| Critical | exec.Command("bash -c") | Shell interprets metacharacters (;, |, `). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing |
| High | Trusting unsanitized input | Validate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything |
| Critical | Hardcoded secrets | Secrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers |
| Medium | Comparing secrets with == | == short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare |
| Medium | Returning detailed errors | Stack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side |
| High | Ignoring -race findings | Races cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races |
| High | MD5/SHA1 for passwords | Both have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard) |
| High | AES without GCM | ECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate |
| Medium | Binding to 0.0.0.0 | Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface |
Security Anti-Patterns
| Severity | Anti-Pattern | Why It Fails | Fix |
| High | Security through obscurity | Hidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or source | Authentication + authorization on all endpoints |
| High | Trusting client headers | X-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forged | Server-side identity verification |
| High | Client-side authorization | JavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP client | Server-side permission checks on every handler |
| High | Shared secrets across envs | Staging breach compromises production | Per-environment secrets via secret manager |
| Critical | Ignoring crypto errors | _, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencrypted | Always check errors — fail closed, never open |
| Critical | Rolling your own crypto | Custom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographers | Use crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 |
See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.
Cross-References
See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.
- → See
samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integrationskill for automated AI-driven code review in CI using these guidelines
Additional Resources
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

