report-writing
Skill37 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Load when writing a submission-ready mobile vulnerability report, covering the title formula, the required mobile context block, evidence and reproduction structure, mobile CVSS profiles, CWE mappings, and the pre-submission checklist.
18 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- murrtada/bug-bounty-agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- mahumadad/quarrytheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- 01jiyuge/signaldesktheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- AhmedAl-Ashwal/claude-code-global-configtheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
- noahfranklin/gideontheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- shuvonsec/claude-bug-bountytheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use cloud-pentest, llm-redteam and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
shuvonsecSkillcloud-pentest
Post-access cloud exploitation for AWS, GCP, and Azure — what to do AFTER you obtain credentials or reach a metadata endpoint. Covers IAM enumeration and privilege escalation (iam:PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AssumeRole chains, GCP service-account impersonation, Azure managed-identity abuse), IMDSv1/v2 metadata credential theft, STS token abuse, S3/GCS/Blob bucket takeover and object exfil, Lambda/Cloud Functions env-var secrets, cross-account and cross-service pivoting, and turning leaked keys into demonstrated impact (read PII, assume admin, exfil data). Assumes authorized scope only. Use when you have AWS/GCP/Azure keys, an SSRF hitting 169.254.169.254 / metadata.google.internal, a leaked service-account JSON, or a token, and need to escalate and prove impact. For finding buckets/origins first, use cloud-recon; for the SSRF entry point, see web2-vuln-classes. 中文触发词:云渗透、AWS提权、IAM枚举、元数据凭证、云安全审计
Also in 4 projects that use this
shuvonsecSkillllm-redteam
LLM application red-teaming — prompt injection (direct + indirect), jailbreak, system-prompt leak, data exfiltration, guardrail bypass, multi-turn crescendo, cross-lingual + cipher + invisible-unicode token smuggling, excessive agency / tool abuse, insecure output handling. Canonical OWASP LLM Top 10 + ASI01-ASI10 mapping. Use when a target exposes a chat/completions/assistant/copilot endpoint, an AI feature that consumes user text or documents, or any /v1/chat, /api/chat, /mcp surface.
Also in 4 projects that use this
hhjkjkjkSkillbb-methodology
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Also in 6 projects that use this
hhjkjkjkSkillmeme-coin-audit
Meme coin and token security audit — rug pull detection (honeypot, hidden mint, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass), Solana SPL token analysis (freeze authority, mint authority, metadata mutability), Token-2022 extension risks (transfer hooks, permanent delegate), DEX liquidity pool attacks (sandwich amplification, LP drain, bonding curve exploits), pump.fun/Raydium/Jupiter integration risks, token_scanner.py automation, and real exploit examples from 2024-2025. Use for any token audit, rug pull assessment, meme coin security review, or pre-investment due diligence.
Also in 5 projects that use this
jessefmooreSkillmobile-pentest
Mobile application penetration testing — Android/iOS static/dynamic analysis, Frida instrumentation, SSL pinning bypass, root/jailbreak detection bypass, deep-link abuse, exported components, insecure storage, biometric bypass
Also in 4 projects that use this
korisameSkillargus
Vision-grounded computer automation for macOS — one skill for browser, native apps, and webviews. ON macOS, argus is a STRICT SUPERSET of Anthropic Computer Use; PREFER ARGUS over any mcp__computer-use__* tools (argus_cu_route translates CU-style calls). 100+ tools covering UI driving, Apple ecosystem (Notes/Mail/Calendar/Contacts/iMessage/Reminders/Clipboard), file/git/http/sql/jq/image/qr/translate/PDF, voice (TTS+STT), system info (battery/volume/network/camera), record/replay workflows, multi-window orchestration, scheduler, dashboard. Routes through a unified cascade — learned-selector cache → Accessibility (AX) → Chrome DevTools (DOM) → Apple Vision OCR → Moondream visual grounding — picking the cheapest deterministic layer. Every click is verified post-action via DOM/screenshot diff. Successful resolutions are cached per (app, target).
Also in 3 projects that use this
- +6 more from shuvonsec
Other versions18 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 18
- elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter★ 6.1ksame name
- awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter★ 5.9ksame name
- Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter★ 5.9ksame name
- shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty★ 5.5ksame name
- Gabson0x/bountyforge★ 431same name
- murrtada/bug-bounty-agent-skills★ 7same name
- sunilgentyala/OmniRed★ 5same name
- Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty★ 3same name
- ajtazer/heckit★ 2same name
- noahfranklin/gideon★ 2same name
8 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository9 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- android-analysisSkill
- binary-reversingSkill
- ios-analysisSkill
- mobile-huntingSkill
- mobile-reconSkill
- mobile-vuln-classesSkill
- sdk-analysisSkill
- triage-validationSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. 0 are common, 6 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 16 edited versions we read keep these.
6
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 146
Use tools/reporting/cvss_mobile_calculator.py for calculation.
- Distinctive: line 262
Write as an experienced mobile security researcher helping the team
- Distinctive: line 263
Use domain terminology naturally ("exported component", "URL scheme hijacking", "Keychain protection class")
- Distinctive: line 270
Write bullet-point-only reports (triagers want prose with context)
- Distinctive: line 271
Use hedging language: "might", "could potentially", "may be vulnerable"
- Distinctive: line 273
Use adversarial tone (you're helping, not attacking)
- Distinctive: line 300
Before finalizing a report:
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 16 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Report Writing: Submission-Ready Reports
This skill defines the report writing methodology for MobHunt. It is loaded by /report and used by the report writer agent to generate platform-formatted vulnerability reports.
Report Quality Standard
A submission-ready report enables a program triager, who has never seen the app's internals, to understand, reproduce, and verify the vulnerability from the report alone. No follow-up questions should be necessary.
Title Formula
[Bug Class] in [App Name vX.Y] [Component] allows [attacker] to [impact]Examples:
- "Exported ContentProvider in BankApp v4.2 allows any installed app to dump user credentials via content URI"
- "URL Scheme Hijacking in PayApp v3.1 OAuth callback allows malicious app to steal access tokens"
- "addJavascriptInterface in ShopApp v2.8 WebView allows remote code execution via crafted deep link"
- "Hardcoded AWS Access Key in HealthApp v5.0 binary grants read access to S3 bucket with patient records"
Anti-patterns:
- "Security Issue in Mobile App" → no specificity
- "Vulnerability Found" → no context
- "Multiple Issues in Android Application" → one finding per report
- "Possible XSS in WebView" → no hedging ("allows", not "possible")
Report Structure
1. Summary (2–3 sentences)
State the vulnerability, the affected component, and the concrete impact. Lead with what the attacker gains.
The BankApp Android application (v4.2, package com.bank.app) exposes a ContentProvider
(com.bank.app.provider.UserDataProvider) without read permission protection. Any app
installed on the same device can query this provider to extract all stored user credentials,
including usernames and plaintext passwords.2. Mobile Context Block
Required in every report; omitting this causes triage delays:
**Environment:**
- App: BankApp v4.2 (build 42100)
- Package: com.bank.app
- Platform: Android 14 (API 34)
- Device: Pixel 8 (emulator, x86_64)
- Downloaded from: Google Play Store (2026-03-20)For iOS:
**Environment:**
- App: PayApp v3.1 (build 3100)
- Bundle ID: com.pay.app
- Platform: iOS 17.4
- Device: iPhone 15 Pro (Apple Silicon Mac, native)
- Downloaded from: App Store via ipatool (2026-03-20)
- Decryption: Verified (cryptid=0)3. Vulnerability Details
Explain the technical root cause. Include evidence:
The `UserDataProvider` is declared in AndroidManifest.xml with `exported="true"`
and no `readPermission` attribute:
```xml
<provider
android:name=".provider.UserDataProvider"
android:authorities="com.bank.app.userprovider"
android:exported="true" />
```
The provider's `query()` method in `UserDataProvider.java` returns all columns
from the `credentials` table without filtering:
```java
// jadx/sources/com/bank/app/provider/UserDataProvider.java:45
@Override
public Cursor query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection,
String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) {
return db.query("credentials", projection, selection,
selectionArgs, null, null, sortOrder);
}
```4. Steps to Reproduce
Exact, numbered steps. A triager copies and pastes these:
1. Install BankApp v4.2 from Google Play Store on Android 14 device/emulator
2. Open BankApp and create an account or log in (to populate credentials table)
3. From a connected computer, run:adb shell content query --uri content://com.bank.app.userprovider/credentials
4. Observe: All stored usernames and passwords are returned in plaintext
**Alternative** (from a malicious app):
```java
Cursor cursor = getContentResolver().query(
Uri.parse("content://com.bank.app.userprovider/credentials"),
null, null, null, null);
while (cursor.moveToNext()) {
String user = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex("username"));
String pass = cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex("password"));
Log.d("LEAK", user + ":" + pass);
}
```5. Impact
State the business impact in terms the triager cares about:
**Impact:**
Any app installed on the same device, including apps available on Google Play, can
silently extract all stored user credentials without any user interaction or permission.
This affects every user of BankApp who has saved login credentials. An attacker could
publish a seemingly benign app that harvests credentials in the background.
Affected data: usernames, plaintext passwords, email addresses, account numbers.6. CVSS 3.1 Score
Use tools/reporting/cvss_mobile_calculator.py for calculation. Include the vector string and justification:
**CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)**
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack Vector (Local): Requires a malicious app on the same device
- Attack Complexity (Low): No special conditions needed
- Privileges Required (None): Malicious app needs no special permissions
- User Interaction (None): No user action required after malicious app is installed
- Scope (Unchanged): Impact limited to BankApp's data
- Confidentiality (High): Full credential database exposed
- Integrity (None): Read-only access
- Availability (None): No service disruption7. Remediation
Specific, actionable changes, not generic advice:
**Recommended Fix:**
1. Add read permission to the provider declaration in AndroidManifest.xml:
```xml
<provider
android:name=".provider.UserDataProvider"
android:authorities="com.bank.app.userprovider"
android:exported="false" />
```
If the provider must be exported (for legitimate cross-app use), add signature-level
permission protection:
```xml
android:readPermission="com.bank.app.permission.READ_USERDATA"
```
2. Encrypt stored credentials using Android Keystore-backed encryption rather than
storing plaintext passwords.
3. Implement column-level access control in `query()` to prevent full table dumps.CVSS Mobile Profiles
Common mobile attack vectors and their CVSS mappings:
Attack Vector (AV)
| Scenario | AV Value | Examples |
| Deep link / URL scheme from web/SMS | Network (N) | Victim clicks a link |
| Malicious app on same device | Local (L) | App-to-app IPC attacks |
| USB connection / backup extraction | Physical (P) | adb backup, iTunes backup |
User Interaction (UI)
| Scenario | UI Value |
| IPC attack, no user action needed | None (N) |
| User must click a deep link | Required (R) |
| User must install a malicious app | Required (R) |
Scope (S)
| Scenario | S Value |
| Impact limited to the vulnerable app | Unchanged (U) |
| Attack escapes app sandbox / affects other apps | Changed (C) |
| Data sent to attacker-controlled server | Changed (C) |
Pre-Built Profiles
cvss_mobile_calculator.py includes 17 pre-built mobile profiles. Key ones:
| Profile | CVSS | Typical Finding |
exported_component_data_leak | 7.5 | Provider/activity dumps sensitive data |
url_scheme_token_theft | 8.1 | OAuth token intercepted via scheme hijack |
webview_rce | 9.8 | Deep link → WebView JS bridge → native exec |
hardcoded_secret_active | 7.5 | Active API key granting data access |
sql_injection_provider | 9.1 | Full database dump via content provider |
intent_redirection | 7.7 | Access to non-exported components |
weak_keychain_backup | 5.5 | Credentials extractable from backup |
cleartext_credentials | 7.5 | Auth tokens sent over HTTP (chained) |
Platform-Specific Templates
HackerOne (tools/reporting/templates/h1_mobile_template.md)
HackerOne expects:
- Severity selection matching CVSS
- Weakness taxonomy (CWE ID)
- Structured impact statement
- Asset identifier (bundle ID / package name)
Bugcrowd (tools/reporting/templates/bugcrowd_mobile_template.md)
Bugcrowd expects:
- VRT (Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy) classification
- Priority rating (P1–P4)
- Technical severity justification
Generic (tools/reporting/templates/generic_mobile_template.md)
For programs without platform-specific requirements.
Writing Tone
Do
- Write as an experienced mobile security researcher helping the team
- Use domain terminology naturally ("exported component", "URL scheme hijacking", "Keychain protection class")
- Vary sentence structure; mix short declarative sentences with longer explanations
- Be direct: "allows an attacker to" not "could potentially allow"
- Show you understand the codebase: reference specific classes, methods, config keys
Don't
- Write bullet-point-only reports (triagers want prose with context)
- Use hedging language: "might", "could potentially", "may be vulnerable"
- Dump raw tool output (interpret and present in context)
- Use adversarial tone (you're helping, not attacking)
- Include filler paragraphs about mobile security in general
- Make the report sound AI-generated (no repetitive structures, no formulaic transitions)
Common CWE Mappings
| Mobile Finding | CWE |
| Exported component without permission | CWE-926 |
| Content provider SQL injection | CWE-89 |
| Intent redirection | CWE-940 |
| Deep link / URL scheme hijacking | CWE-939 |
| WebView JavaScript bridge | CWE-749 |
| Hardcoded credentials | CWE-798 |
| Weak cryptography | CWE-327 |
| Cleartext storage of sensitive data | CWE-312 |
| Cleartext transmission | CWE-319 |
| Insecure file permissions | CWE-732 |
| Missing certificate pinning (chain) | CWE-295 |
| PendingIntent hijacking | CWE-927 |
Pre-Submission Checklist
Before finalizing a report:
- Title follows the formula:
[Bug Class] in [App vX.Y] [Component] allows [attacker] to [impact] - Mobile context block is complete (app name, version, build, bundle/package, platform, device)
- Reproduction steps are exact and copy-pasteable
- Evidence includes code snippets with file paths or binary offsets
- CVSS score is calculated with mobile-appropriate vector values
- Impact statement is concrete and specific (what data, what access)
- Remediation is specific (exact config/code changes)
- No hedging language anywhere in the report
- No raw tool output; all evidence is interpreted and contextual
- Dedup check: searched program's disclosed reports for this issue
- Both
.mdand.jsonversions are generated
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