Security Review

Comprehensive security checklist for agent-core. Run through all 10 categories before any security-sensitive change or PR.

See .claude/rules/python/security.md for tool-specific guidance (bandit, pip-audit). See .claude/rules/security.md for credential, sandbox, and shell execution rules.

1. Secrets Management

Rule: Credentials never enter source code.

• No API keys, tokens, or passwords hardcoded in .py files
• All secrets loaded from environment variables via os.getenv()
• .env files not committed (already in .gitignore — do not remove)
• settings.json deny rules block Read(./.env) and Read(./**/secrets/**)
• Test files use mock defaults: os.getenv("KEY", "mock-key-for-tests")

# Bad
API_KEY = "sk-1234567890abcdef"

# Good
import os
API_KEY = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY")  # Must be set in environment

2. Input Validation

Rule: Validate all external input before use.

• User-supplied file paths checked with safe_path utilities
• Paths rejected if they contain .. or resolve outside allowed scope
• Shell commands constructed via parameterized APIs, not string concatenation
• URL parameters and query strings sanitized before use

For sys_operation:

from openjiuwen.core.common.security import safe_path

def execute_command(user_path: str, working_dir: Path) -> None:
    validated = safe_path(user_path, allowed_base=working_dir)
    if validated is None:
        raise SecurityError(f"Path outside allowed scope: {user_path}")
    # Proceed with validated path

3. SQL Injection

Rule: Use parameterized queries for all database operations.

• No string interpolation in SQL: f"SELECT * FROM {table}" is forbidden
• All SQL uses parameterized placeholders: "WHERE id = ?", (id,)
• Table/column names validated against an allowlist if dynamic

# Bad
cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM {table_name} WHERE id = {user_id}")

# Good
cursor.execute(
    "SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE id = ?",
    (session_id,)
)

4. Authentication and RBAC

Rule: Access control must be enforced server-side, not just client-side.

• All agent capabilities gated behind permission checks in core/security/
• Guardrails in openjiuwen/core/security/ verify permissions before execution
• No capability bypassed by missing checks on alternate code paths
• Resource limits enforced (rate limiting, concurrent request limits)

5. Prompt Injection

Rule: openjiuwen/harness/prompts/ must guard against injected user content.

• User-provided strings never concatenated directly into system prompts without sanitization
• Prompt templates use placeholder isolation (separate user content from instruction)
• Rail outputs validated before being passed to downstream components
• The security rail (openjiuwen/harness/rails/) correctly blocks dangerous patterns

Prompt injection is agent-core's most unique security concern. Attackers may try to inject instructions into conversation history to manipulate agent behavior:

# Bad — user content injected into system prompt
system_prompt = f"You are a helpful assistant. User said: {user_message}"

# Good — user content kept in separate context slot
system_prompt = SYSTEM_INSTRUCTIONS
context = {
    "user_message": sanitize_for_display(user_message),
    "conversation_history": conversation,
}

6. CSRF / Request Validation

Rule: All mutating requests include validation.

• core/session/ validates that requests originate from legitimate sessions
• Session IDs are non-guessable (use secrets.token_urlsafe())
• Session state changes are idempotent or protected by transaction semantics
• No state-modifying operations accessible without session context

7. Rate Limiting

Rule: Protect core/runner/ and core/runner/ resources from exhaustion.

• Runner.resource_mgr enforces limits on concurrent agent executions
• Memory usage bounded for long-running sessions
• Compaction triggers prevent unbounded context growth
• Tool call frequency limits enforced per session

8. Sensitive Data in Logs

Rule: Logs must not expose credentials, tokens, or sensitive data.

• No API keys, tokens, or passwords in log output
• Use structured logging with explicit field names, not f-string interpolation
• Error messages do not include sensitive user data
• openjiuwen.core.common.logging used instead of print()

# Bad
logger.info(f"Authenticated user {user_id} with token {token}")

# Good
logger.info("User authenticated", extra={"user_id": user_id})

9. Dependency Security

Rule: All dependencies scanned before merging PRs.

• New dependencies reviewed for known CVEs: pip-audit
• New network-facing dependencies reviewed for security implications
• bandit -r openjiuwen/ -ll passes (no HIGH/CRITICAL findings)
• Third-party code in core/sys_operation/ and core/security/ minimized

# Run before merging dependency changes
pip-audit
bandit -r openjiuwen/ -ll

10. Sandbox Isolation

Rule: core/sys_operation/sandbox/ must provide genuine isolation.

• File operations respect path scoping (no escape via ../)
• Shell execution runs in a restricted environment
• Network access is explicitly allowed/denied, not default-open
• Cleanup runs after every operation, even on failure
• Interrupt/confirm flows preserved for user-facing operations

For sandbox implementations, verify:

# Path isolation
def sandbox_read(path: Path, allowed_base: Path) -> str:
    resolved = (allowed_base / path).resolve()
    if not resolved.is_relative_to(allowed_base):
        raise SecurityError(f"Escape attempt: {path}")
    return resolved.read_text()

Pre-Review Checklist

Before marking a security-sensitive PR as ready for review, run through all 10 categories above. Document the review in the PR description:

Security Review
===============
Secrets:        PASS (no hardcoded credentials)
Input Val:      PASS (safe_path used for all user paths)
SQL Injection:  PASS (parameterized queries only)
Auth/RBAC:      PASS (guardrails enforce permissions)
Prompt Inject:  PASS (user content isolated from system prompts)
CSRF:           PASS (session IDs are non-guessable)
Rate Limiting:  PASS (resource_mgr enforces limits)
Log Safety:     PASS (no credentials in structured logs)
Dependencies:   PASS (bandit + pip-audit clean)
Sandbox:        PASS (path scoping verified)

For changes to core/security/, core/sys_operation/, or openjiuwen/extensions/sys_operation/sandbox/, request a dedicated security review from a second reviewer.