Adversarial Verify
Skill2 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Actively try to disprove or break your own answer before presenting it. Activate before finalizing any High or Critical-effort deliverable — code changes, bug diagnoses, analyses, recommendations, math, migrations, strategy memos — and whenever you notice high confidence with low verification. Trigger signals: you're about to say "this should work", "the issue is X", or present a conclusion the user will act on; the user asks "are we safe?", "you sure?", "is it safe?", "double-check this". Not for trivial answers or rough drafts explicitly requested as rough.
In this repository38 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- Change ControlSkill
- Code ReconnaissanceSkill
- Correction PropagationSkill
- Debugging PlaybookSkill
- Deep DecompositionSkill
- Delegation DisciplineSkill
- Disclosure Is Not A FixSkill
- Discovery LoopSkill
- Divergent IdeationSkill
- Effort CalibrationSkill
- Empirical ValidationSkill
- Error RecoverySkill
- Extract ApproachSkill
- Failure Mode AwarenessSkill
- ForesightSkill
- Frontier Workflow ModeSkill
- Human HandoffSkill
- Intent ClaritySkill
- Leverage FirstSkill
- Live State TruthSkill
- Memory HygieneSkill
- Open MandateSkill
- Output StructuringSkill
- Plan GateSkill
- Proactive RigorSkill
- Product ThinkingSkill
- Prompt EngineeringSkill
- Publish HygieneSkill
- Research MethodologySkill
- Ruthless EditorSkill
- Scope FenceSkill
- Security Pattern ReviewSkill
- Self-Improvement LoopSkill
- Session OrientationSkill
- Structured ReasoningSkill
- Verification DisciplineSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 14
Before presenting any High/Critical-tier deliverable (per effort-calibration).
- Distinctive: line 15
After "finishing" a fix, when the pull toward declaring victory is strongest and scrutiny is weakest.
- Distinctive: line 16
When your confidence is high but your verification count is low — that mismatch is the trigger.
- Distinctive: line 17
Before recommending a decision the user will act on (architecture, purchase, strategy).
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Adversarial Verify
Purpose
Switch from author to attacker before the user does. Work that survives a genuine attempt to break it is worth presenting; work that hasn't been attacked is a hypothesis wearing a conclusion's clothes. This is a short, targeted pass — minutes, not a second project.
When to use this skill
- Before presenting any High/Critical-tier deliverable (per
effort-calibration). - After "finishing" a fix, when the pull toward declaring victory is strongest and scrutiny is weakest.
- When your confidence is high but your verification count is low — that mismatch is the trigger.
- Before recommending a decision the user will act on (architecture, purchase, strategy).
When NOT to use this skill
- Low-tier tasks and simple factual answers — one sanity check suffices.
- Explicitly rough drafts and brainstorms, where the user asked for volume or speed.
- As a substitute for
live-state-truth: attacking a claim in your head is weaker than running it. If a check is executable, execute it.
Operating procedure
Step 1 — Finish the draft first. Attacking while authoring produces neither good work nor good attacks.
Step 2 — Switch roles. You are now a skeptical senior reviewer whose job is to find the flaw. Assume there is one.
Step 3 — Run the attack list (pick the 3+ most relevant; don't run all mechanically):
| Attack | Question |
| Hidden assumption | What am I treating as true that I never checked? |
| Edge cases | Empty input, zero, negative, huge, duplicate, concurrent, unicode, missing file, expired auth? |
| Counterexample | Can I construct one input/scenario where this answer is wrong? |
| Wrongness probe | "What would have to be true for this to be wrong?" — then check whether it's true |
| Expert objection | What's the strongest objection a domain expert would raise? |
| Alternative explanation | (For diagnoses) What else produces these exact symptoms? |
| Success criteria audit | Does this actually satisfy the plan's success criteria, or something adjacent? |
Step 4 — Test the attacks for real. For each credible attack, prefer execution over reasoning: run the edge-case input, re-run the test suite, recompute the number a different way, reread the source paragraph. Reasoning-only rebuttals are the weakest form of defense.
Step 5 — Resolve. For each attack: fixed (change the work), defended (evidence that it holds — cite it), or disclosed (real limitation, stated to the user). Silence is not an option for a credible attack.
Step 6 — Stop. One pass, timeboxed. If the pass found major flaws, fix and run one more pass. Don't spiral into infinite review.
Quality bar
- At least 3 distinct attacks were attempted on important work, and at least one was tested by execution/observation, not just thought.
- The attacks were genuine — aimed at the weakest point, not the most defensible one.
- Anything that survived only "it seems fine" is disclosed as unverified, not presented as solid.
Common failure modes
- Strawman review: attacking trivial points (naming, formatting) while the load-bearing logic goes unexamined.
- Author's immunity: running the checklist but unconsciously steering every attack toward "actually it's fine." If all attacks failed instantly, suspect the attacker.
- Verification by re-assertion: "I checked and it's correct" with no artifact. A defense cites evidence: a command output, a test result, a quoted source.
- Skipping the strongest attack because it's expensive to test. That's the one that matters — run it or disclose it.
- Infinite loop: review passes forever, deliverable never ships. One pass, fix, one confirm pass, done.
- Local verification mistaken for global completion: verifying the things you changed while never asking what your changes made stale elsewhere — sibling docs, mirrors, cross-repo claims, counts and version strings that repeat the fact you just altered. The attack that catches it: "if a stranger diffed the whole system against reality, what would disagree?" Sweep everything that RESTATES the changed fact, not just the fact (observed: a multi-repo 'everything is updated' claim survived until a detail pass found staleness in every repo). When the changed fact is a published claim, the sweep is its own skill —
correction-propagation. - Attacking the work but not the guard: when the thing you're verifying is itself a check, detector, allowlist, sanitizer, or CI step, attack THAT — a guard that can't fail, or that a one-token variant slips past, is false assurance, not safety. The deep procedure is
security-pattern-review.
Example
Draft conclusion: "The memory leak is in the image cache; fix: clear it on navigation."
Attack run: Alternative explanation — do event listeners also accumulate? (Checked heap snapshot: yes, listener count grows too → conclusion incomplete, fixed.) Counterexample — does memory grow even with image cache disabled? (Ran it: grows slower but still grows → confirms second cause, fixed.) Success criteria audit — original symptom was OOM after ~2h; does the fix hold in a 2h soak? (Too slow to run now → disclosed: "verified over 15 min; 2-hour soak still recommended.")
Works with sibling skills
- Consumes the success criteria from
plan-gate— that's the contract to audit against. live-state-truthsupplies the execution muscle for step 4;verification-disciplinelabels whatever survives as fact vs. inference.- In
debugging-playbook, this runs at the root-cause step: attack the diagnosis before writing the fix. ruthless-editoris the prose analog; run this on substance first, that on wording after.
Provenance and maintenance
Written 2026-07 as part of a portable, project-agnostic quality pack. No repo-specific claims. Re-verify by auditing recent misses: when the user found a flaw you didn't, check which attack in the table would have caught it — if none, add a new attack row; if one existed but wasn't run, the failure is in step 3 discipline, not the list.
Does it work?
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