iso-27090-ai-security
Skill62 starsChanged 9 months agoMITView on GitHub
Gap assessment of AI system security against the ISO/IEC 27090:2026 guidance, with a threat-based checklist, maturity scale and a short client-ready report.
In this repository14 other files it gives its agents.
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The file
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8 rules. About 0 are common, 6 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
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Distinctive · estimate
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- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 18
Certifiable counterparts: When the organization holds or pursues formal certification, map findings to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (ISMS / Annex A …
- Distinctive: line 58
Follow these seven steps sequentially:
- Very specific: line 73
Never accept verbal assurances as verified evidence.
- Distinctive: line 83
Check that defensive controls do not contradict each other or degrade core AI performance beyond acceptable thresholds.
- Distinctive: line 84
Ensure controls do not erode over time during retraining, model re-prompting, or provider API changes.
- Distinctive: line 161
Direct, professional tone: Keep assessments objective, actionable, and free of marketing fluff.
- Very specific: line 162
Evidence-backed: Every finding must cite verified artifacts (config, file, code, or interview quote).
- Distinctive: line 163
No certification claims: Never assert that an organization is "ISO 27090 certified" or "ISO 27090 compliant".
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
ISO/IEC 27090 AI Security Assessment
This skill enables AI agents to conduct a structured gap assessment of an organization's AI systems against ISO/IEC 27090:2026 (Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Artificial intelligence — Guidance for AI security), published by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27.
It assesses how an organization (from small-and-medium enterprises to large institutions) protects its AI systems against AI-specific threats across seven security domains: data poisoning, model theft, prompt injection, evasion, output manipulation, supply chain dependencies, and operational drift.
Before Starting: Scope & Certification Boundaries
- Guidance only: ISO/IEC 27090:2026 is guidance, not a certifiable management-system standard. There is no "ISO 27090 certification".
- Deliverable type: The output is strictly a gap assessment, never a "compliant / certified" verdict.
- Certifiable counterparts: When the organization holds or pursues formal certification, map findings to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (ISMS / Annex A controls) and ISO/IEC 42001:2023 (Artificial Intelligence Management System).
- Do not invent clause numbers: ISO/IEC 27090 clause numbering is copyright-protected. If the client or auditor provides a licensed copy or table of contents, map to their verified clauses. Otherwise, reference findings by topic domain and threat category (e.g.,
Threat: Data Poisoning,Domain: Model Protection). - Language: Deliver the assessment, interview notes, and final report in the user's requested language.
When to Use This Skill
Invoke this skill when:
- Assessing AI cybersecurity posture for custom models, fine-tuned models, or third-party AI services.
- Evaluating threats specific to AI (prompt injection, model theft, training data poisoning, inference attacks).
- Reviewing AI supply chains, vendor contracts, and AI Bill of Materials (AIBOM).
- Preparing an SME or enterprise for AI security audits before product launch or procurement.
- Mapping technical AI security controls into ISO/IEC 27001 or ISO/IEC 42001 risk registers.
- Responding to AI security incidents or evaluating adversarial robustness.
Inputs Required
Gather the following inputs before or during Phase 1:
Required:
- ai_system_inventory: List of AI systems to assess, including intended purpose, deployment model, and user base.
- organization_role: Role per system:
- Developer: trains/fine-tunes models from scratch or checkpoints.
- Integrator / Deployer: connects third-party foundation models/APIs into products, agents, or RAG pipelines.
- Consumer: uses commercial off-the-shelf AI/SaaS tools for internal operations.
Recommended:
- aibom: AI Bill of Materials (models, weights, datasets, open-source libraries, vector DBs, APIs).
- system_criticality: Expected impact on business continuity, human safety, and legal rights (High / Medium / Low).
- exposure_level: Accessibility (Internal only / Customer-facing / Public Internet).
- existing_controls: Current policies, authentication, monitoring, rate limits, and incident playbooks.
- licensed_copy_toc: Table of contents or licensed copy of ISO/IEC 27090:2026 (if available).
Assessment Process
Follow these seven steps sequentially:
Step 1: Scope & Inventory
- Catalog every in-scope AI asset: system name, purpose, business unit, provider, model family.
- Identify the organization's role (Developer, Integrator, or Consumer).
- Request or assemble an AIBOM (foundation models, embedding models, fine-tuning datasets, vector indices, orchestration frameworks like LangChain/LlamaIndex).
Step 2: Criticality & Exposure Classification
For each system, determine:
- Criticality: Impact of failure or compromise on business, safety, or legal rights (High / Medium / Low).
- Exposure: Internal (employees only), Partner/B2B, Customer-facing, or Public Internet.
Step 3: Evidence Gathering by Domain
Audit against the seven ISO/IEC 27090 domains using references/checklist-by-domain.md.
- Gather concrete evidence: architecture diagrams, configuration files, vendor contracts, data pipelines, monitoring logs.
- Never accept verbal assurances as verified evidence; mark unverified controls as
Not Verified. - Role adjustment: If the organization only consumes a third-party service (e.g., LLM via API), concentrate on Domains 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 directly, and cover Domains 3 and 4 via vendor diligence and contractual guarantees.
Step 4: Threat Assessment & CIA Mapping
Map each identified gap to specific AI threats and classic security impacts:
- Confidentiality (C): Model inversion, membership inference, training data leakage, system prompt extraction.
- Integrity (I): Training data poisoning, weight tampering, prompt injection, output poisoning.
- Availability (A): Resource exhaustion (sponge attacks, unbounded context loops), API denial of service.
Step 5: Holistic Defense Review
- Check that defensive controls do not contradict each other or degrade core AI performance beyond acceptable thresholds.
- Ensure controls do not erode over time during retraining, model re-prompting, or provider API changes.
Step 6: Scoring & Gap Prioritization
Score each checklist item using the Maturity Scale. Calculate finding priority: $$\text{Priority} = \text{System Criticality} \times \text{Gap } (3 - \text{Maturity})$$
Step 7: Client-Ready Reporting
Generate a 2–3 page gap assessment report using the template in references/report-template.md.
The 7 Security Domains (Overview)
Detailed evaluation checks and verification methods are in references/checklist-by-domain.md:
- Governance & Responsibilities: Cross-functional ownership (Security, AI, Data, Legal), AI risk register, and shadow AI / acceptable use policy.
- Security by Design & Supply Chain: Secure AI development lifecycle, Zero Trust model access, AIBOM management, and vendor AI contract terms.
- Training & Operational Data (Poisoning): Data provenance, change controls, sanitization of user data fed back into fine-tuning, and repository access logs.
- Model Protection: Direct tampering protection (signed checkpoints/hashes), theft/extraction defense (rate limiting, anomaly detection), and membership inference mitigations.
- Inputs (Evasion & Prompt Injection): System prompt and data separation, input sanitization, adversarial robustness, and least-privilege tool execution with human confirmation.
- Outputs: Sensitive information leakage guards, output validation before downstream ingestion (avoiding indirect SQL/HTML/OS command injection).
- Monitoring & Response: Protected input/output audit logging, model drift/anomaly detection, AI-specific incident response playbooks (model isolation, rollback), and revalidation triggers.
Maturity Scale & Prioritization
Evaluate each domain control on a 4-level maturity scale:
| Level | Rating | Definition |
| 0 | Non-existent | Control is not performed or recognized. |
| 1 | Informal | Ad-hoc practices exist without documentation or repeatable evidence. |
| 2 | Defined | Control is documented with evidence, but only partially or inconsistently applied. |
| 3 | Managed | Control is fully applied, measured, integrated into workflows, and periodically reviewed. |
| N/A | Not Applicable | Control does not apply to the organization's role (must provide brief justification). |
Finding Priority matrix:
- High: High-criticality system with Level 0 or 1 maturity (Gap $\ge 2$).
- Medium: Medium-criticality system with Level 0–1 maturity, or High-criticality with Level 2.
- Low: Low-criticality system or minor gap in a Level 2 control.
Output Format
The client-ready deliverable is structured into five concise sections (2–3 pages max):
- Executive Summary: Scope, systems evaluated, 3–5 key findings, and disclaimer regarding non-certifiable guidance.
- AI System Inventory: Table detailing system name, role, provider, criticality, and exposure.
- Results by Domain: Summary table of the 7 domains with average maturity and primary gaps.
- Prioritized Findings & Recommendations: Table linking each gap to concrete evidence, threats, CIA impact, priority, recommended fix, and mapping to ISO 27001/27002 / ISO 42001.
- Action Plan: Roadmap divided into Quick Wins (30 days), Medium-Term (90 days), and Structural enhancements.
Example finding row:
| # | Finding | Evidence | Threat | CIA | Priority | Recommendation | Cross-Reference |
| 1 | Chatbot API lacks per-user rate limits | API gateway config without quotas | Model extraction & cost denial | C, A | High | Implement token quotas, IP/user rate limiting, and volume anomaly alerts | ISO 27002: 8.16; ISO 42001: B.6; OWASP LLM10 |
The complete copy-ready template is in references/report-template.md.
Cross-Framework Relationships
ISO/IEC 27090 bridges organizational AI governance and technical vulnerability testing:
iso-42001-ai-governance: Management-system anchor (AIMS). ISO 27090 provides the technical AI security depth to fulfill ISO 42001 Clause 6 (Risk) and Annex A/B controls.nist-ai-rmf: Connects ISO 27090 findings to NIST Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage functions and trustworthy AI characteristics (Safe, Secure & Resilient).owasp-llm-top10: Detailed vulnerability analysis for LLM applications (LLM01 Prompt Injection, LLM04 Poisoning, LLM06 Excessive Agency).owasp-ai-testing: Hands-on testing execution guide for active validation of controls assessed during the ISO 27090 audit.- ISO/IEC 27001 / ISO/IEC 27002:2022: Maps AI security threats into existing organizational ISMS controls (e.g., A.5.8 Project management, A.8.25 Secure development, A.8.16 Monitoring).
Output Rules
- Direct, professional tone: Keep assessments objective, actionable, and free of marketing fluff.
- Evidence-backed: Every finding must cite verified artifacts (config, file, code, or interview quote). If evidence cannot be reviewed, explicitly label it
Not Verified. - No certification claims: Never assert that an organization is "ISO 27090 certified" or "ISO 27090 compliant".
- Client format: Render markdown directly in chat, or export to document formats (PDF/DOCX/HTML) when requested by the user.
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