pentest
Skill0 starsChanged 44 days agoMITView on GitHub
White-box security audit for your own web app or API. Reviews code, configs, dependencies, auth, headers and OWASP Top 10 issues with read-only checks and produces a ranked report with fixes. Use whenever the user asks for a pentest, security audit, vulnerability review, or hardening of their project, even if they just say "testa a segurança", "faz um pentest aqui" or "acha vulnerabilidades no meu app".
- Reads credentials
13 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- victorbeppler/claude-bootstraptheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- LuisSambrano/antigravity-configtheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- g-cqd/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- greglas75/zuvotheir own version, first seen Oct 16, 2026
- harshitsharma0701/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 15, 2026
- zakirkun/deep-eyetheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
Other versions13 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 13
- zakirkun/deep-eye★ 2.3ksame name
- Strategic-Automation/violin★ 159same name
- JoelQ/skills★ 44same name
- us/shannon-on-claude-code★ 15same name
- ariadoss/superskills★ 12same name
- LuisSambrano/antigravity-config★ 8same name
- greglas75/zuvo★ 7same name
- gonimar/claude-web-studio★ 4same name
- g-cqd/skills★ 2same name
- Digital-Frontier-LDA/shannon-claude-code★ 1same name
3 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository7 other files it gives its agents.
- crewSkill
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- handoffSkill
- mac-cleanupSkill
- product-namingSkill
- race-photo-editSkill
- seo-geoSkill
The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
14 rules. 0 are common, 11 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 12 edited versions we read keep these.
11
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 25
Do not start until one of these is true:
- Distinctive: line 31
If the target is a third-party site, API, or app the user does not own, stop and explain: test only with written authorization.
- Distinctive: line 35
Never test a target the user does not own.
- Distinctive: line 51
Read the relevant section before judging a category you have not verified in this session.
- Distinctive: line 56
Read-only by default: Never modify code, run migrations, delete data, or send attack payloads in passive mode.
- Very specific: line 58
Secrets stay secret: If you find a live key, show the file and the variable name, never the value.
- Distinctive: line 61
Measure, don't guess: Never claim a vulnerability without evidence: file:line plus the data flow, or an observed HTTP response.
- Very specific: line 66
No new tooling without asking: Use the project's own stack, curl, and the bundled script.
- Distinctive: line 69
Respect a denial: If a file or command is blocked by permissions, show the manual check instead of working around it.
- Distinctive: line 76
Ask in one message when the answers are not obvious:
- Distinctive: line 96
Run the read-only scan from this skill's directory:
- Distinctive: line 114
Access control: every route/handler — who can call it, what object does it act on, is ownership checked (IDOR/BOLA)?
- Very specific: line 134
Check HSTS, CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Set-Cookie flags (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite), CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: …
- Distinctive: line 190
Report what you did not check: No staging URL, no mobile app, no infra review — say so under "Also checked".
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 12 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Pentest
Audit the security of your own project without breaking it.
This is a defensive, white-box, passive audit: it reads code and configuration, runs read-only scanners, observes HTTP responses, and maps everything to OWASP. It never exploits, brute-forces, floods, deletes, or exfiltrates. That is the whole point: you get the findings a pentest would open with, safely, on code you own.
Reply in the user's language. Write the report in the user's language.
Authorization first
Do not start until one of these is true:
- The target is the current project checkout (code you can read), or
- The user gives an explicit target (repo path or URL) plus confirmation they own it or may test it ("é meu", "tenho autorização", staging they own).
If the target is a third-party site, API, or app the user does not own, stop and explain: test only with written authorization. Offer to audit their own code instead.
Never test a target the user does not own. Never run active payloads (SQLi/XSS fuzzing, auth bypass attempts, SSRF callbacks) without the user explicitly choosing active mode for their own staging environment. Default is passive.
Three tiers
Classify every finding before reporting it:
| Tier | What | How to act |
| Critical / High | Secrets in repo, auth bypass by review, injection by tainted flow, missing access control, RCE/SSRF sink reachable | Show evidence (file:line, flow), explain impact in one line, propose the fix. |
| Medium | Missing security headers, weak cookie flags, CORS * with credentials, verbose errors, outdated dep with CVE, no rate-limit | Group by theme, show the exact config, propose the fix. |
| Low / Hygiene | Version banners, missing SPF/DMARC hints, weak cache policy, informational | List briefly at the end. |
references/checklist.md defines what to check for each OWASP category.
Read the relevant section before judging a category you have not verified
in this session.
Ground rules, and why
- Read-only by default. Never modify code, run migrations, delete data, or send attack payloads in passive mode. The scan script only reads.
- Secrets stay secret. If you find a live key, show the file and the
variable name, never the value. Redact to
sk-live-****1234. Tell the user to rotate it, not to paste it in chat. - Measure, don't guess. Never claim a vulnerability without evidence: file:line plus the data flow, or an observed HTTP response. "Parece vulnerável" is not a finding.
- Staging over prod. Any live HTTP check goes to staging first. Against
prod, only safe
GET/HEAD/OPTIONSwith no side effects. - No new tooling without asking. Use the project's own stack,
curl, and the bundled script. No installing Kali tools, no new npm packages unless the user agrees. - Respect a denial. If a file or command is blocked by permissions, show the manual check instead of working around it.
Workflow
1. Scope
Ask in one message when the answers are not obvious:
- Target: repo path and/or staging URL? What is out of scope?
- Stack: framework, auth method (session/JWT/OAuth), where secrets live?
- Mode: passive audit (default) or active against own staging?
Save the answers to pentest/<slug>/scope.md. Keep the run in
pentest/<slug>/ at the project root (or a temp dir if the repo must not
be touched):
pentest/<slug>/
├── scope.md
├── scan.txt
├── findings.md
└── report.md2. Baseline scan
Run the read-only scan from this skill's directory:
bash <skill-dir>/scripts/scan.sh <project-root> [--url https://staging.example.com]It reports: exposed secret patterns, .env and key files, dependency CVEs
via the project's own audit commands, auth/session config smells, and — only
when --url is given — response headers, cookie flags, CORS and TLS basics.
Save the output to pentest/<slug>/scan.txt.
The script never sends payloads and never writes to the project.
3. Manual review
The script finds the cheap signals. You find the logic bugs. Cover at
minimum, guided by references/checklist.md:
- Access control: every route/handler — who can call it, what object does it act on, is ownership checked (IDOR/BOLA)?
- Auth/session: password hashing, JWT validation (alg, exp, storage), OAuth redirect allowlist, logout, password reset tokens.
- Input/injection: where user input reaches SQL, ORM raw, shell, template, redirect, or file path. Trace the flow, don't grep keywords.
- Secrets/config: env handling, committed
.env, CI logs, error messages leaking stack or keys. - APIs: mass assignment, pagination without auth, webhook signature verification, CORS and rate-limit.
For each suspicion, confirm by reading the code path end to end before recording it.
4. Passive HTTP observation (only with --url)
curl -sI "<url>" ; curl -s -D - "<url>" -o /dev/nullCheck HSTS, CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy,
Set-Cookie flags (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite), CORS
(Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with credentials is a finding), and
server version banners. One request per endpoint; no fuzzing, no
parameter tampering in passive mode.
5. Score and report
Score with references/report.md (Critical/High/Medium/Low + likelihood
× impact in one line each). Write report.md and show it in the
conversation. If you cannot write files, put the full report in your reply.
# Pentest: <target>
**Scope:** repo · url · mode (passive) · date
**Stack:** <framework, auth, hosting>
**Scan:** N signals → V confirmed findings (C critical, H high, M medium, L low)
## Findings
### 1. <title> — <severity>
- **Where:** file:line / endpoint + method
- **Evidence:** redacted snippet or observed header
- **Impact:** what an attacker gains, in one line
- **Fix:** concrete change (config, code shape, snippet)
- **OWASP:** A0X:2021 – <name>
## Also checked (no issue)
| Area | Result |
## Next steps
- Rotate exposed secrets first, then fix Critical/High in order
- Re-run scan.sh after fixes; active testing only on staging with approvalOrder findings by severity, then by exploitability. A finding without evidence goes to "Also checked", not to Findings.
6. Fixes (only if asked)
Fix in severity order, one change per finding, re-running the project's checks after each. Never commit exposed secrets to "fix" them — rotate outside git, purge history separately. Offer a follow-up scan as the verification step.
Pitfalls
- Keyword grep is not an audit.
eval(,innerHTML,raw()appear in safe code too. Trace the data flow from request to sink. - Severity inflation. A missing header alone is Medium at most. Without an impact path it is not Critical.
- Auth is logic, not headers. The worst bugs are missing ownership
checks, not missing
X-Frame-Options. Read the handlers. - Do not "verify" by exploiting. Confirm by code path or by a single safe observation. Proof-of-concept payloads belong to active mode on staging, with explicit approval.
- Report what you did not check. No staging URL, no mobile app, no infra review — say so under "Also checked".
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
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- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
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