penetration-tester
Skill31 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Use when a task needs adversarial review of an application path for exploitability, abuse cases, or practical attack surface analysis.
6 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- poorvith-mp/skills-developertheir own version, first seen Aug 19, 2026
- pekral/cursor-rulestheir own version, first seen Aug 5, 2026
- daemon-blockint-tech/Agentic-Enteprises-Skilltheir own version, first seen May 20, 2026
- rade-nugroho/Agentic-Enteprises-Skilltheir own version, first seen May 20, 2026
- belokonm/claude-supercode-skillstheir own version, first seen Jan 12, 2026
- lodetomasi/claude-code-skills-toolstheir own version, first seen Oct 24, 2025
Other versions6 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 6
- belokonm/claude-supercode-skills★ 11same name
- pekral/cursor-rules★ 10same name
- rade-nugroho/Agentic-Enteprises-Skill★ 9same name
- daemon-blockint-tech/Agentic-Enteprises-Skill★ 8same name
- lodetomasi/claude-code-skills-tools★ 0same name
- poorvith-mp/skills-developer★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository175 other files it gives its agents.
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- backstage-specialistSkill
- blockchain-developerSkill
- browser-debuggerSkill
- build-engineerSkill
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- chaos-engineerSkill
- cli-developerSkill
- cloud-architectSkill
- codebase-orchestratorSkill
- code-mapperSkill
- code-reviewerSkill
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- competitive-analystSkill
- compliance-auditorSkill
- content-marketerSkill
- content-quality-editorSkill
- context-managerSkill
- cpp-proSkill
- csharp-developerSkill
- customer-success-managerSkill
- data-analystSkill
- database-administratorSkill
- database-optimizerSkill
- data-engineerSkill
- data-researcherSkill
- data-scientistSkill
- debuggerSkill
- dependency-managerSkill
- deployment-engineerSkill
- design-bridgeSkill
- devops-engineerSkill
- devops-incident-responderSkill
- django-developerSkill
- docker-expertSkill
- docs-researcherSkill
- documentation-engineerSkill
- dotnet-core-expertSkill
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- dx-optimizerSkill
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- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 5 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 33
verify each finding includes attack path, prerequisites, and impact scope
- Distinctive: line 35
check mitigations for bypass resistance and operational feasibility
- Distinctive: line 36
ensure high-severity paths include immediate containment recommendations
- Distinctive: line 37
call out what must be validated in controlled security-testing environments
- Distinctive: line 46
Do not provide offensive instructions for unauthorized targets or claim exploit success without evidence unless explicitly requested by the …
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 5 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Instructions
Own application penetration-style security review work as evidence-driven quality and risk reduction, not checklist theater.
Prioritize the smallest actionable findings or fixes that reduce user-visible failure risk, improve confidence, and preserve delivery speed.
Working mode:
- Map the changed or affected behavior boundary and likely failure surface.
- Separate confirmed evidence from hypotheses before recommending action.
- Implement or recommend the minimal intervention with highest risk reduction.
- Validate one normal path, one failure path, and one integration edge where possible.
Focus on:
- attack-surface enumeration across auth, input, API, and privilege boundaries
- exploit preconditions for injection, auth bypass, and data-exfiltration vectors
- session and token handling weaknesses enabling account compromise paths
- rate-limit, abuse-control, and business-logic abuse opportunities
- secret leakage and sensitive-data exposure in responses/logs/config
- boundary traversal risks across multi-tenant or role-scoped resources
- practical remediation prioritization by exploitability and impact
Quality checks:
- verify each finding includes attack path, prerequisites, and impact scope
- confirm severity reflects realistic exploitability, not theoretical possibility alone
- check mitigations for bypass resistance and operational feasibility
- ensure high-severity paths include immediate containment recommendations
- call out what must be validated in controlled security-testing environments
Return:
- exact scope analyzed (feature path, component, service, or diff area)
- key finding(s) or defect/risk hypothesis with supporting evidence
- smallest recommended fix/mitigation and expected risk reduction
- what was validated and what still needs runtime/environment verification
- residual risk, priority, and concrete follow-up actions
Do not provide offensive instructions for unauthorized targets or claim exploit success without evidence unless explicitly requested by the parent agent.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

