kookaburra-release
Skill10 starsChanged 2 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Cutting a macOS release of Kookaburra Cut through the GitHub Actions release pipeline: the signed v* tag that triggers it, the Touch ID tag key and the commit key, the Signed head app check, recovery for a lost Mac, the build / sign / verify / publish jobs, the protected release environment and its secrets, the private licensed-models archive, ad-hoc rehearsals, Developer ID signing, Apple notarisation, the plain and styled DMGs, the updater manifest and the packaged-parity gate. Use when asked to "cut a release", "tag a release", "rehearse the release", "build a release build", "make a DMG", "sign the app", "notarise", "staple", "ship it", "publish a build", "bump the version and release", "rotate the signing key", "rotate the tag key", "Signed head is missing", "lost my Mac", or when touching .github/allowed_tag_signers, .github/allowed_signers, .github/workflows/release.yml, .github/workflows/signers.yml, scripts/release.sh, scripts/sign-and-notarize.sh, scripts/verify-release.sh, scripts/make-dmg.sh, scripts/build-ffmpeg-sidecar.sh, scripts/install-build-tools.sh, scripts/bundle-digest.sh, rust-toolchain.toml, src-tauri/dmg/, or bundle.macOS and plugins.updater in tauri.conf.json.
- Reads credentials
In this repository11 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- kookaburra-background-authoringSkill
- kookaburra-brand-packsSkill
- kookaburra-commitSkill
- kookaburra-export-presetsSkill
- kookaburra-lighting-authoringSkill
- kookaburra-pr-descriptionsSkill
- kookaburra-scene-authoringSkill
- kookaburra-skill-creatorSkill
- kookaburra-video-editingSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 23
Approve the sign job: when GitHub asks (the release environment's required reviewer).
- Very specific: line 39
Create the app (private, no webhook, Checks write only), then on its page note the App ID and Client ID, click Generate a private key and …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
kookaburra-release
Ship a signed, notarised, stapled .app and DMG that opens on any Mac with no Gatekeeper warning, built by CI from a signed tag so no laptop holds a release key.
The shape, in one paragraph
A release is a signed v* tag on main, pushed by pnpm release. .github/workflows/release.yml then runs four jobs on fresh runners: build (no signing secret in reach) verifies the tag against main's .github/allowed_tag_signers, sets up the pinned toolchain, builds the ffmpeg sidecar from pinned source, fetches the beat-this model and the licensed device models, runs pnpm tauri build --no-sign through cargo auditable (the binary carries its crate list), writes the SBOM (scripts/sbom.mjs) and uploads the unsigned app with its SHA-256, plus a separate build record (build-info.txt, bundle-digests.txt, sidecar-digests.txt, KookaburraCut-<version>.cdx.json) whose digest is a job output; sign, in the protected release environment (one reviewer approves), checks that digest, imports the Developer ID into a temporary keychain, signs inside-out with the hardened runtime, notarises and staples the app and a plain DMG, tars the stapled app for the updater and signs it bound to the version, then deletes every key; verify, with no environment, checks signatures, notarisation, Gatekeeper and the updater signature against plugins.updater.pubkey, compares every file in the zip's and the updater tar's app, signatures stripped and file list included, with the build record, then runs the signed binary's edit caps and check flashes; publish writes SHA256SUMS over the set (the updater .sig included), build-info.txt and the SBOM (scripts/release-sums.sh, which a branch rehearsal also runs), attests the DMG, zip, updater tar, build-info.txt and the SBOM in one attestation, attests the SBOM on the DMG, and drafts the GitHub release for you to publish, its body the version's CHANGELOG.md section (scripts/changelog-section.sh) followed by the install and verify text, with the attestation's bundle as KookaburraCut-<version>.intoto.jsonl, the updater .sig and the SBOM among its assets (OpenSSF Scorecard reads only release assets, never the attestation store). Budget about an hour, plus the approval click.
Cutting a release
- Bump the version in
src-tauri/tauri.conf.json(the single source of truth), re-readSECURITY.mdagainstmainand set its "As of version" line to match, move## [Unreleased]'s entries inCHANGELOG.mdunder## [<version>] - <date>(every security fix under### Security, one line on what it meant for a user, a GHSA link when an advisory exists:CONTRIBUTING.md, "Changelog"), and merge all three tomainthrough a PR like any change.pnpm releaseand the build job refuse a tag whoseSECURITY.mdnames another version, because 0.21.1 shipped under a file describing controls it lacked, and a tag whoseCHANGELOG.mdhas no section, because the release body is built from it. The README must state theminimumSystemVersionfloor (macOS 26.0+); the build job refuses otherwise. Security docs:git diff v<previous> HEAD -- SECURITY.md docs/privacy.md docs/mdm.md, carry every change intodocs/security-overview.mdanddocs/fleet.md, and set the version line in all four (scripts/security-docs.test.mjsfails until each matchestauri.conf.json). - Tag and push from a clean
mainequal toorigin/main:
It prints the commits and thepnpm releasesigners.ymltag-key files changed since the previous tag and asks y/N. Read them:src/andbuild.rschange under the commit key. Then it signs the tag with the key atkookaburra.tagkey(one Touch ID), verifies it against.github/allowed_tag_signers, pushes only the tag and prints the workflow URL. Nothing is built locally. - Approve the sign job when GitHub asks (the
releaseenvironment's required reviewer). The run waits for you; nothing is signed before. - Publish the draft once verify and publish are green: read the run summary (digests, sidecar record, SBOM count, build info), check the draft's assets hold
KookaburraCut-<version>.cdx.jsonand its body opens with the version's changelog section, then publish the release on GitHub. The in-app updater only sees a published release (the draft 404s atreleases/latest/download/latest.json). - Run the packaged-parity gate on the published DMG's app (below). The workflow does not run it: it needs this machine's recorded baselines.
- Update the website. In
mpalmes-website-nextjs, setDESCRIBESinpages/kookaburracut/security.tsxto the new version so its tag-pinned links resolve (the page lands with the website's security PRs; before then there is nothing to set), and refreshExpiresinpublic/kookaburracut/security.txtif it falls within the next three months; open a PR there.
Rehearsals, in order of cost:
pnpm release:rehearse: build, sign ad hoc, plain DMG, verify, on this Mac. No key, no tag.- Actions > Release > Run workflow on a branch with
dry_runtrue: the same pipeline on GitHub's runners with an ad-hoc signature; the branch never sees a secret. Use it for any change to the workflow or the scripts. - The same dispatch on a
v*tag withdry_runtrue: a real signed, notarised set as artefacts, no release.
One-time setup (GitHub side)
Everything here is done by hand, once. Nothing in the repository works until it is.
- Signing keys, in the Secure Enclave. Two non-exportable keys, so a stolen disk signs nothing. See "Signing keys" below.
- The signed-head app, which posts
Signed head(see "Signing keys"). Its key is in an environment onlymaincan use, so no workflow a pull request adds can post as it. Do all of this before the ruleset requires its check, or every PR waits on a check nothing posts.- Create the app (private, no webhook, Checks write only), then on its page note the App ID and Client ID, click Generate a private key and Install App on
kookaburra-cutonly:open "https://github.com/settings/apps/new?name=kookaburra-cut-signed-head&description=Posts%20the%20Signed%20head%20check&url=https://github.com/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut&public=false&webhook_active=false&checks=write" - The
signed-headenvironment, limited tomain, holding the key and the client ID; then delete the downloaded.pem:gh api --method PUT repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/environments/signed-head -F 'deployment_branch_policy[protected_branches]=false' -F 'deployment_branch_policy[custom_branch_policies]=true'gh api --method POST repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/environments/signed-head/deployment-branch-policies -f name=main -f type=branchgh secret set SIGNED_HEAD_APP_KEY --env signed-head --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut < "<path to the one downloaded .pem>"
Without the branch policy any branch's own workflow could use the key, so check it readsgh variable set SIGNED_HEAD_APP_CLIENT_ID --env signed-head --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut --body "<Client ID>"{"custom_branch_policies":true,"protected_branches":false}and["branch:main"], then lists both names:R=repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/environments/signed-head && gh api $R --jq .deployment_branch_policy && gh api $R/deployment-branch-policies --jq '[.branch_policies[] | "\(.type):\(.name)"]' && gh secret list --env signed-head --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut && gh variable list --env signed-head --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut - Open or update any PR into
main: the app'sSigned headcheck must appear besideHead commit signedwith the same result. Only then require it (next step).
- Create the app (private, no webhook, Checks write only), then on its page note the App ID and Client ID, click Generate a private key and Install App on
- Rulesets.
main: pull request required, thefrontend,rustandSigned headchecks required,Signed headpinned to the app's ID so an Actions job of that name can't answer for it; no force push, no deletion; an empty bypass list. Tagsv*: no update, no deletion. To swapHead commit signedfor the app's check, then confirm it reads back:APP_ID="<App ID>" RS=19092788 && gh api repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/rulesets/$RS | jq --argjson app "$APP_ID" '{rules: [.rules[] | if .type == "required_status_checks" then .parameters.required_status_checks |= (map(select(.context != "Head commit signed")) + [{context: "Signed head", integration_id: $app}]) else . end]}' | gh api --method PUT repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/rulesets/$RS --input -gh api repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/rulesets/19092788 --jq '.rules[] | select(.type=="required_status_checks") | .parameters.required_status_checks' - The
releaseenvironment with a required reviewer (yourself) and a deployment branch policy of tags matchingv*only. Its secrets:Secret What DEVELOPER_ID_P12the Developer ID Application certificate and key, base64 of a .p12exportDEVELOPER_ID_P12_PASSWORDthe export password NOTARY_KEY_P8an App Store Connect API key ( .p8, Developer role), raw or base64NOTARY_KEY_ID,NOTARY_ISSUER_IDthat key's ID and issuer TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEYthe updater (minisign) private key file's contents TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORDits password Repository variables: APPLE_TEAM_ID(the Team ID every signature is checked against), optionallyLICENSED_ASSETS_REPO. The runner image ismacos-26, hard-coded so a variable can't redirect the sign job. - Updater key. Keep the key the published apps trust (
plugins.updater.pubkey) if existing installs are to update themselves; rotating it means every install at or below the last laptop-signed release needs one manual download, since their bundled public key will not verify the new signature. Either way, generate any new key withpnpm tauri signer generate -w <file>and paste the public key intotauri.conf.jsonin the same PR that rotates the secret. - Licensed device models (
src/assets/models/README.md). Create a private repository (defaultmichael-palmes/kookaburra-cut-assets) holding one file,licensed-models.tar.age: a flat tar of the licensed glbs encrypted to an age recipient. Repository secrets (not in the environment: the build job reads them, and they hold no signing power):LICENSED_ASSETS_TOKEN, a fine-grained token with read-only Contents on that one repository, andLICENSED_ASSETS_AGE_KEY, the matching age identity. The build job unpacks the archive and refuses any glb that does not matchsrc/assets/models/licensed.sha256.cd src/assets/models/licensed && COPYFILE_DISABLE=1 tar --no-mac-metadata --no-xattrs -cf /tmp/licensed-models.tar *.glb age-keygen -o /tmp/licensed-models.key # the identity goes in the secret, the recipient below age -r <recipient> -o licensed-models.tar.age /tmp/licensed-models.tar - Back up and retire the laptop key material. Export the Developer ID
.p12and the updater key to an encrypted offline backup, then remove the signing identity from the login keychain, thekookaburra-cut-updaterkeychain item and the~/.taurikey file. Nothing local signs releases any more.
Signing keys
| Key | Protection | Listed in | Signs | Can't |
Tag (kookaburra-tag) | Touch ID | .github/allowed_tag_signers | release tags, PR heads that change what the release pipeline runs or pins | run without a person |
Commit (kookaburra-commit) | none, no prompt | .github/allowed_signers | every other PR head, including an agent's while you're away | tag a release, change what the release pipeline runs or pins |
release.yml and release.sh read only the tag list. signers.yml requires the tag key when anything in its tag_paths differs between the PR head and its merge base with the base branch: .github/, every script the pipeline reaches, both lock files, package.json, patches/, tauri.conf.json and the pin files. A stolen commit key can't point release.yml at the commit list or swap what the sign job runs, but it can still change src/ and build.rs, so read the diff before tagging. scripts/signers-paths.test.mjs fails when a new pipeline script is missing from the list, which release.sh reads too. GitHub runs the workflow from the default branch's copy, whatever the PR's base, and it reads both lists from main.
Two jobs, so the key never sits beside PR content. Head commit signed has no secret: it fetches the head by SHA as data, checks it and logs the fix. For a PR into main, Post Signed head then mints a Checks-only token from the app's key and posts the verdict as the app's Signed head, the check the ruleset requires; a missing verdict posts a failure. Keep it that way: never give the key to a job that fetches or reads PR content, and pass PR values to run: only through env:, never as ${{ }} inside the script. A re-run checks the run's own head against main as it stood at the first run (a force-pushed head has its own run), and the app check's own Re-run does nothing (no webhook): re-run from the Signers run it links, or close and reopen the PR to check against today's lists. A fork's head carries no listed key, so it fails: fetch it into a branch here, re-sign the head and open the PR from that.
Set up a Mac (the files ssh-keygen -K writes are references to the Secure Enclave, useless on another machine):
sc_auth create-ctk-identity -l kookaburra-tag -k p-256-ne -t bio
sc_auth create-ctk-identity -l kookaburra-commit -k p-256-ne -t none
mkdir -m 700 -p ~/.ssh/kookaburra && (cd ~/.ssh/kookaburra && ssh-keygen -w /usr/lib/ssh-keychain.dylib -K -N "") # press Return at the PIN prompt
echo 'export SSH_SK_PROVIDER=/usr/lib/ssh-keychain.dylib' >> ~/.zshenv
# from here, run inside this repository
git config kookaburra.tagkey ~/.ssh/kookaburra/id_ecdsa_sk_rk_kookaburra-tag.pub
git config gpg.format ssh && git config commit.gpgsign true && git config tag.gpgsign true
git config user.signingkey ~/.ssh/kookaburra/id_ecdsa_sk_rk_kookaburra-commit.pub # only once main lists this keyA head signed by an unlisted key fails Signers on every PR, so set user.signingkey last. Without SSH_SK_PROVIDER, signing stops with No FIDO SecurityKeyProvider specified; release.sh sets it itself. A list line is <GitHub noreply address> namespaces="git" <first two fields of the .pub>. Check a key with ssh-keygen -lf <file>.pub against sc_auth list-ctk-identities -t ssh. Dependabot's branches are re-signed by hand, each with the tag key (one Touch ID), because every bump touches a lock file or .github/; Signed head fails on Dependabot's own head and passes on yours. About half of all PRs touch the list too, and an agent working alone stops there until you can sign.
Rotating a key. Change the list in a PR with the head signed by the current tag key: git -c user.signingkey="$(git config --path kookaburra.tagkey)" commit --amend --no-edit -S. Remove the old key once no open PR's head still carries it; a PR that passed before keeps that pass until it runs again, so close and reopen any still signed by it.
Rotating the app key. On the app's page, generate a new private key and store it with the gh secret set above, check that the next PR's Signed head posts, then delete the old key there.
Testing a change to signers.yml. pull_request_target always runs main's copy, so a test PR into a branch does not exercise your edit. Copy the keyless job into a throwaway workflow under pull_request on that base branch. The app job can't run there (its environment refuses any ref but main), so the next PR into main proves a change to it; if a merged change stops Signed head posting, every PR waits on it: land the fix through the admin bypass as in "Recovery for a lost Mac". Never test with a v* tag: the ruleset refuses to delete it and a push starts a release.
Recovery for a lost Mac
Both keys die with the Mac and neither has a backup, by design. No listed key remains to sign the PR that replaces them, so this goes through a repository admin. It needs the GitHub account, so keep its recovery route off that Mac.
- Contain. Sign the lost Mac out of GitHub (Settings > Sessions), revoke its SSH keys and tokens, and rotate the secrets it could reach. A Mac taken while logged in can still sign with the commit key, which can't tag or change a list. The tag key needs a finger.
- New keys. Set up the new Mac as above.
- PR. Replace every line for the lost keys in both lists and sign the head with the new tag key.
Signed headfails, as it should. - Admin bypass, for this PR only. Settings > Rules >
main-branch-protection: add Repository admin to the bypass list, merge the PR, then empty the bypass list straight away. Check it reads[]:gh api repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/rulesets --jq '.[] | select(.name=="main-branch-protection") | .id' | xargs -I{} gh api repos/michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/rulesets/{} --jq .bypass_actors - Prove it. Open a PR with a one-line change signed by the new commit key:
Signed headpasses. Close it.
Published releases are unaffected, since a tag is checked only at build time. A tag not yet built fails against the new list; bump the version and tag again.
Packaged-parity gate (required before publishing)
docs/determinism.md makes this its own gate class: the packaged .app must reproduce dev-mode hashes, because "internally deterministic" is not "correct". Download the DMG from the draft (or the kookaburra-cut-<version> artefact), mount it, copy the app to release/, quit any running Kookaburra Cut, then run one leg at a time:
pnpm kookaburra:run --action verify --project showcase-tour --aspect 16:9 --app "release/Kookaburra Cut.app"
pnpm kookaburra:run --action verify --project ws:launch-2026 --aspect 16:9 --app "release/Kookaburra Cut.app"ws:launch-2026 must be EQUAL (the null-for-legacy proof). On any divergence, diff the renderStateFingerprint first.
Traps
Each of these produces a build that signs and notarises happily, then misbehaves.
The dev sidecar poisons a local build. pnpm setup:ffmpeg copies the Homebrew ffmpeg, which links /opt/homebrew dylibs that exist on no other Mac, and it overwrites the release sidecar. sign-and-notarize.sh refuses a bundle whose sidecars link anything outside /usr/lib and /System. The release build never has this problem: CI builds the sidecar from pinned source every time.
Unpinned source is not a release. scripts/build-ffmpeg-sidecar.sh fetches ffmpeg, x264 and x265 against SHA-256 pins and a commit; a bump edits the pin and the hash together, in one reviewed commit. CI takes cmake, nasm and pkgconf from scripts/install-build-tools.sh; a local build may use Homebrew's.
A toolchain bump can move the sidecar. The Rust, Node, pnpm and tool pins are in rust-toolchain.toml, package.json (engines, packageManager) and install-build-tools.sh. The digests in the build record differ on every run, because ffmpeg's configuration string holds the build's random temp path, so comparing them across runs proves nothing. Before bumping a build tool, build the sidecar with the old and the new one, then compare with signatures removed and that path normalised: only the 16-byte LC_UUID may differ, and a small x264 and x265 encode must match byte for byte. For packageManager, use +sha512.<hex> of the npm tarball's integrity: pnpm itself and pnpm/action-setup ignore the hash, so only the release build's corepack enforces it.
A failed bundle digest means the sign job changed the bundle. verify-release.sh prints the differing lines. bundle-digest.sh runs Contents/MacOS through sidecar-digest.sh and hashes everything else raw, leaving out only Contents/_CodeSignature/CodeResources and the stapled Contents/CodeResources. Never add a path to that list to get a release through: find out what wrote the file. The normal form also depends on the runner's codesign, so an image rollout between build and verify fails every Mach-O line and no other: compare runner_image in build-info.txt with the verify job's log, then re-run the whole workflow.
A missing licensed model silently drops that device. modelUrl.ts resolves src/assets/models/licensed/*.glb through import.meta.glob, fixed at BUILD time; an absent glb hides the device and renders saved references through the Android fallback (0.15.0 shipped without the iPad this way). scripts/check-licensed-models.sh fails the tag build when any mapped glb is missing or does not match its pin. A branch rehearsal skips the fetch and ships the fallback, by design.
The updater must bind the version. plugins.updater.requireSignedVersion is on, so the app refuses a signature whose trusted comment lacks version:<v>; sign-and-notarize.sh signs with --app-version and checks the comment. Manifests before 0.21 carry no binding, which is the point: a latest.json re-pointed at an older build is refused.
Never set bundle.createUpdaterArtifacts. It tars the bundle during tauri build, BEFORE notarisation staples the ticket. The script tars the stapled app itself.
Never call trash::delete. The crate's default macOS backend drives Finder over osascript; TCC blames the Apple Event on us, and under the hardened runtime it is silently denied. Call workspace::trash_path instead.
The Secure Enclave identities carry a one-year certificate. sc_auth list-ctk-identities shows Valid To. Whether signing stops at that date is untested; rotate both keys before it.
Entitlements must stay empty. sign-and-notarize.sh and verify-release.sh fail on any entitlement. Nothing in the shell needs one.
Artefacts go in release/, never dist/. dist/ is Vite's output; vite build empties it.
The ffmpeg sidecar is GPL (libx264, libx265). It ships as an arm's-length sidecar process; the release notes point at the recipe and the sources. Do not "fix" this with LICENSE=lgpl: that drops the deterministic default encoder and invalidates every baseline.
DMG artwork
CI ships a plain DMG (--plain-dmg: the app, an Applications link, no background): Finder styles the DMG and there is no Finder on a headless runner. The styled Retina DMG stays for local builds (pnpm package:dmg from a release/Kookaburra Cut.app): src-tauri/dmg/dmg_bg.png (806×488) and dmg_bg@2x.png (1612×976), an exact 2:1 pair that make-dmg.sh merges into a multi-rep TIFF (1x first). Icon positions are measured off the artwork: either end of the printed rule at (170,253) and (635,253) with Finder landing icons ~3pt low, and label plates at y=316..345 because Finder draws labels in the system colour. Swapping art means re-measuring both.
Verify by hand
scripts/verify-release.sh does all of this; for a single artefact:
codesign -dvv "release/Kookaburra Cut.app" # flags=0x10000(runtime), Authority=Developer ID Application, a Timestamp
codesign -d --entitlements - "release/Kookaburra Cut.app" # expect NO entitlements
xcrun stapler validate "release/Kookaburra Cut.app"
xcrun stapler validate release/KookaburraCut-<version>.dmg
spctl -a -t exec -vv "release/Kookaburra Cut.app" # accepted, source=Notarized Developer ID
shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing
gh attestation verify KookaburraCut-<version>.dmg --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut \
--signer-workflow michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/.github/workflows/release.yml \
--source-ref refs/tags/v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners
gh attestation verify KookaburraCut-<version>.dmg --bundle KookaburraCut-<version>.intoto.jsonl \
--repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut --signer-workflow michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/.github/workflows/release.yml \
--source-ref refs/tags/v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners # offline, the release's own bundle
node scripts/verify-updater-sig.mjs KookaburraCut-<version>-updater.app.tar.gz KookaburraCut-<version>-updater.app.tar.gz.sig \
"$(node -p "require('./src-tauri/tauri.conf.json').plugins.updater.pubkey")" <version>
gh attestation verify KookaburraCut-<version>.dmg --repo michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut \
--signer-workflow michael-palmes/kookaburra-cut/.github/workflows/release.yml \
--source-ref refs/tags/v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners \
--predicate-type https://cyclonedx.org/bom # the SBOM attestationscripts/verify-install.sh --version <version> --dir <downloads> runs every check above on a downloaded release (gh release download v<version> first), plus the Team ID and the sidecars' signatures, and with --previous <version> prints how SECURITY.md changed.
Troubleshooting
Signed headstays Expected on a PR intomain: read the Signers run'sPost Signed headjob.not allowed to deploymeans the run's ref isn'tmain; a failed token step means the app is uninstalled, its key revoked or the client ID wrong (one-time setup, step 2). Fix it and re-run Signers.verify-tagfails in the build job: the tag was not made bypnpm release, or its key is not inmain's.github/allowed_tag_signers(No principal matchedmeans the commit key signed it). Delete the tag only if thev*ruleset lets you; otherwise bump the version.- The sign job waits forever: nobody approved the
releaseenvironment. Approve it from the run page. - notarytool returns
Invalid: the sign job printsnotarytool log; usually an unsigned or dylib-linked sidecar. - Verify fails on
edit caps: the signed binary could not run its sidecars; check the notary log and the self-containment gate output in the build job. - Finder styling fails (
-1728) locally: grant the terminal Automation permission (System Settings > Privacy & Security > Automation) and re-runpnpm package:dmg. - App launches then quits in a packaged build only: suspect the CSP or a TCC denial, not the signature (
docs/determinism.md, "Packaged-app parity").
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

