msteams-channel
CLAUDE.md3 starsChanged 4 days agoMITView on GitHub
Runtime is Bun (no Node, no bundler, no build step — TypeScript runs directly). Running the plugin for real needs two things beyond installing it — a managed-settings allowlist entry and claude --channels plugin:msteams@msteams-channel. See README.md "Two-step enablement"; without both, inbound events are dropped silently. One Bun process (server.ts) is simultaneously: 1. an MCP stdio server Claude Code spawns (tools + claude/channel capability), and 2. the Teams webhook listener (@microsoft/teams.apps App, served by our own src/bun-adapter.ts instead of the SDK's…
- Reads credentials
The file
We split this CLAUDE.md into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 85
All dirs 0700 / files 0600: .env (credentials, read once at boot), access.json (re-read on
- Very specific: line 118
Every code-free access mutation writes to whatever file it finds, so if a skill resolves a different dir than the running listener, …
- Very specific: line 121
refuses to write: when the listener is demonstrably elsewhere.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 27,641 CLAUDE.md files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
Commands
Runtime is Bun (no Node, no bundler, no build step — TypeScript runs directly).
bun test # whole suite (394 tests, ~14s, no tenant/network)
bun test tests/gate.test.ts # one file
bun test -t "outbound" # one test by name
bun run typecheck # tsc --noEmit; must pass before committing
bun server.ts # run the MCP server standalone (stderr is the only log)
bun send.ts --list # proactive-send CLI: list reachable conversationsRunning the plugin for real needs two things beyond installing it — a managed-settings
allowlist entry and claude --channels plugin:msteams@msteams-channel. See
README.md "Two-step enablement"; without both, inbound events are dropped silently.
Architecture
One Bun process (server.ts) is simultaneously:
- an MCP stdio server Claude Code spawns (tools +
claude/channelcapability), and - the Teams webhook listener (
@microsoft/teams.appsApp, served by our ownsrc/bun-adapter.tsinstead of the SDK's express adapter).
Same shape as the official telegram plugin, where the poller lives inside the MCP process.
server.ts starts the listener and installs shutdown handlers on import — that is why
pure logic (chunk.ts, env.ts, gate.ts) is extracted into src/, and why tests import
modules rather than the server.
Inbound pipeline
webhook → queue.enqueue (persist before ack) → gate → conversations.upsert → permission-verdict
intercept → attachment registration → normalize → notifications/claude/channel
src/queue.ts— one file per activity, written before the webhook is acked; a throw becomes a 500 so Bot Framework retries. Dedup onactivity.id; finished entries become tombstones. Unfinished entries replay on boot.src/gate.ts— the pure half of access control: tenant check, AAD-object-id match, channel opt-in, mention requirement. Also ownsoutboundAllowed(),extractThreadId(),mentionsBot(), and theAccesstype. Keep it free of I/O.src/access.ts— the stateful half: read/writeaccess.json, pairing codes, approval dropfiles, static-mode snapshot. Imports fromgate.ts, never the reverse.src/normalize.ts— activity →{content, meta}. Meta keys must match/^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$/(hyphens are dropped silently by the harness) and every value must be a string. Paths go inmeta, never incontent— content is sender-forgeable.
Outbound path
reply / edit_message / react and send.ts all run the same two-part outbound gate:
a stored ConversationRef must exist (proves the inbound gate once accepted it — the
anti-exfiltration property) and outboundAllowed() must pass against the current
access.json (so revocation revokes both directions). Never add a conversation-addressed
tool that skips either half. download_attachment is exempt by design: it addresses a file
handle, not a conversation.
Files take one of three routes, chosen per file by src/outbound.ts (planOutboundFiles) and
delivered by the one engine both reply and send.ts call (deliverOutbound):
| personal chat | channel / group chat | |
| image < 4MB | inline data URI | inline data URI |
| anything else | FileConsentCard (src/file-consent.ts) | SharePoint upload (src/sharepoint.ts) |
The consent route is asynchronous and crosses processes: the card is posted, the bytes are
snapshotted into pending-uploads/, and the recipient's Accept arrives later as a
fileConsent/invoke at the listener (not necessarily the process that offered the file,
which is why the store is on disk). That invoke passes the same inbound gate as a message,
and PendingUploadStore.claim is an atomic rename so a redelivered Accept cannot upload
twice. Group-chat sharing links use a Graph beta endpoint: GROUP_CHAT_FILES_ENABLED in
src/outbound.ts is the switch if that ever stops being acceptable.
State dir
src/state.ts owns the single rule — MSTEAMS_STATE_DIR ?? ~/.claude/channels/msteams, user
scope like the official discord/telegram plugins. Both skills resolve it identically in shell
(${MSTEAMS_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.claude/channels/msteams}). The default cannot become
project-relative: .mcp.json runs the server with --cwd ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}, so its pwd is
the plugin dir while a skill's is the project.
All dirs 0700 / files 0600: .env (credentials, read once at boot), access.json (re-read on
every inbound message), conversations/, queue/, inbox/, approved/,
pending-uploads/ (snapshots of files offered by consent card, TTL 1h), bot.pid.
The /msteams:access skill (a separate process) mutates access.json and drops
approved/<senderId>; the server polls for it every 5s. That dropfile is the whole IPC.
Invariants that are easy to break
- Credentials come from
.envonly, never argv — argv is world-readable in/proc. - Inbound attachment
downloadUrls are credentials (live OneDrivetempauth=tokens). They stay in memory insrc/attachments.ts, keyed by opaque handle; never log them, never put them in an error message, never persist them. - A consent invoke's
uploadInfo.uploadUrlis the same class of credential. It is a pre-authorized upload session.fileConsent/invoketherefore never enters the ingress queue (which persists raw activities verbatim), is never logged, and never reaches Claude.fetchputs the request URL in its own error text, souploadToConsentUrlrethrows sanitized.pending-uploads/holds only our own outbound bytes, never anything from an invoke. - Thread on
extractThreadId()'s value, neveractivity.id. Teams does not setreplyToIdon channel posts; thread identity lives in the;messageid=suffix ofconversation.id. Replying to a message's own id opens a new thread. Seetests/fixtures/README.md. - Nothing happens before the gate: conversation references, attachment handles and permission verdicts are all registered after it, so a stranger can never seed a proactive-send target or vote on a permission prompt.
- Refusals are silent toward Teams (log to stderr only) — the one exception is the
pairing code, without which
dmPolicy: 'pairing'would be indistinguishable fromdisabled. - Never approve access from a Teams message. The MCP
instructionsstring and the access skill both say so; that request is what a prompt injection looks like. src/attach.tsis outbound,src/attachments.tsis inbound. Similar names, opposite directions.- A state-dir split makes
removea revocation that reports success and revokes nothing. Every code-free access mutation writes to whatever file it finds, so if a skill resolves a different dir than the running listener,remove/policy/deny/group rmall lie. The access skill checks forbot.pidin the dir it resolved — the listener writes it there at boot — and refuses to write when the listener is demonstrably elsewhere. Never soften that to a warning, and never add a mutating branch that skips the check (setcounts). - Mid-session stderr does not reach
~/.claude/debug/<session-id>.txt(only startup output does), so stderr logging is a dev aid, not something to point an operator at.
Testing conventions
tests/fixtures/holds real activities captured from a live tenant and scrubbed with same-shape stand-ins (the code parses those shapes).fixtures.test.tsreplays them through queue → gate → normalize, and asserts the scrubbing held. Readtests/fixtures/README.mdbefore touching them.tests/server-contract.test.tsspawns the realserver.tsover MCP stdio (unconfigured, no tenant needed) and pins capabilities, tool list and instructions.tests/auth-coverage.test.tsdrives the SDK's JWT validators through internal subpaths — it fails loudly if an SDK release moves them, which is the point.- Tests that write state use
mkdtempSync+MSTEAMS_STATE_DIR; a green run legitimately prints "access.json is corrupt, moved aside" and the static-mode downgrade warning.
Known-impossible things (don't re-derive)
- Reactions always fail with 412. Graph's
setReactionaccepts no application-only permission and this channel has client-credentials auth. The tool exists and degrades with an explanation. Public summary:docs/REACTIONS.md; the derivation that makes re-deriving it pointless (412 trace, the two ruled-out hypotheses) is the private reactions topic. - Reactions are the only outbound capability Teams withholds. Files are not: see the outbound file routes above.
- No history: Teams exposes none to this plugin.
skipLibCheckis on because the SDK ships express typings we deliberately don't install.
Docs map
README.md (enablement + security model) · SETUP.md (provisioning runbook, every
command executed against a real tenant) · ACCESS.md (operator-facing access model) ·
TROUBLESHOOTING.md (symptom-first setup diagnostics) · docs/REACTIONS.md (public
limitation) · CONTRIBUTING.md (dev setup; why bun run dev and not start) ·
SECURITY.md (what counts as a vulnerability here). Two operator tools ship alongside:
teams-app/ (the app package source; build.sh reads the bot id from .env and never
prints it) and probe-files.ts (checks a SharePoint grant end to end, since the failure
mode is a bare 403). Attribution for adapted OpenClaw (MIT)
and official-plugin (Apache-2.0) code lives in source headers at each point of use —
keep those headers when editing the files that carry them. Live E2E procedure,
runs and deferred feature designs are private Hermit compiled topics, never public docs.
Releases go through /release (.claude/skills/release/SKILL.md) — the version lives in
four places and claude plugin tag only checks two.
Does it work?
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

