vulnerability-analysis
Skill2 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Every vulnerability you miss is one an attacker can find. Systematic analysis traces untrusted data from source to sink, evaluates filters for bypass, and questions every trust boundary assumption. Taint Analysis: Mark untrusted data at origin (source), track propagation to dangerous operations (sink). Vulnerability exists when tainted data reaches sink without adequate sanitization. Source-Forward: Start from data entry points, trace every path to sinks. Comprehensive but time-consuming. Sink-Backward: Start from dangerous operations (eval, exec, SQL, innerHTML), trace backward to sources.…
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. About 0 are common, 7 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈7
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 11
Every vulnerability you miss is one an attacker can find.
- Distinctive: line 27
Source-Forward: Start from data entry points, trace every path to sinks.
- Distinctive: line 29
Sink-Backward: Start from dangerous operations (eval, exec, SQL, innerHTML), trace backward to sources.
- Distinctive: line 55
Check for established patterns — recognized safe idioms in the domain?
- Distinctive: line 56
Exploitability Gate: Before reporting ANY finding:
- Distinctive: line 60
Findings: Document CWE, severity, root cause, exploitation scenario, remediation.
- Distinctive: line 78
Use-after-free: dangling pointers, double-free
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 308,232 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
name: vulnerability-analysis description: Expert-level source code security auditing — taint analysis, memory safety, injection classes, auth flaws, crypto weaknesses, concurrency bugs, supply chain risks metadata: type: offensive phase: analysis
Vulnerability Analysis
Every vulnerability you miss is one an attacker can find. Systematic analysis traces untrusted data from source to sink, evaluates filters for bypass, and questions every trust boundary assumption.
When to Activate
- Reviewing any code for security vulnerabilities - Auditing authentication, authorization, or session logic - Evaluating input handling and output encoding - Assessing cryptographic implementations - Reviewing file operations, command execution, or deserialization - Checking for race conditions in concurrent code - Analyzing dependency security and supply chain risks
Core Methodology
Taint Analysis: Mark untrusted data at origin (source), track propagation to dangerous operations (sink). Vulnerability exists when tainted data reaches sink without adequate sanitization.
Source-Forward: Start from data entry points, trace every path to sinks. Comprehensive but time-consuming.
Sink-Backward: Start from dangerous operations (eval, exec, SQL, innerHTML), trace backward to sources. Faster and targeted.
Hybrid Approach: Sink-backward for rapid high-risk identification, then source-forward for complete coverage.
Rule Categories by Priority
| Priority | Category | Impact |
| 1 | Taint Analysis | CRITICAL |
| 2 | Memory Safety | CRITICAL |
| 3 | Injection Attacks | CRITICAL |
| 4 | Authentication & Authorization | HIGH |
| 5 | Cryptographic Vulnerabilities | HIGH |
| 6 | Concurrency & Race Conditions | HIGH |
| 7 | Web & API Security | MEDIUM-HIGH |
| 8 | Supply Chain & Dependencies | MEDIUM |
Audit Protocol
1. Reconnaissance: Identify language, frameworks, trust boundaries, sensitive data, high-value targets. Establish threat model. 2. Attack Surface Enumeration: Map all entry points — HTTP endpoints, CLI args, file inputs, IPC, deserialization points. 3. Systematic Analysis: Apply hybrid taint analysis across all source-sink paths. 4. False Positive Reduction: - Trace validation chains upstream — is the value bounded before reaching sink? - Confirm reachability — can attacker actually trigger this path? - Evaluate against threat model — does exploitation require capabilities attacker doesn't have? - Check for established patterns — recognized safe idioms in the domain? 5. Exploitability Gate: Before reporting ANY finding: - Are you certain this isn't expected functionality? - Is this a valid vulnerability worth reporting? - Is it actually exploitable in production? 6. Findings: Document CWE, severity, root cause, exploitation scenario, remediation. 7. Variant Hunting: Generalize each finding into a pattern and search for variants.
Vulnerability Classes
Injection Attacks
- SQL Injection: string concat in queries, ORM raw methods, second-order injection - Command Injection: user input in system(), exec(), backticks, $() - XSS: reflected, stored, DOM-based, template injection - SSTI: user input in template engines (Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker) - XXE: XML parsing with external entities enabled - SSRF: user-controlled URLs in server-side requests - Deserialization: untrusted data in pickle, Java ObjectInputStream, PHP unserialize - Path Traversal: ../../../etc/passwd in file operations - ReDoS: catastrophic backtracking in regex with user input
Memory Safety
- Buffer overflow: unbounded copies, integer overflow in size calculations - Use-after-free: dangling pointers, double-free - Integer overflow: unchecked arithmetic in size/offset calculations - Null pointer dereference: missing null checks on fallible operations - Format string: user-controlled format specifiers
Authentication & Authorization
- Auth bypass: missing checks, JWT algorithm confusion, middleware ordering - IDOR: direct object references without ownership verification - Privilege escalation: role checks on client side only - Session fixation: predictable tokens, missing regeneration
Cryptographic Issues
- Weak algorithms: MD5, SHA1 for security, DES, RC4 - ECB mode: pattern-preserving encryption - Missing HMAC: encryption without authentication - Hardcoded keys/IVs: secrets in source code - Insufficient randomness: Math.random() for security tokens
Concurrency
- TOCTOU: check-then-act without atomicity - Race conditions: shared state without proper locking - Double-spend: financial operations without idempotency
Security Review Checklist
- [ ] All user inputs validated server-side with allowlists - [ ] Database queries use parameterized statements exclusively - [ ] Command execution avoids shell interpretation - [ ] Output encoding matches rendering context (HTML, JS, CSS, URL) - [ ] Authentication checks on every sensitive endpoint - [ ] Authorization verifies ownership, not just authentication - [ ] Cryptographic operations use modern algorithms with proper key management - [ ] Session tokens have sufficient entropy with Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite - [ ] File operations validate paths against traversal - [ ] Deserialization never operates on untrusted data without safe loaders - [ ] Race conditions mitigated with atomic operations or proper locking - [ ] Dependencies pinned, audited, free of known CVEs
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude★ 401same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
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