certificate-management
Skill1 starsChanged 32 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Issue, renew, read, and revoke TLS/SSL certificates, and where a platform documents it set up the certificate authority and issuance roles, on a supported certificate-management platform or protocol — currently the ACME protocol (e.g. Let's Encrypt), HashiCorp Vault's PKI secrets engine, AWS Certificate Manager, DigiCert ONE Trust Lifecycle Manager, and Sectigo Certificate Manager. Use when an agent needs to manage certificate lifecycle itself, distinct from installing/binding an already-issued certificate to a specific application, device, or load-balancer VIP (that binding step belongs to the consuming platform's own skill, e.g. load-balancing). Assumes an authenticated client/credential for the target platform's API is already available; this skill does not provision or authenticate it. See references/INDEX.md for the full vendor/protocol list.
In this repository40 other files it gives its agents.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 19
Not for installing or binding an already-issued certificate to a specific consuming system — e.g.
- Distinctive: line 25
No wire-level standard grounds every platform in this category the way, say, RFC 1035/2136 grounds DNS — the ACME protocol (RFC 8555) is …
- Very specific: line 59
Check references/INDEX.md.
- Distinctive: line 73
Does not cover installing/binding an issued certificate to a consuming application, device, or load balancer — that belongs to the …
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Certificate Management
Manages TLS/SSL certificate lifecycle — issuance, renewal, inspection, revocation — on whichever certificate-management platform or protocol the caller is targeting, following that platform's own documented procedure exactly.
When to use this skill
- Issuing, renewing, reading (expiry, SANs, chain), or revoking a certificate on a supported platform/protocol.
- Where a platform's reference documents it (see the INDEX): creating a certificate authority and defining or changing issuance roles.
- Not for installing or binding an already-issued certificate to a specific consuming system — e.g.
binding a certificate to a load-balancer VIP is
load-balancing's concern, not this skill's; this skill's job ends at producing/managing the certificate itself.
Universal concepts (shared certificate-management vocabulary, not a wire standard)
No wire-level standard grounds every platform in this category the way, say, RFC 1035/2136 grounds
DNS — the ACME protocol (RFC 8555) is itself a standard, but Vault PKI, AWS ACM, DigiCert, and Sectigo are each a
vendor-specific API with no shared protocol underneath them. The claims below hold for the platforms checked;
DigiCert and Sectigo details are partly unverified (see their procedure files). They do not extend
automatically to a platform not listed in references/INDEX.md; verify against that platform's own
behavior first. Several plausible-sounding claims do
not hold on every platform and are deliberately left out below (see each platform's own
procedure.md "Patterns"/"Known limitations" for specifics):
- Revocation is generally permanent; a hold or suspension, where a platform offers one, may be
reversible. No platform documents reversing a revocation made for any other reason, and the
remedy is issuing a replacement certificate. Confirm which reasons are reversible in the
platform's own
procedure.md. This is why every platform's procedure gates revocation on explicit operator confirmation. - "Renewal" is not one consistent mechanism across platforms — confirm which pattern a given
platform actually uses before assuming behavior. The ACME protocol and Vault's PKI engine have no
dedicated renewal call at all (renewing is just issuing again); AWS ACM has both an automatic
managed-renewal mechanism and a separate explicit
RenewCertificateaction with its own narrower eligibility rules. Do not assume a "renew" step exists as a distinct wire operation, or that a certificate's identifier is preserved across renewal, until that platform's ownprocedure.mdconfirms it either way. - Where a platform generates the private key on the caller's behalf, capturing it at issuance time is a one-time opportunity, not something guaranteed retrievable later — confirmed explicitly for Vault PKI's issue call; check this against any platform that offers server-side key generation rather than assuming AWS ACM's fully-managed-key model (where the caller never handles the private key at all) is how every platform works. Where a platform offers optional key escrow, one-time capture may not apply.
See references/INDEX.md for which platforms/protocols have a procedure, and each platform file for
how it implements this shape concretely.
Procedure
- Identify the target platform/protocol — from the caller's request or the
platformargument. Checkreferences/INDEX.md; if no matching row exists, stop: this skill doesn't cover it yet. - Open the procedure file the INDEX lists for that platform and action (where a platform lists more than one procedure, choose the one matching the action) and follow it exactly — it contains that platform's full operational procedure, error handling, patterns, known limitations, tools, and verification checklist.
- Report the outcome using that platform procedure's own status vocabulary — don't normalize it away, and don't conflate a renewed certificate with a newly issued one, on a platform that distinguishes them (e.g. serial number/identifier continuity).
Known limitations
- Currently covers the ACME protocol (e.g. Let's Encrypt), HashiCorp Vault's PKI secrets engine, AWS
Certificate Manager, DigiCert ONE Trust Lifecycle Manager, and Sectigo Certificate Manager — see
references/INDEX.md. A platform not listed there needs a new reference file before this skill can be used for it. - Does not cover installing/binding an issued certificate to a consuming application, device, or load balancer — that belongs to the consuming system's own skill.
Contributing to this skill
SKILL.md only changes for two reasons: a bug in the universal concepts/router logic above, or
adding a pointer to a newly-supported platform. Platform-specific procedure changes — a new error
code, a corrected field, a changed call mechanism detail — belong in that platform's own
references/<platform>/procedure.md, never here.
Tools
Each platform assumes its own authenticated client/credential — see references/INDEX.md for which,
and that platform's procedure.md for the specific operations.
Verification checklist
- Target platform/protocol confirmed against
references/INDEX.mdbefore proceeding - That platform's own
procedure.mdwas followed, including its own confirmation gates on destructive changes (revocation, which is generally irreversible) - Outcome reported using the platform procedure's own status vocabulary, distinguishing a renewed certificate from a newly issued one where the platform makes that distinction
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