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pashki975pashki975/thm-claude-kit/.claude/skills/windows-ad-methodology/SKILL.md

windows-ad-methodology

Skill2 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub

Standard operating procedure for solving Windows and Active Directory TryHackMe boxes. Use when the target is Windows/domain-joined (SMB/LDAP/Kerberos/WinRM ports open, or the room mentions AD/domain), when asked "what next" on a Windows room, or when a Linux-oriented approach isn't fitting. Guides the recon → AD enum → foothold → Kerberos → privesc → domain flow.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈5

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Add the DC's FQDN to /etc/hosts (Kerberos needs name resolution)

    line 17
  2. Distinctive:

    Consider /enum-udp too — SNMP can leak users/processes on Windows hosts.

    line 22
  3. Distinctive:

    Run BloodHound collection — let the ad-attack-advisor agent read the results

    line 36
  4. Distinctive:

    Check ADCS (certipy) if certificate services are present

    line 42
  5. Distinctive:

    Prefer credentialed remote tools (evil-winrm) over noisy reverse shells when you can

    line 66

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Windows / Active Directory Methodology

For readers who live in Linux: Windows CTF is a different surface. Instead of web/SSH → SUID/sudo, the game is SMB/LDAP/Kerberos → tokens/ACLs/tickets. Follow this flow.

Recognizing a Windows box

Open 135/139/445 (SMB), 3389 (RDP), 5985 (WinRM), and especially 88 (Kerberos) + 389/636 (LDAP) → domain-joined AD. Kerberos (88) present = treat it as full AD.

0. Setup

  • /vpn-check the target
  • Add the DC's FQDN to /etc/hosts (Kerberos needs name resolution)
  • Watch clock skew: sync to the DC if Kerberos tooling errors (sudo rdate -n <DC-IP>)

1. Recon

  • /recon as usual. Note the domain name, DC hostname, OS build.
  • Consider /enum-udp too — SNMP can leak users/processes on Windows hosts.

2. AD / SMB enumeration

  • /enum-ad — null/guest sessions, shares, RPC, LDAP, build a user list
  • Harvest usernames from RID cycling, shares, LDAP. Save to users.txt.

3. Get a foothold credential (try in order)

  • AS-REP roast the user list (/kerberos) — no creds needed
  • Password spray weak/found passwords across users (careful of lockout)
  • Anonymous/guest readable shares — look for creds, configs, scripts
  • Any web app on the box → normal web enum (/enum-web)
  • Any database on the box → /db-enum (MSSQL especially — xp_cmdshell)

4. Situational awareness (once you have ANY valid cred)

  • Run BloodHound collection — let the ad-attack-advisor agent read the results
  • Validate the cred everywhere: nxc smb <IP/range> -u <u> -p <p> (look for Pwn3d!)

5. Escalate within the domain

  • Kerberoast service accounts (/kerberos), crack offline
  • Abuse ACLs / delegation / DCSync per BloodHound (ad-attack-advisor agent)
  • Check ADCS (certipy) if certificate services are present

6. Get a shell

  • /win-shell — evil-winrm, psexec/wmiexec, or RDP depending on the cred
  • Immediately run whoami /priv and whoami /groups

7. Local privesc (if not already SYSTEM/admin)

  • /win-privesc — token privileges first (SeImpersonate → Potato is the classic), then services, stored creds, kernel last
  • Analyze enum with the win-privesc-advisor agent

8. Pivot (if the domain has more hosts to reach)

  • From the compromised host, tunnel to internal targets (/tunnel: ligolo-ng / chisel)
  • Reuse domain creds across the internal range — one cred often unlocks many hosts
  • Record each internal host in notes.md and continue this methodology against it

9. Domain dominance & loot

  • DCSync krbtgt if you reach it — note the domain is fully compromised
  • Record all flags (user.txt, root.txt/admin) and creds in notes.md
  • report-writer agent for the writeup

Rules

  • Stay strictly on the assigned target IP/range
  • Most Windows CTF blockers are: missed enum, /etc/hosts, or clock skew — check those first
  • Prefer credentialed remote tools (evil-winrm) over noisy reverse shells when you can

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