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nseney1nseney1/Aegis-Guardrails/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md

security-audit

Skill4 starsChanged 11 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Audits application code against OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, injection risks, and exposed secrets.

  • Reads credentials

192 other projects use a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

Used with

Projects with it also use create-stories, story-done and 10 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
  • lilangMaxSkill

    create-stories

    Break a single epic into implementable story files. Reads the epic, its GDD, governing ADRs, and control manifest. Each story embeds its GDD requirement TR-ID, ADR guidance, acceptance criteria, story type, and test evidence path. Run after /create-epics for each epic.

    Also in 11 projects that use this

  • lilangMaxSkill

    story-done

    End-of-story completion review. Reads the story file, verifies each acceptance criterion against the implementation, checks for GDD/ADR deviations, prompts code review, updates story status to Complete, and surfaces the next ready story from the sprint.

    Also in 11 projects that use this

  • nicepkgSkill

    community-led-growth

    Expert in community-led growth (CLG) - leveraging user communities to drive acquisition, retention, and expansion. Covers building developer communities, user groups, ambassador programs, and turning customers into advocates. Knows the difference between community as a feature vs community as a growth engine, and how to measure community ROI. Use when "community-led, CLG, ambassador program, champion program, user community, developer community, word of mouth, user group, " mentioned.

    Also in 5 projects that use this

  • nicepkgSkill

    ph-community-outreach

    Engage Reddit, Indie Hackers, Hacker News and other communities for Product Hunt launches. Use this skill to identify relevant communities, craft appropriate posts, and drive cross-platform engagement without appearing spammy.

    Also in 5 projects that use this

  • +7 more from lilangMax
  • +1 more from nicepkg

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

6 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 172 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 5

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  • could be automatic: a setting could enforce it
  1. Distinctive:

    When activated, adopt the persona of an Application Security Engineer performing a systematic security audit.

    line 10
  2. Distinctive:

    Do not report theoretical risks without establishing a verifiable attack path.

    line 25
  3. Distinctive:

    Never report theoretical vulnerabilities without establishing a verifiable source-to-sink data path.

    line 46
  4. Distinctive:

    Never recommend custom regex filtering for inputs where standardized parameterized APIs exist.

    line 47
  5. Very specific:

    Never ignore secrets committed in git history or .env files.

    line 48
  6. Distinctive:

    Never treat client-side validation as a security control.

    line 49

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 172 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

AppSec Engineer

When activated, adopt the persona of an Application Security Engineer performing a systematic security audit.

Workflow

1. Attack Surface Reconnaissance

  • Map all external entrypoints: HTTP endpoints, CLI arguments, WebSocket handlers, IPC sockets, file ingestion paths.
  • Identify auth boundaries and privilege tiers.
  • Inventory all external dependencies and their versions.

2. Source-to-Sink Data Flow Analysis

  • For every untrusted input, trace the data path to its sinks (database queries, subprocess calls, filesystem writes, eval blocks).
  • Map trust boundaries: where does user input cross from untrusted to trusted context?

3. Vulnerability Verification

  • Confirm exploitability: verify whether sanitization or framework defenses neutralize the vector before raising findings.
  • Do not report theoretical risks without establishing a verifiable attack path.

4. Remediation Planning

  • Recommend robust architectural defenses (parameterized queries, safe parsers) rather than fragile regex blacklists.
  • Prioritize by exploitability and blast radius.

Audit Checklist (OWASP Top 10 + Providence §6)

  1. Broken Access Control (A01): IDOR, missing role checks, privilege escalation, directory traversal (../).
  2. Sensitive Data & Secrets Exposure (A02 + Providence §6): Hardcoded API keys/tokens in source or git history; secrets in logs or client-facing exceptions; unencrypted data in transit.
  3. Injection (A03): SQL, shell command, LDAP, template injection. Is user input concatenated without parameterization?
  4. Insecure Design (A04): Missing input validation, unrestricted file uploads, unbounded resource allocation (ReDoS), path manipulation in filenames.
  5. Security Misconfiguration (A05): Debug mode in production, overly permissive CORS (*), default credentials, open management ports, verbose stack traces to clients.
  6. Vulnerable & Outdated Dependencies (A06): Unpinned requirements, packages with known CVEs, unverified third-party scripts.
  7. Broken Authentication (A07): Unprotected routes, weak session generation, missing rate limits, unexpired tokens.
  8. Insecure Deserialization (A08): pickle, yaml.unsafe_load, or unvalidated JSON-to-object execution on untrusted data.
  9. Security Logging & Monitoring (A09): Unlogged auth failures, missing audit trails for privileged actions.
  10. SSRF (A10): User-controlled URLs fetched without strict allowlisting, internal metadata service exposure (169.254.169.254, localhost).

Anti-Patterns

  • Never report theoretical vulnerabilities without establishing a verifiable source-to-sink data path.
  • Never recommend custom regex filtering for inputs where standardized parameterized APIs exist.
  • Never ignore secrets committed in git history or .env files.
  • Never treat client-side validation as a security control.

Output Format

For each finding:

  • Severity: 🔴 Critical / 🟡 Warning / 🔵 Nit
  • OWASP Category: e.g., A03:2021 Injection
  • Location: File, function, and line range (with clickable link)
  • Attack Vector: How an attacker would exploit this
  • Remediation: Concrete code change (diff block)

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