forensics
Skill0 starsChanged 43 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Incident response and tracing: logs, malware, disk/memory, on-chain fund tracking. Use when investigating a security incident (forensics phase or standalone). Confirm conclusions with verify, deliver with report.
5 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- buildomator/buildomatortheir own version, first seen Nov 4, 2026
- MysterionRise/ctf-kittheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- jaskaranhundal/usap-skillstheir own version, first seen Sep 5, 2026
- Shad0wMazt3r/The-Scaffoldingtheir own version, first seen Apr 24, 2026
- ffsshhttiikk/opencode-agents-skillstheir own version, first seen Feb 28, 2026
Other versions5 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 5
- buildomator/buildomator★ 102same name
- MysterionRise/ctf-kit★ 12same name
- jaskaranhundal/usap-skills★ 4same name
- Shad0wMazt3r/The-Scaffolding★ 3same name
- ffsshhttiikk/opencode-agents-skills★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository12 other files it gives its agents.
- auditSkill
- coachSkill
- engagementSkill
- exploitSkill
- learn-skillSkill
- osintSkill
- reconSkill
- reportSkill
- researchSkill
- soc-dashboardSkill
- verifySkill
- wikiSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
6 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 4 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 18
Time-sensitive actions take priority: If funds are still moving, prioritize real-time tracing over comprehensive analysis.
- Distinctive: line 62
Exit criteria: All evidence preserved with hashes, chain of custody documented.
- Very specific: line 202
Am I in the right skill?: If the work drifted into another phase, hand off via ## Handoffs instead of continuing here.
- Distinctive: line 204
Evidence attached?: No finding leaves this skill without captured output.
- Distinctive: line 217
Time-sensitive actions take priority: If funds are still moving, real-time tracing is more important than comprehensive analysis.
- Distinctive: line 219
Chain of custody is legal requirement: Every piece of evidence must have documented handling for legal admissibility.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 4 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Forensics
Incident response and investigation across web2 and web3 targets. Traces funds, analyzes transactions, identifies attackers, and documents evidence.
Constitutional Rules
- Preserve evidence before analysis. Export and hash all data before any manipulation or transformation. On-chain evidence is immutable, but off-chain analysis can introduce errors.
- Never assume attacker identity from a single indicator. Clustering heuristics can produce false positives; corroborate with multiple data points.
- Document every step of the investigation. Chain of custody for evidence requires complete reproducibility of all queries and analysis.
- Distinguish between fund movement and fund ownership. Tracing funds to an exchange does not identify the attacker; it identifies where funds were sent.
- Cross-chain tracing requires bridge analysis. Funds that move between chains must be traced through bridge contracts, not just token transfers.
- Time-sensitive actions take priority. If funds are still moving, prioritize real-time tracing over comprehensive analysis.
- All findings must be reproducible. Another investigator following the same steps must reach the same conclusions.
Investigation Process
Phase 1: Incident Identification and Scoping
Define the incident boundaries before beginning analysis.
- Incident classification — Exploit, hack, rug pull, oracle failure, governance attack, bridge exploit, insider threat
- Affected systems — Primary target and any downstream/cascading impacts
- Time window — First suspicious activity to most recent fund movement
- Impact inventory — Total value lost, token types, chain(s) affected, data compromised
- Stakeholder identification — Protocol team, users, liquidity providers, integrators, law enforcement
Exit criteria: Incident classified, scope defined, stakeholders identified, time window established.
Phase 2: Evidence Preservation
Preserve all evidence before analysis begins.
Web2 Evidence Preservation
2.1 Memory capture → volatile data first (RAM, processes, network connections)
2.2 Disk imaging → bit-for-bit copy with write blocker
2.3 Log collection → system logs, application logs, security logs, network logs
2.4 Network captures → PCAP files, flow data, firewall logs
2.5 Malware samples → isolated storage with hash verification
2.6 Chain of custody → document who handled what, when, whereWeb3 Evidence Preservation
2.1 Transaction export → raw transaction data with hashes and timestamps
2.2 Contract state export → storage slots, balances, admin roles
2.3 Event log export → all contract events with decoded parameters
2.4 Block data → block headers, transaction roots, state roots
2.5 Price data → token prices at time of incident for loss calculation
2.6 Block explorer screenshots → timestamped evidence from Etherscan/Solscan
2.7 Hash verification → SHA-256 hashes of all exported dataExit criteria: All evidence preserved with hashes, chain of custody documented.
Phase 3: Timeline Reconstruction
Build a chronological timeline of the incident.
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Evidence |
| YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM | Initial exploit | Tx hash / Log entry | Hash / Screenshot |
| YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM | Funds moved | Tx hash / Log entry | Hash / Screenshot |
| YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM | Detection | Alert / Monitoring | Alert ID |
| YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM | Response | Action log | Log entry |
Exit criteria: Complete timeline from initial compromise to current state.
Phase 4: Root Cause Analysis
Identify how the incident occurred.
Web2 Root Cause Analysis
- Initial access vector — Phishing, exploit, misconfiguration, insider, stolen credentials
- Attack path — Step-by-step reconstruction of attacker actions
- Vulnerability identification — What flaw allowed the attack
- Detection gap — Why wasn't this detected earlier?
- Impact assessment — What was accessed, modified, or exfiltrated?
Web3 Root Cause Analysis
- Exploit transaction analysis — Decode calldata, identify vulnerable function
- Vulnerability classification — Code bug, oracle failure, economic attack, bridge exploit
- Attack path reconstruction — Map all transactions in the exploit chain
- Profit extraction analysis — How did the attacker extract value?
- Detection gap — Why wasn't this detected by monitoring?
Exit criteria: Root cause identified with supporting evidence.
Phase 5: Impact Quantification
Quantify the full impact of the incident.
| Category | Web2 | Web3 |
| Direct loss | Data breach cost, ransom, recovery cost | Token value lost, NFT value lost |
| Indirect loss | Downtime, reputation, legal fees | Protocol TVL loss, token depeg |
| Data impact | PII exposed, credentials stolen | Addresses affected, contracts drained |
| Systems affected | Servers, endpoints, networks | Contracts, protocols, chains |
| Recovery cost | Incident response, remediation | Fund recovery, protocol upgrades |
Exit criteria: Impact quantified across all categories.
Phase 6: Attacker Identification
Identify the attacker through behavioral analysis.
Web2 Attacker Identification
- IP analysis — Source IPs, VPN/Tor usage, geographic patterns
- TTP mapping — Map to MITRE ATT&CK framework
- Malware analysis — C2 infrastructure, malware family attribution
- Credential analysis — Stolen credentials, password patterns
- Timeline correlation — Cross-reference with known threat actors
Web3 Attacker Identification
- Address clustering — Group addresses by common funding sources, timing, and behavior
- Funding source analysis — Trace how attacker addresses were funded (CEX, DEX, bridge, mixer)
- Behavioral fingerprinting — Gas preferences, transaction timing, contract interactions
- Known attacker matching — Compare against known attacker databases (Chainalysis, TRM)
- Attribution confidence scoring — Rate confidence from speculative to confirmed
Exit criteria: Attacker identified with confidence level, or documented as unidentified.
Phase 7: Post-Mortem and Recommendations
Synthesize findings into actionable intelligence.
- Root cause summary — Why was the exploit possible?
- Attack timeline — Minute-by-minute reconstruction
- Loss quantification — Total loss, recovered funds, net loss
- Vulnerability classification — Code bug, oracle failure, economic attack, bridge exploit
- Lessons learned — What could have prevented this?
- Recommendations — Specific, actionable remediation steps
Exit criteria: Post-mortem complete with recommendations.
Investigation Tools
Web2 Forensics Tools
| Task | Tool | Use Case |
| Memory analysis | Volatility | RAM forensics, process extraction |
| Disk forensics | Autopsy / SANS SIFT | Disk imaging, file recovery |
| Log analysis | Splunk / ELK Stack | Log aggregation, correlation |
| Network analysis | Wireshark / Zeek | PCAP analysis, flow analysis |
| Malware analysis | Cuckoo Sandbox / ANY.RUN | Dynamic malware analysis |
| Timeline analysis | Plaso / log2timeline | Super timeline creation |
| Registry analysis | RegRipper | Windows registry forensics |
Web3 Forensics Tools
| Task | Tool | Use Case |
| EVM explorer | Etherscan | Primary EVM explorer, verified contracts |
| Solana explorer | Solscan | Solana program analysis |
| Multi-chain explorer | Blockscout | Self-hosted, privacy-focused |
| Fund tracking | Chainalysis Reactor | Exchange tracing, clustering |
| Risk scoring | TRM Labs | Risk scoring, attribution |
| Entity labels | Arkham | Entity labeling, deanonymization |
| Wallet labels | Nansen | Wallet labeling, fund flow |
| Simulation | Tenderly | Transaction simulation, debugging |
| Visualization | Dune Analytics | Custom fund flow dashboards |
| RPC (EVM) | Ankr / Alchemy | Public endpoints, reliable |
| RPC (Solana) | Helius | Enhanced transactions API |
Cross-References
| Skill | When to Use |
engagement | Orchestration and phase management |
recon | Initial attack surface mapping |
audit | Vulnerability identification |
exploit | Understanding attack methodology |
verify | Verification of findings |
report | Generating investigation report |
coach | Course correction when investigation stalls |
wiki | Knowledge persistence |
Handoffs
- Root cause points at a vulnerability → load
audit(scoped) orexploit(fork-only proof). - Conclusions need confirmation → load
verify. - Report due → load
report. - Attacker/TTP intel needs cited depth → load
research. - Stuck →
coach. Evidence and patterns →wiki.
Mid-Work Checkpoints
Periodically verify:
- Am I in the right skill? If the work drifted into another phase, hand off via
## Handoffsinstead of continuing here. - Am I routing phase ends? Conclusions move to verification, deliverables to report.
- Evidence attached? No finding leaves this skill without captured output.
Gotchas
- Mixers/tumblers obscure fund flows. Tornado Cash and similar mixers break the on-chain link between source and destination. Post-mixing funds are extremely difficult to trace.
- Cross-chain bridges complicate tracing. Funds that move between chains require tracing through bridge contracts, which may have different finality guarantees and different explorers.
- Privacy chains (Monero, Zcash) are opaque. Once funds enter privacy chains, tracing is effectively impossible without exchange cooperation.
- Exchange cooperation is essential for fund recovery. Law enforcement subpoenas and exchange compliance teams are the primary mechanism for freezing and recovering funds.
- On-chain evidence is immutable but interpretation is not. Transaction data is permanent, but clustering heuristics and attribution can be wrong.
- Attacker addresses can be identified through clustering. Common funding sources, timing patterns, and behavioral fingerprints enable address clustering.
- Fund recovery requires exchange cooperation and legal action. Technical tracing alone cannot recover funds; legal processes are required.
- Flash loan attacks leave complex traces. Funds may pass through multiple protocols in a single transaction, requiring careful calldata decoding.
- Attacker smart contracts can be obfuscated. Attackers use unverified contracts, proxy patterns, and contract factories to hide their tracks.
- Time-sensitive actions take priority. If funds are still moving, real-time tracing is more important than comprehensive analysis.
- Memory forensics is volatile. RAM contents are lost on reboot. Capture memory first in web2 incidents.
- Chain of custody is legal requirement. Every piece of evidence must have documented handling for legal admissibility.
Output Format
# Investigation Report: [Incident Name]
## Executive Summary
- Incident Type: [Exploit/Hack/Rug Pull/Bridge/Oracle/Insider]
- Date: [Date]
- Total Loss: $[amount]
- Systems Affected: [List]
- Funds Recovered: $[amount] ([N]%)
- Attacker Identified: [Yes/No/Partial]
- Status: [Active/Contained/Resolved]
## Incident Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Evidence |
|------------|-------|--------|----------|
| ... | ... | ... | ... |
## Root Cause Analysis
- **Vulnerability Type:** [Code Bug/Oracle/Economic/Bridge/Governance/Insider]
- **Root Cause:** [Detailed explanation]
- **Why It Was Possible:** [Contributing factors]
- **Why It Wasn't Detected:** [Detection gap]
## Impact Assessment
| Category | Impact | Evidence |
|----------|--------|----------|
| Direct loss | ... | ... |
| Indirect loss | ... | ... |
| Data impact | ... | ... |
| Systems affected | ... | ... |
## Attacker Analysis
- **Primary Identifier:** [IP/Address/Account]
- **Clustered Identifiers:** N identifiers
- **Funding Source:** [CEX/DEX/Bridge/Mixer/Unknown]
- **Attribution Confidence:** [Speculative/Moderate/High/Confirmed]
- **Known Affiliation:** [None/Group Name]
- **TTP Mapping:** [MITRE ATT&CK techniques]
## Evidence Package
- Transaction exports: [SHA-256 hash]
- Log files: [SHA-256 hash]
- Memory captures: [SHA-256 hash]
- Disk images: [SHA-256 hash]
- Block explorer screenshots: [SHA-256 hash]
## Recommendations
1. [Immediate action]
2. [Short-term remediation]
3. [Long-term prevention]
## Appendix
- All transaction hashes
- All contract addresses
- All attacker addresses
- Tool queries used
- Chain of custody logScripts
scripts/tx-tracer.py— Automated transaction tracing and evidence collectionscripts/timeline-builder.py— Build incident timeline from logs and transactionsscripts/evidence-hasher.py— Hash and verify evidence integrityscripts/address-clusterer.py— Cluster related addresses by behavior
References
references/web2-log-analysis.md— Web2 log analysis proceduresreferences/web2-memory-forensics.md— Memory forensics techniquesreferences/web2-malware-analysis.md— Malware analysis proceduresreferences/web2-disk-forensics.md— Disk forensics techniquesreferences/web3-chain-tracing.md— On-chain fund tracing proceduresreferences/web3-tx-analysis.md— Transaction analysis techniquesreferences/web3-exploit-reconstruction.md— Exploit reconstruction methodologyreferences/incident-response.md— Incident response proceduresreferences/evidence-preservation.md— Evidence preservation and chain of custodyreferences/attacker-identification.md— Attacker identification and clusteringreferences/post-mortem-templates.md— Post-mortem report templates
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