audit

Overview

Multi-layer security audit, dependency management, and threat modeling.

When to Use

Run trust on any freshly received project before the first install or build command, daily before merging a significant PR, and comprehensive before a major release. The bare /audit covers dependencies, secrets, Docker, and code patterns in one pass.

Subcommand Routing

If no subcommand is given, run all layers except threat modeling, daily, and comprehensive, which require focused analysis.

Process

1. Route the invocation per Subcommand Routing; with no subcommand, run Full Audit.
2. Check which scanners are on PATH and report the missing ones before scanning.
3. Run the Steps of the selected section in order.
4. Report findings in that section's output format, with severity buckets or 1-10 scores, and masked secret matches.
5. For threat, daily, and comprehensive, state every finding rated 8/10 or higher as blocking.

Full Audit (default)

Steps

1. Detect project and tools, parallel: identify languages from manifests, check for Dockerfiles, check available tools, pnpm, pip-audit, cargo-audit, trivy, grype, semgrep, bandit, read .env.example.
2. Dependency scan: per-language audit (see deps section).
3. Secret scanning: scan all tracked files, git ls-files using patterns from ~/.claude/hooks/secret-scanner.py. Skip binaries, lockfiles, vendored code. Check .gitignore covers .env, *.pem, *.key. Apply the extended provider-specific patterns below (see secrets section) for Stripe, Twilio, GCP, Azure, Slack, Shopify, and other services not covered by the hook's generic patterns.
4. Dockerfile and Compose checks: see the docker subcommand section below. Run the full Dockerfile checklist and, when compose*.yml or docker-compose*.yml is present, the full Compose checklist. If hadolint is on PATH, run hadolint Dockerfile. If docker scout is available, run docker scout quickview and docker scout cves. If trivy is available, scan built images.
5. Code patterns: SQL injection, string concatenation in queries, command injection via exec, spawn, or eval with dynamic input, XSS through dangerouslySetInnerHTML or innerHTML, path traversal, hardcoded secrets, insecure randomness using Math.random() for security, empty catch blocks. Run semgrep --config auto if available. Also check supply chain risks: review postinstall scripts in dependencies via cat node_modules/<pkg>/package.json | jq .scripts.postinstall, verify scoped packages resolve to the private registry, pnpm install --lockfile-only --ignore-scripts, verify Docker secrets use --mount=type=secret not ENV or ARG, and confirm lockfile integrity hashes are present.
6. Compile report by severity:

## Security Audit Report

**Project:** <name>
**Date:** <date>
**Layers scanned:** dependencies, secrets, docker, code

### Critical (fix immediately)
### High (fix before next release)
### Medium (schedule fix)
### Low (backlog)

### Summary
| Layer | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|-------|----------|------|--------|-----|

### Missing safeguards
- [ ] .gitignore covers .env and credential files
- [ ] .env.example documents all required env vars
- [ ] Dockerfiles use non-root user
- [ ] Dependencies have no critical vulnerabilities

1. Suggest next steps per finding severity.

deps

Audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities. Detect package manager from lockfile.

Package Manager Detection

bun.lock/bun.lockb = bun, pnpm-lock.yaml = pnpm, yarn.lock = yarn, package-lock.json = npm, which is converted to pnpm with pnpm import, Cargo.toml = cargo, go.mod = go, pyproject.toml with uv.lock = uv, pyproject.toml with [tool.poetry] = poetry, pyproject.toml/requirements.txt = pip. Also check for Makefile/Justfile targets.

Audit (default)

Run language-specific audit: pnpm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, govulncheck ./.... Parse and present by severity.

outdated

Run pnpm outdated, cargo outdated, go list -m -u all, etc. Show current, wanted, and latest versions.

update [package]

Show what would change, ask for approval, run update, re-audit to verify no new vulnerabilities.

scan (deep)

Check available tools, parallel: trivy, snyk, gitleaks. Run all available:

• trivy fs . for dependency + config + secret scanning.
• snyk test + snyk code test for dependency + static analysis.
• gitleaks detect --source . for hardcoded secrets.

Extended Secret Detection Patterns

Apply these provider-specific patterns during secrets and scan runs. These extend the generic patterns in secret-scanner.py with service-specific formats.

Also check high-risk contexts: test fixtures with real credentials, database seed files with production data, .tfstate files, Docker ENV/ARG with secrets, and *.js.map source maps containing decompiled secrets.

image <name>

• trivy image <name> for OS and library vulnerabilities.
• dive <name> for layer analysis and wasted space.

docker

Dockerfile, Compose, BuildKit, and image authoring audit. Authority for every rule below is standards/container-security.md.

Dockerfile checklist

For each Dockerfile in the repo, verify:

• Base image pinned by digest, FROM image:tag@sha256:..., not floating tag such as latest, lts, or no tag
• # syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 declared at the top to enable modern BuildKit frontend
• Multi-stage build; runtime stage does not include compilers, source, or dev dependencies
• WORKDIR absolute path
• USER directive in final stage sets a non-root UID. Numeric preferred for Kubernetes compatibility
• No COPY .env*, COPY *.pem, COPY *.key, COPY *.crt, COPY id_rsa*
• No ENV or ARG containing literal secret values such as PASSWORD=, TOKEN=, API_KEY=, or PRIVATE_KEY=
• Build-time secrets use RUN --mount=type=secret,id=<name>, never ENV or ARG
• Package installs use --no-install-recommends, apt, --no-cache, apk, or equivalent
• Package manager caches purged in the same layer: rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*, pip cache purge, etc.
• BuildKit cache mounts used for package managers when build time matters: --mount=type=cache,target=<path>
• COPY --link used to maximize layer cache hits
• HEALTHCHECK declared with --interval, --timeout, --start-period, --retries
• PID 1 covered by tini, dumb-init, docker run --init, or Compose init: true
• .dockerignore exists and excludes .env*, *.pem, *.key, .git/, node_modules/, .terraform/
• Hadolint clean on the file when hadolint is on PATH. Run hadolint Dockerfile

Compose checklist

For each compose.yml, compose.*.yml, docker-compose.yml, docker-compose.*.yml:

• No top-level version: key. Deprecated under Compose v2
• Every service has read_only: true unless the workload legitimately writes to its root
• Every service has cap_drop: ["ALL"] followed by minimal cap_add: entries
• Every service has security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
• No service has privileged: true
• No service has pid: host, ipc: host, network_mode: host, or userns_mode: host
• Every service either inherits a non-root USER from the Dockerfile or sets user: "<uid>:<gid>"
• Secrets defined via top-level secrets: with file:, environment:, or external: true source; never via plain environment:
• Apps consume secrets via the *_FILE convention (DB_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/db_password)
• Dev port bindings use 127.0.0.1: prefix; internal services use expose:, not ports:
• Networks are explicit per tier; backend networks marked internal: true
• depends_on: uses condition: service_healthy form for ordering, paired with healthcheck:
• Every service sets init: true or has tini/dumb-init as PID 1 in its Dockerfile
• Resource limits set such as deploy.resources.limits.memory, cpus, plus pids_limit, or ulimits.nofile
• restart: uses on-failure:<n> or unless-stopped, not unbounded always
• Only namespaced sysctls:. No raw net.core.*
• Dev-only services gated behind profiles: ["dev"]
• Production deployment does not invoke docker compose watch or the develop: block

Tools to invoke when present

Reporting

Report findings in the standard severity buckets: Critical, High, Medium, or Low. Critical: secrets in layers, privileged: true, host namespaces, COPY .env. High: missing USER non-root, floating tags, missing cap_drop, missing no-new-privileges, dev ports bound to 0.0.0.0. Medium: missing HEALTHCHECK, missing init: true, missing .dockerignore, missing BuildKit cache mounts. Low: missing attestations, missing Hadolint config, image bloat.

threat

STRIDE threat modeling for the full project or a specific component. Systematic analysis of security threats across six categories.

When to use

• Before deploying a new service or API to production.
• When adding authentication, authorization, or data handling features.
• During security review of an existing system.
• When compliance or regulatory requirements demand threat analysis.

Arguments

• No arguments: analyze the full project.
• <component>: focus on a specific module, service, or feature (e.g., /audit threat auth, /audit threat payments).

Steps

1. Map the attack surface. Read the project structure and identify:
   • Entry points: API routes, webhooks, message consumers, CLI commands.
   • Data stores: databases, caches, file storage, session stores.
   • External integrations: third-party APIs, OAuth providers, payment processors.
   • Trust boundaries: where authenticated meets unauthenticated, where internal meets external.

2. Analyze each STRIDE category. For every entry point and data flow:

   Category	Question	What to look for
   Spoofing	Can an attacker impersonate a user or service?	Missing auth on endpoints, weak token validation, no mutual TLS between services
   Tampering	Can data be modified in transit or at rest?	Missing input validation, unsigned payloads, no integrity checks on stored data
   Repudiation	Can a user deny performing an action?	Missing audit logging, no transaction records, unsigned operations
   Information Disclosure	Can sensitive data leak?	Verbose error messages, exposed stack traces, missing field-level authorization
   Denial of Service	Can the system be overwhelmed?	Missing rate limits, unbounded queries, no payload size limits, resource-intensive operations without throttling
   Elevation of Privilege	Can a user gain unauthorized access?	Missing authorization checks, IDOR vulnerabilities, role bypass, privilege escalation through API chaining

3. Score each finding.

   Severity	Criteria
   Critical (9-10)	Exploitable without authentication, data breach risk
   High (7-8)	Exploitable with low-privilege access, significant impact
   Medium (4-6)	Requires specific conditions, moderate impact
   Low (1-3)	Theoretical risk, minimal impact

4. Generate the threat model report:

   ## STRIDE Threat Model
   
   **Scope:** <full project or component name>
   **Date:** <date GMT>
   **Entry points analyzed:** <count>
   
   ### Attack Surface Map
   <list of entry points, data stores, trust boundaries>
   
   ### Findings by Category
   
   #### Spoofing
   | # | Threat | Severity | Affected Component | Mitigation |
   |---|--------|----------|-------------------|------------|
   
   #### Tampering
   ...
   
   #### Repudiation
   ...
   
   #### Information Disclosure
   ...
   
   #### Denial of Service
   ...
   
   #### Elevation of Privilege
   ...
   
   ### Summary
   | Category | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
   |----------|----------|------|--------|-----|
   
   ### Priority Actions
   <findings rated 8+ must be resolved before shipping>

5. Gate check. Findings rated 8/10 or higher are blocking. State them explicitly and recommend resolution before deployment.

daily

Fast security gate for routine use. Three focused checks that catch the highest-impact issues with minimal time investment.

When to use

• Before merging a significant PR.
• As a periodic health check during active development.
• After onboarding a new dependency or changing CI configuration.

Steps

1. Secrets archaeology. Search git history for leaked credentials:
   • Run git log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only to find added files.
   • Search for patterns: API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings.
   • Check .env files that were committed and later removed but remain in history.
   • Check for high-entropy strings in configuration files.
   • Report each finding with the commit hash, file path, and pattern matched.
2. Dependency supply chain check. Audit the dependency tree:
   • Run the project's audit command: pnpm audit, uv run pip-audit, cargo audit, or equivalent.
   • Check for known CVEs with severity >= HIGH.
   • Flag packages with fewer than 100 weekly downloads or a single maintainer.
   • Flag packages added in the last 30 days that have no prior release history.
   • Cross-reference lockfile integrity: verify the lockfile is committed and matches the manifest.
3. CI/CD pipeline security review. Audit workflow files:
   • Check for pull_request_target triggers with checkout of PR code, which enables code injection.
   • Check for secrets passed to steps that run user-controlled code.
   • Check for actions/checkout without pinned SHA versions.
   • Check for overly permissive permissions blocks.
   • Check for self-hosted runners on public repos.
   • Verify OIDC is used for cloud provider authentication where possible.

Output

## Security Daily Report

**Date:** <timestamp GMT>
**Mode:** daily
**Duration:** <seconds>

### Secrets Archaeology
| Commit | File | Pattern | Severity |
|--------|------|---------|----------|
| <hash> | <path> | <type> | <1-10> |

### Supply Chain
| Package | Issue | CVE | Severity |
|---------|-------|-----|----------|
| <name> | <description> | <id or N/A> | <1-10> |

### CI/CD Pipeline
| File | Line | Issue | Severity |
|------|------|-------|----------|
| <path> | <line> | <description> | <1-10> |

### Verdict
<PASS: no blocking findings / BLOCK: N findings rated 8/10+>

comprehensive

Deep scan that includes everything from daily mode plus OWASP Top 10, STRIDE threat modeling per component, and LLM/AI security review.

When to use

• Monthly security review cadence.
• Before a major release or launch.
• After significant architecture changes.
• When onboarding a new team member who needs a security overview.

Steps

1. Run all daily checks. Execute steps 1-3 from the daily mode.

2. OWASP Top 10 audit. Read ~/.claude/skills/security-patterns.md as a vulnerability pattern catalog. Map each pattern to its OWASP category when checking the codebase:

   Category	What to check
   A01: Broken Access Control	Authorization checks on every endpoint, IDOR prevention, CORS configuration
   A02: Cryptographic Failures	TLS usage, password hashing algorithms, sensitive data exposure in logs
   A03: Injection	SQL injection, XSS, command injection, LDAP injection, template injection
   A04: Insecure Design	Business logic flaws, missing rate limiting, missing abuse prevention
   A05: Security Misconfiguration	Default credentials, unnecessary features enabled, error messages leaking internals
   A06: Vulnerable Components	Outdated frameworks, known vulnerable versions, unmaintained dependencies
   A07: Authentication Failures	Weak password policies, missing MFA, session fixation, credential stuffing prevention
   A08: Data Integrity Failures	CI/CD pipeline integrity, unsigned updates, deserialization vulnerabilities
   A09: Logging Failures	Missing audit logs, sensitive data in logs, no alerting on security events
   A10: SSRF	Server-side request forgery via user-controlled URLs, DNS rebinding

3. STRIDE threat modeling. For each major component identified in the codebase:

   Threat	Question	What to check
   Spoofing	Can an attacker pretend to be someone else?	Authentication mechanisms, token validation, certificate pinning
   Tampering	Can an attacker modify data in transit or at rest?	Input validation, integrity checks, signed payloads
   Repudiation	Can an attacker deny performing an action?	Audit logging, non-repudiation controls, tamper-evident logs
   Information Disclosure	Can an attacker access data they should not see?	Authorization boundaries, error messages, debug endpoints, log contents
   Denial of Service	Can an attacker make the system unavailable?	Rate limiting, resource quotas, payload size limits, algorithmic complexity
   Elevation of Privilege	Can an attacker gain higher access than intended?	Role checks, privilege escalation paths, default permissions

   Produce a threat matrix entry for each component-threat combination that has a non-trivial risk.

4. LLM/AI security review. If the project uses LLMs or AI models:
   • Check for prompt injection vulnerabilities in user-facing inputs.
   • Check for sensitive data leakage through model context or logs.
   • Check for missing output sanitization on model responses.
   • Check for excessive permissions granted to AI agents or tools.
   • Check for missing rate limiting on model API calls.
   • Skip this section entirely if the project does not use LLM or AI features.

Output

## Security Comprehensive Report

**Date:** <timestamp GMT>
**Mode:** comprehensive
**Duration:** <minutes>

### Daily Checks
<Include full daily report sections>

### OWASP Top 10 Audit
| Category | Status | Findings | Severity |
|----------|--------|----------|----------|
| A01: Broken Access Control | PASS/FAIL | <description> | <1-10> |
| A02: Cryptographic Failures | PASS/FAIL | <description> | <1-10> |
| ... | ... | ... | ... |

### STRIDE Threat Matrix
| Component | Threat | Likelihood | Severity | Mitigation |
|-----------|--------|-----------|----------|------------|
| <name> | <S/T/R/I/D/E> | <low/medium/high> | <1-10> | <action> |

### LLM/AI Security
| Finding | Severity | Mitigation |
|---------|----------|------------|
| <description> | <1-10> | <action> |
(or "Not applicable: no LLM/AI features detected.")

### Summary
**Total findings:** <count>
**Blocking (8/10+):** <count>
**Action items:** <numbered list>

### Verdict
<PASS: no blocking findings / BLOCK: N findings rated 8/10+ require remediation>

trust

Read-only safety scan for untrusted projects. Detects install-time hooks, credential-theft patterns, exfiltration endpoints, CI/CD attack patterns, editor auto-run, dependency red flags, and binary anomalies. Produces a verdict: SAFE / SUSPICIOUS / HIGH-RISK / MALICIOUS.

When to use

• First contact with a project from any external source: take-home, contractor delivery, open-source repo from an unknown maintainer, a dependency you are considering adding.
• Automatically invoked by /onboard Phase 0 before any architecture exploration begins.
• Before running pnpm install, uv sync, cargo build, or any build/setup command on a fresh clone.

When NOT to use

• Projects you wrote yourself.
• Projects from a trusted internal source where the provenance chain is known.
• After installation has already happened. The scan is preventive; once installation runs, lifecycle scripts have already executed.

Arguments

• No arguments: scan the current directory.
• <path>: scan the given directory.
• --no-semgrep, --no-trivy, --no-gitleaks: opt out of specific external tools even if installed.
• --strict: upgrade MEDIUM findings to HIGH. Useful when the project is highly untrusted.
• --json: emit machine-readable findings instead of the narrative report. Used by /onboard Phase 0.
• --no-signatures: skip pnpm audit signatures in step 12.

Steps

1. Detect ecosystem. In parallel, check for package.json, pyproject.toml/requirements.txt/setup.py, Cargo.toml, go.mod, Gemfile, composer.json. Record the ecosystem set.
2. Read manifest and lockfile. For each detected ecosystem, read the manifest. Extract scripts/lifecycle hooks, dependency list with versions, declared maintainer. Read the lockfile if present.
3. Scan install hooks. Apply Section A patterns from trust-patterns.md to the manifest scripts, at the severity each row assigns. A lifecycle value that pipes to bash or sh, or decodes with base64 -d or xxd -r, is CRITICAL; one that calls curl, wget, node -e, or python -c without a pipe to a shell is HIGH.
4. Scan auxiliary install configs. Read .npmrc, .yarnrc, .yarnrc.yml, .pip.conf, setup.cfg [install] section. Apply Section A patterns. Unusual registry is HIGH.
5. Scan source files for code patterns. Walk source directories. Skip node_modules, .git, dist, build, vendor, target, out. For each text file under 1MB, apply Section B patterns. Cluster matches per the verdict logic in trust-patterns.md.
6. Scan for sensitive path references. Grep all source files for the Section C strings. Any match in a non-test file is at least HIGH. Cluster with Section D matches in the same file escalates to CRITICAL.
7. Scan for exfiltration endpoints. Grep for Section D patterns. Discord/Telegram webhook URLs are CRITICAL on sight. Pastebin URLs are HIGH. Direct public IP addresses in production code are HIGH. URL shorteners are HIGH.
8. Scan CI/CD files. Walk .github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml, .circleci/, Jenkinsfile. Apply Section E patterns. pull_request_target with PR-ref checkout is CRITICAL. Unpinned actions in sensitive workflows are MEDIUM. Secrets piped to network calls is CRITICAL.
9. Scan editor configs. Read .vscode/settings.json, .vscode/tasks.json, .idea/workspace.xml, .envrc, .devcontainer/devcontainer.json. Apply Section F patterns. Auto-run on folder open is HIGH. eval in .envrc is CRITICAL.
10. Scan dependencies. For each direct dependency in the manifest:
    • Query offline metadata first, lockfile, package cache.
    • If pnpm is available and the user has internet, run pnpm view <name> time to get age. Skip if offline.
    • Compare names against the typosquat list and known-malicious package list in trust-patterns.md.
    • Apply Section G patterns. Known-malicious match is CRITICAL. Age under 7 days is HIGH. Lockfile resolving to non-default registry is CRITICAL.
11. Scan binaries. Walk the tree for files with executable bits, non-text content, in non-build directories. Apply Section H patterns. Pre-compiled binaries in source-only directories are HIGH.
12. Integrate external tools, auto-detect, parallel.
    • gitleaks if installed: run gitleaks detect --no-git --redact --report-path /tmp/gitleaks-trust.json. Parse findings.
    • semgrep if installed and the apiiro/malicious-code-ruleset is reachable: run with that ruleset. Parse findings.
    • trivy if installed: run trivy fs --scanners misconfig,secret,vuln .. Parse findings.
    • pnpm audit signatures if package.json and pnpm-lock.yaml are present, network is available, and --no-signatures was not passed. Verifies Sigstore provenance.
    • Each tool's findings merge into the master findings list with mapped severity. Tools are opt-out via --no-<tool> if the user wants speed.
13. Compute verdict. Per the rules in trust-patterns.md Verdict Logic section. Per-file aggregate first, then project aggregate.
14. Render the report. Markdown output. Header with verdict, scan duration, timestamp, ecosystem(s) detected, external tools used. Findings grouped by section. Each finding includes severity, file:line, pattern matched, rationale, recommendation. Closing summary with next-step recommendations: do not install, do not run, sandbox in Docker, abandon the project.

Output format

## Trust Scan Report

**Verdict:** SAFE / SUSPICIOUS / HIGH-RISK / MALICIOUS
**Project:** <path>
**Duration:** <seconds>
**Timestamp:** <YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM GMT>
**Ecosystems:** <list>
**External tools used:** <gitleaks, semgrep, trivy, none>

### Worst findings

1. [CRITICAL] <one-line summary> at <file:line>
2. [HIGH] <one-line summary> at <file:line>
3. [HIGH] <one-line summary> at <file:line>

### Findings by section

#### Section A. Install-time hooks
| Severity | File:Line | Pattern | Rationale |
|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|

[Repeat for sections B through H]

### Verdict explanation
<One paragraph stating why the verdict landed where it did>

### Recommendations
<Numbered next steps. Vary by verdict:
- SAFE: proceed with onboarding.
- SUSPICIOUS: review findings before installing.
- HIGH-RISK: do not run any setup command. Inspect the flagged files manually.
- MALICIOUS: do not install, do not run, do not open in your IDE. Move to a Docker sandbox or delete the directory.>

Rules

• Read-only. Never install dependencies, never run lifecycle scripts, never execute any script from the project.
• Never read .env or *.local.env files. Only .env.example.
• Never reveal actual secret values. Show file, line, pattern name. Mask the match.
• Never call paid external APIs without explicit user opt-in.
• Pattern list in trust-patterns.md is the single source of truth. Updates land there.
• Verdict MALICIOUS has no override, because it comes only from a definitive IOC: a row rated CRITICAL or a Section C read paired with a Section D endpoint, never from clustering alone. Verdict HIGH-RISK, including a HIGH cluster, requires the user to type a confirmation phrase. SUSPICIOUS asks once and defaults to no.
• Skip scan directories: node_modules, .git, dist, build, vendor, target, out, coverage. Their contents are not analyzed.

Rules

• Never install scanning tools without asking. Report availability.
• Never modify code or fix vulnerabilities automatically. Report and let user decide.
• Never expose actual secret values. Show file, line number, pattern name only.
• Always scan .env.example, never .env directly.
• Always detect package manager from lockfile.
• Never update packages without showing changes and getting approval.
• Never apply pnpm audit --fix overrides that cross a major version without explicit approval.
• If no vulnerabilities found, say so clearly.
• Classify by actual severity, not quantity.

Common Rationalizations

• "trivy is missing, so install it and continue": installing a scanner needs the user's approval. Report what is available and ask.
• "pnpm audit --fix clears the report fastest": it can jump major versions and break the build. Show the changes and get explicit approval.
• "Showing the leaked key makes the finding concrete": the report carries file, line, and pattern name, with the match masked.
• "Run pnpm install first so the dependency scan sees node_modules": on an untrusted project, install runs lifecycle scripts. Run trust first, from manifests and lockfiles only.
• "Twelve LOW findings outweigh one HIGH": classify by actual severity, never by count.

Red Flags

• Stop and recommend no install, no run, and a Docker sandbox when trust reaches a MALICIOUS verdict.
• Stop and require the confirmation phrase when trust reaches HIGH-RISK.
• Stop and redact when a draft finding contains a live secret value instead of a masked match.
• Stop and read .env.example when a step points at .env or *.local.env.
• Stop and ask for approval when a step would modify code, a lockfile, or an installed package.

Verification

• The report names every layer or section scanned, the scanners used, and a GMT date.
• Each finding carries a severity, a file:line or commit hash, and the matched pattern name.
• git status shows no change made by the run, except packages the user approved under deps update.
• After deps update, a re-audit ran and reports no new vulnerabilities.
• daily, comprehensive, and trust end with an explicit verdict line.

Related skills

• /review -- Security-aware code review of specific changes.
• /test -- Run tests to verify security fixes.
• /infra docker -- Docker container management.