incident-triage
Skill0 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Guide rapid triage and initial response to security incidents following NIST SP 800-61 methodology. Use when the user mentions 'incident response,' 'security incident,' 'triage,' 'we've been hacked,' 'breach,' 'compromised,' 'malware detected,' 'suspicious activity,' 'IOC,' 'indicators of compromise,' or needs help handling a security event.
23 other projects use a version of this, 1 of them edited.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- termalinapp/termalin-plugintheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- superset-sh/supersettheir own version, first seen Nov 2, 2026
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsedited, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- Happy-Technologies-LLC/happy-platform-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- rpraharaj/ai-sdlctheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- rpraharaj/ai-engineertheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use write-runbook, explore-codebase and 5 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
MaheshAwasareSkillwrite-runbook
Generate an operational runbook for a service from its code, config, and dependencies — what to do when it breaks, where to look, how to roll back, who to escalate to. Use proactively before a service goes to production, after a major incident, or when handing off operational ownership.
Also in 3 projects that use this
srclightSkillexplore-codebase
This skill should be used when the user asks to "explore this codebase", "understand this project", "give me an overview", "how does this work", "onboard me", "walk me through the architecture", "map the codebase", or any request to understand a codebase's structure, architecture, or design.
Also in 3 projects that use this
thlaureSkillreview-change
Use this skill when the user asks for a code review, a correctness pass, a check before PR, or asks whether a Signalist change follows project conventions.
Also in 4 projects that use this
SentrySkillwrite-tests
Write tests following project conventions. Use when adding new tests or modifying existing ones.
Also in 3 projects that use this
MicrosoftSkillapi-design
Guide for designing and documenting RESTful APIs. Use when asked to design an API, create endpoints, or document an API.
Also in 3 projects that use this
SentrySkillsecurity-review
Finds exploitable application security vulnerabilities in code changes. Use for Warden security scans, appsec review, OWASP-style checks, authentication or authorization bugs, injection, XSS, SSRF, path traversal, secrets, unsafe crypto, webhook verification, open redirects, or sensitive data exposure.
Also in 4 projects that use this
Other versions23 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 1
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills★ 48931% same
Wrote their own version · 22
- ParadevAI/Paradev★ 16ksame name
- superset-sh/superset★ 16ksame name
- Happy-Technologies-LLC/happy-platform-skills★ 41same name
- Indium-AI-Labs/indium-agentkit★ 18same name
- Ionate-Technologies/indium-agentkit★ 17same name
- Mozurok/fhorja.dev★ 10same name
- aws-samples/sample-aws-ops-skills-for-agents★ 8same name
- ByronScottJones/Agents★ 7same name
- aprameyak/coding-skills★ 1same name
- natrisc/claude-code-agents★ 1same name
12 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository30 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- cybersecurity-skillsSkill
- ai-risk-managementSkill
- api-auditSkill
- breach-patternsSkill
- cloud-auditSkill
- container-auditSkill
- crypto-auditSkill
- csf-mappingSkill
- dependency-auditSkill
- disk-forensicsSkill
- finding-triageSkill
- hipaa-auditSkill
- iam-auditSkill
- mobile-auditSkill
- osint-reconSkill
- owasp-auditSkill
- pci-auditSkill
- privacy-engineeringSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- reconSkill
- red-team-engagementSkill
- secrets-auditSkill
- security-commsSkill
- siem-detectionSkill
- soc-operationsSkill
- threat-huntingSkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- vuln-researchSkill
- web-pentestSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 19 edited versions we read keep these.
4
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 71
If memory forensics tools are available (LiME, WinPmem), capture a memory dump before anything else.
- Distinctive: line 82
Process tree: look for unusual process names, paths, or parent-child relationships
- Distinctive: line 151
If unsure about a containment action's impact, advise caution and ask
- Distinctive: line 152
Never recommend "hacking back" or retaliatory actions
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 19 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Incident Triage — Security Incident Response
Guide rapid triage and initial response to security incidents. Follow NIST SP 800-61 methodology.
Cross-references: siem-detection for the rules that produced the alert this triage is responding to, disk-forensics for deeper disk and memory analysis once a host is contained, breach-patterns for the post-incident pattern extraction that hardens against recurrence, soc-operations for the operational layer above this skill (runbooks, escalation, handoff), security-comms for the stakeholder / customer notifications the response generates, privacy-engineering / hipaa-audit / pci-audit for the regulatory-clock determination when personal data, PHI, or cardholder data is involved, ai-risk-management for AI-specific incident classes (model failure, fairness drift, jailbreak exploitation in production).
Priorities (in order)
- Preserve human safety
- Contain the incident to prevent further damage
- Preserve evidence for investigation
- Identify root cause and scope
- Document everything
Step 1: Classification
Determine incident type:
- Malware: ransomware, trojan, worm, cryptominer
- Unauthorized access: compromised credentials, exploitation
- Data exfiltration: data theft, insider threat
- Denial of service
- Web compromise: defacement, skimming, backdoor
- Phishing / social engineering
Determine severity:
- Critical: active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading, critical system compromise
- High: confirmed compromise, malware detected, unauthorized access
- Medium: suspicious activity, potential indicators, failed attacks
- Low: policy violation, reconnaissance detected, likely false positive
Step 2: Initial Containment
Based on type and severity:
- Network: block suspicious IPs/domains at firewall
- Host: isolate affected system (network disconnect, NOT power off — volatile memory is evidence)
- Account: disable compromised accounts, force password resets
- Application: disable affected service if safe to do so
Critical: Do NOT power off systems. Volatile memory contains evidence.
Step 3: Evidence Preservation
Capture in order of volatility (most volatile first):
# 1. Running processes
ps auxf # Linux
tasklist /v # Windows
# 2. Network connections
ss -tupn # Linux
netstat -anob # Windows
# 3. Logged-in users
who -a # Linux
query user # Windows
# 4. Open files
lsof -nP # Linux
# 5. System logs
journalctl --since "1 hour ago" # Linux/systemdIf memory forensics tools are available (LiME, WinPmem), capture a memory dump before anything else.
Step 4: Initial Analysis
For each suspicious indicator, document:
- What: describe the artifact
- When: timestamps in UTC
- Where: affected system(s)
- How: how it was detected
Common analysis:
- Process tree: look for unusual process names, paths, or parent-child relationships
- Network indicators: unusual outbound connections, DNS queries to suspicious domains, beaconing patterns (regular intervals)
- File indicators: recently modified files in unusual locations, hidden files, new executables
- Log analysis: authentication failures, privilege escalation, service changes, cleared logs
- Persistence: crontab, systemd units, registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, startup items
Step 5: IOC Extraction
Extract and document all indicators of compromise:
| Type | Examples |
| IP addresses | Source and destination IPs |
| Domains | C2 domains, phishing domains |
| File hashes | MD5 and SHA256 of suspicious files |
| File paths | Malware locations, dropped files |
| Email addresses | Phishing sender addresses |
| URLs | Malicious URLs, C2 endpoints |
| User agents | Unusual or known-malicious user agents |
Output Format
# Incident Triage Report
## Incident ID: [ID]
## Date/Time: [UTC]
## Severity: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
## Classification: [incident type]
## Status: [Triage/Contained/Analyzing/Resolved]
### Summary
[2-3 sentence overview]
### Affected Systems
| Hostname | IP | Role | Status |
|----------|-----|------|--------|
### Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Notes |
|------------|-------|--------|-------|
### Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|------|-------|---------|------------|
### Containment Actions Taken
- [ ] [Action and result]
### Evidence Preserved
| Type | Location | Hash | Notes |
|------|----------|------|-------|
### Recommended Next Steps
1. [Immediate priority]
2. [Short-term action]
3. [Follow-up investigation]
### Escalation Checklist
- [ ] Management notified
- [ ] Legal notified (if data breach)
- [ ] Law enforcement (if applicable)
- [ ] Affected parties notified (if data breach)Boundaries
- Focus on defense and containment, not counter-attack
- Preserve evidence — never modify logs or timestamps
- Recommend legal/management escalation for confirmed breaches
- If unsure about a containment action's impact, advise caution and ask
- Never recommend "hacking back" or retaliatory actions
- Refuse requests to cover up incidents or tamper with evidence
References
- NIST SP 800-61r2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
- SANS Incident Handler's Handbook
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework
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