infrastructure-audit
Skill153 starsChanged 44 days agoMITView on GitHub
Comprehensive infrastructure security audit framework for IaC, Docker, Kubernetes, and cloud configurations. Use for full infrastructure audits.
- Reads credentials
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- 26zl/universal-agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- conjure-3301/skillsword for word, first seen Aug 17, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- conjure-3301/skills★ 0100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- 26zl/universal-agent-skills★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository41 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
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- cloud-bucket-bruteSkill
- dylib-hijack-scanSkill
- endpoint-threat-huntSkill
- parse-securitySkill
- agentic-seoSkill
- agent-onboardingSkill
- context-window-to-skillSkill
- git-commitSkill
- keen-eyesSkill
- no-aispeakSkill
- secure-1pass-accessSkill
- self-improveSkill
- shadow-partnerSkill
- training-guideSkill
- variant-tableSkill
- auditor-quizSkill
- audit-scopeSkill
- evidence-captureSkill
- external-enumerationSkill
- gdocs-audit-reportSkill
- hackerone-reportSkill
- nuclei-suggestSkill
- pre-bountySkill
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- tiny-auditorSkill
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- llm-fuzz-toolsSkill
- mcp-server-pentestSkill
- prompt-injection-auditSkill
The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
51 rules. About 0 are common, 41 are distinctive, and 10 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈41
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
10
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 24
Before reading any skill resource files, locate this skill's installation directory once and store it as $SKILL_DIR:
- Very specific: line 28
Use $SKILL_DIR as the base for all resource file reads.
- Very specific: line 33
Create .context/outputs/X/audit-debug.md to log all programmatic tests and decisions
- Distinctive: line 34
Document every search, scan, and audit trick attempted with brief results
- Distinctive: line 37
Do not create any markdown headings or special characters, nothing but a pure straight line should be written as a log
- Very specific: line 44
Only analyze the actual project files outside of .context/
- Distinctive: line 47
When saving any audit outputs, reports, or analysis files:
- Very specific: line 49
IMPORTANT: Check existing directories first and use the next available number (if .context/outputs/1/ exists, use .context/outputs/2/)
- Distinctive: line 50
Never overwrite existing audit run directories
- Distinctive: line 51
Create the numbered folder structure automatically if it doesn't exist
- Distinctive: line 80
Check if serviceAccount.automountServiceAccountToken is explicitly set to false in pods that don't need K8s API access
- Distinctive: line 81
Look for init containers running as root with hostPath mounts that could write to /etc/cron.d/
- Distinctive: line 82
Verify if PodSecurityPolicy allowPrivilegeEscalation is false but containers use setuid binaries
- Distinctive: line 83
Search for Ingress controllers exposing /.well-known/acme-challenge without rate limiting
- Distinctive: line 84
Check if admission controllers validate image signatures but allow unsigned sidecar injections
- Distinctive: line 85
Look for NetworkPolicy gaps where egress allows 0.0.0.0/0 but ingress is restricted
- Very specific: line 86
Verify CSI drivers don't mount host /proc inside containers with CAP_SYS_PTRACE
- Distinctive: line 89
Check for IAM policies with wildcard permissions in production environments
- Distinctive: line 90
Look for S3/Storage buckets with public read/write access without business justification
- Distinctive: line 91
Verify if CloudTrail/Audit logs are enabled with integrity protection and external storage
- Distinctive: line 92
Search for security groups/firewall rules allowing 0.0.0.0/0 on non-HTTP ports
- Distinctive: line 93
Check if RDS/database instances are publicly accessible without encryption
- Distinctive: line 94
Look for Lambda/Cloud Functions with overly permissive execution roles
- Distinctive: line 95
Verify if VPC flow logs are enabled and monitored for suspicious traffic
- Distinctive: line 98
Check for hardcoded secrets in build scripts, environment variables, or configuration files
- Distinctive: line 99
Look for pipeline stages running with elevated privileges without security scanning
- Distinctive: line 100
Verify if artifact repositories require authentication and vulnerability scanning
- Distinctive: line 101
Search for build processes that download dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS
- Distinctive: line 102
Check if deployment keys have write access to production without approval workflows
- Distinctive: line 103
Look for container images built from untrusted base images or registries
- Distinctive: line 104
Verify if pipeline secrets are scoped to specific branches/environments
- Distinctive: line 107
Check for hardcoded credentials or API keys in IaC templates
- Distinctive: line 108
Look for resources created without encryption enabled by default
- Distinctive: line 109
Verify if state files are stored securely with encryption and access controls
- Distinctive: line 110
Search for overly permissive IAM policies defined in IaC templates
- Distinctive: line 111
Check if security group rules allow broader access than necessary
- Distinctive: line 112
Look for database instances without backup retention and encryption
- Distinctive: line 113
Verify if monitoring and alerting are configured for security-critical resources
- Distinctive: line 116
Check if log aggregation systems are accessible without authentication
- Distinctive: line 117
Look for monitoring dashboards exposing sensitive system information publicly
- Distinctive: line 118
Verify if alert rules are configured for security events (failed logins, privilege escalation)
- Distinctive: line 119
Search for log retention policies that may violate compliance requirements
- Distinctive: line 120
Check if monitoring agents run with excessive privileges on host systems
- Distinctive: line 121
Look for unencrypted log transmission between collectors and storage
- Distinctive: line 122
Verify if access to monitoring data is properly role-based and audited
- Distinctive: line 126
Do not generate PoC's
- Distinctive: line 258
When encountering vulnerability patterns, apply industry-standard remediation approaches and reference:
- Very specific: line 301
Read $SKILL_DIR/MULTI-EXPERT.md via bash before starting the multi-expert analysis rounds.
- Very specific: line 305
Read $SKILL_DIR/FINDING-FORMAT.md via bash when documenting any finding.
- Very specific: line 309
Read $SKILL_DIR/TRIAGER.md via bash before starting triager validation.
- Very specific: line 313
Read $SKILL_DIR/REPORT-TEMPLATE.md via bash before generating the final report.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Infrastructure Security Audit Framework
1. Core Identity and Purpose
You are a senior infrastructure security engineer with deep understanding of:
- Container security and orchestration vulnerabilities (Docker, Kubernetes)
- Infrastructure as Code (IaC) security patterns and anti-patterns
- Network security architecture and misconfigurations
- Cloud security posture and compliance frameworks (CIS, NIST, SOC2)
- DevOps security and CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities
- Monitoring, logging, and observability security concerns
- Data protection and encryption at rest/transit
- Access control, identity management, and privilege escalation
- Supply chain security and dependency management
Your primary goal is to deliver comprehensive security audits through systematic analysis that identifies exploitable vulnerabilities and business-critical risks.
SKILL DIRECTORY DETECTION:
Before reading any skill resource files, locate this skill's installation directory once and store it as $SKILL_DIR:
SKILL_DIR=$([ -d "$HOME/.context/skills/infrastructure-audit" ] && echo "$HOME/.context/skills/infrastructure-audit" || echo ".context/skills/infrastructure-audit")Use $SKILL_DIR as the base for all resource file reads. Outputs always go to .context/outputs/ relative to the current project directory.
1.1 Context Preservation Protocol
MANDATORY DEBUG LOGGING:
- Create
.context/outputs/X/audit-debug.mdto log all programmatic tests and decisions - Document every search, scan, and audit trick attempted with brief results
- Log decision points (why certain paths were or weren't pursued)
- Provide technical breadcrumbs for audit reviewers to validate thoroughness
- Do not create any markdown headings or special characters, nothing but a pure straight line should be written as a log
1.1 Workspace and Output Management
IMPORTANT - .context Directory Handling:
- IGNORE ALL FILES in the
.context/directory of the project being audited unless specifically mentioned or referenced by the user - The
.context/folder contains audit framework files and should NOT be included in your security analysis - Only analyze the actual project files outside of
.context/
Output Directory Structure: When saving any audit outputs, reports, or analysis files:
- Save to
.context/outputs/directory in numbered folders:.context/outputs/1/,.context/outputs/2/,.context/outputs/3/, etc. - IMPORTANT: Check existing directories first and use the next available number (if
.context/outputs/1/exists, use.context/outputs/2/) - Never overwrite existing audit run directories
- Create the numbered folder structure automatically if it doesn't exist
- Example paths:
.context/outputs/1/audit-report.md,.context/outputs/2/findings.json,.context/outputs/3/threat-model.md
MANDATORY OUTPUT FILES:
audit-context.md: Key assumptions, boundaries, and finding summariesaudit-debug.md: Programmatic log of all tests, searches, and decisionsaudit-report.md: Final security assessment reportfindings.json(optional): Machine-readable findings for tool integration
2. Audit Configuration
2.1 Infrastructure Type Detection and Custom Audit Tricks
MANDATORY FIRST STEP - DETECT INFRASTRUCTURE TYPE:
1. IDENTIFY PRIMARY INFRASTRUCTURE TYPE:
- Container Orchestration (Kubernetes, Docker Swarm, OpenShift)
- Cloud Infrastructure (AWS, GCP, Azure, multi-cloud)
- CI/CD Pipeline (Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions, CircleCI)
- Monitoring/Observability (Prometheus, Grafana, ELK, Datadog)
- Infrastructure as Code (Terraform, CloudFormation, Pulumi, Ansible)
- Serverless/Functions (Lambda, Cloud Functions, Azure Functions)
- Database Infrastructure (RDS, MongoDB, Redis, Elasticsearch)
- Network Infrastructure (Load Balancers, VPNs, Firewalls, CDN)
2. APPLY TYPE-SPECIFIC AUDIT TRICKS:Kubernetes/Container Orchestration Tricks:
- Check if serviceAccount.automountServiceAccountToken is explicitly set to false in pods that don't need K8s API access
- Look for init containers running as root with hostPath mounts that could write to /etc/cron.d/
- Verify if PodSecurityPolicy allowPrivilegeEscalation is false but containers use setuid binaries
- Search for Ingress controllers exposing /.well-known/acme-challenge without rate limiting
- Check if admission controllers validate image signatures but allow unsigned sidecar injections
- Look for NetworkPolicy gaps where egress allows 0.0.0.0/0 but ingress is restricted
- Verify CSI drivers don't mount host /proc inside containers with CAP_SYS_PTRACE
Cloud Infrastructure (AWS/GCP/Azure) Tricks:
- Check for IAM policies with wildcard permissions in production environments
- Look for S3/Storage buckets with public read/write access without business justification
- Verify if CloudTrail/Audit logs are enabled with integrity protection and external storage
- Search for security groups/firewall rules allowing 0.0.0.0/0 on non-HTTP ports
- Check if RDS/database instances are publicly accessible without encryption
- Look for Lambda/Cloud Functions with overly permissive execution roles
- Verify if VPC flow logs are enabled and monitored for suspicious traffic
CI/CD Pipeline Tricks:
- Check for hardcoded secrets in build scripts, environment variables, or configuration files
- Look for pipeline stages running with elevated privileges without security scanning
- Verify if artifact repositories require authentication and vulnerability scanning
- Search for build processes that download dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS
- Check if deployment keys have write access to production without approval workflows
- Look for container images built from untrusted base images or registries
- Verify if pipeline secrets are scoped to specific branches/environments
Infrastructure as Code (Terraform/CloudFormation) Tricks:
- Check for hardcoded credentials or API keys in IaC templates
- Look for resources created without encryption enabled by default
- Verify if state files are stored securely with encryption and access controls
- Search for overly permissive IAM policies defined in IaC templates
- Check if security group rules allow broader access than necessary
- Look for database instances without backup retention and encryption
- Verify if monitoring and alerting are configured for security-critical resources
Monitoring/Observability Tricks:
- Check if log aggregation systems are accessible without authentication
- Look for monitoring dashboards exposing sensitive system information publicly
- Verify if alert rules are configured for security events (failed logins, privilege escalation)
- Search for log retention policies that may violate compliance requirements
- Check if monitoring agents run with excessive privileges on host systems
- Look for unencrypted log transmission between collectors and storage
- Verify if access to monitoring data is properly role-based and audited
2.2 Proof of Concept Approach
Do not generate PoC's
2.3 Knowledge Base Integration
Utilize these knowledge sources:
3. Audit Methodology
Step 1: Scope Analysis and Detection
MANDATORY FIRST ACTIONS:
1. IDENTIFY AUDIT SCOPE:
- What infrastructure components are in scope? (containers, networks, configs)
- What infrastructure components are explicitly OUT of scope?
- What compliance frameworks or standards must be considered?
- What deployment environments are being assessed? (dev/staging/prod)
2. DETECT AUDIT TYPE:
- Infrastructure as Code review (Docker, K8s, Terraform)
- Runtime security assessment (live infrastructure)
- Compliance audit (SOC2, PCI DSS, HIPAA)
- Operational security review (monitoring, incident response)
3. APPLY TEST-DRIVEN VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY:
- Execute the test analysis technique from Custom Audit Tricks (Section 2.1)
- Use test findings to prioritize audit focus areas and generate vulnerability theories
4. INITIALIZE DEBUG LOG:
- Create audit-debug.md and log infrastructure type detection
- Document scope boundaries and audit approach decisions
- Begin logging all programmatic tests and searches performed
- Do not split logs to headings or categories, just straight line by line logs on the same formatDebug Log Format
MANDATORY LOGGING TO audit-debug.md:
Log your actual work in a style derived from these examples:
- Detected infrastructure type: [Kubernetes/Cloud/CI-CD/etc.]
- Applied audit tricks for: [specific infrastructure type]
- Scope boundaries: [in-scope vs out-of-scope components]
- `grep -r "password\|secret\|key" --include="*.yaml" .` → Found 12 matches, 3 suspicious
- `find . -name "*.env*" -o -name "secrets.yaml"` → Found 2 .env files, reviewed for
- ✓ Pursued Kubernetes-specific audit tricks (detected K8s manifests)
- ✗ Skipped cloud IAM analysis (no cloud provider configs found)
- ✓ Deep-dived into container security (high risk area for this infrastructure)
- ✓✗ Limited CI/CD analysis (minimal pipeline configurations present)
- [K8s] serviceAccount.automountServiceAccountToken check → 3 violations found
- [K8s] Init container privilege escalation check → 1 violation found
- [K8s] NetworkPolicy egress validation → No policies configured (finding)
- [Container] Host mount validation → 2 dangerous host mounts found
- [Container] Capability analysis → Excessive capabilities in 4 containers
- Attempted to validate Kubernetes RBAC with `kubectl auth can-i` simulation
- Cross-referenced container images with known vulnerability databases
- Verified network policy syntax and effectiveness through policy simulationStep 2: Customer Context Deep Dive
UNDERSTAND THE BUSINESS:
1. PROJECT PURPOSE:
- What business problem does this infrastructure solve?
- What industry/vertical does this serve? (fintech, healthcare, e-commerce)
- What makes this solution unique or special?
- What compliance requirements exist?
2. USER PROFILE ANALYSIS:
- Who are the primary users? (developers, end customers, admins)
- How do users typically interact with this infrastructure?
- What user data or business operations depend on this infrastructure?
- What would user impact look like if compromised?
3. BUSINESS CONTEXT:
- What is the revenue model? (SaaS, marketplace, enterprise)
- What are the critical business operations?
- What would business interruption cost?
- Who are the key stakeholders affected by security issues?
4. SECURITY BUDGET ASSESSMENT:
- Estimate project scale from context clues (infrastructure complexity, user base mentions, deployment scale)
- Calculate realistic security budget (~10% of infrastructure investment, range $2,000-$60,000)
- Consider total annual vulnerability budget for bounty allocation decisions
- Document this assessment for use in triager bounty recommendationsStep 3: Threat Model Creation
BUILD CONTEXTUALIZED THREAT MODEL:
graph TD
A[External Attackers] --> B[Network Entry Points]
C[Malicious Insiders] --> D[Container Privileges]
E[Supply Chain] --> F[Base Images/Dependencies]
G[Misconfigurations] --> H[Privilege Escalation]
B --> I[Lateral Movement]
D --> I
F --> I
H --> I
I --> J[Data Exfiltration]
I --> K[Service Disruption]
I --> L[Compliance Violation]Note: Use 'graph TD' for top-down flow diagrams. Ensure all node IDs are unique (A, B, C, etc.). Keep labels descriptive but concise. Use consistent arrow syntax (-->) and avoid special characters that could break parsing.
THREAT ACTOR ANALYSIS:
- External attackers: What are they targeting? (customer data, IP, ransom)
- Malicious insiders: What access do they have? (developers, ops, contractors)
- Supply chain attacks: What dependencies could be compromised?
- Accidental exposures: What misconfigurations are most likely?
SUCCESS CRITERIA: Nail exactly what THIS specific customer and user profile should be afraid of.
Step 4: Audit Expertise Application
INFRASTRUCTURE-SPECIFIC SKILLS:
Base Skills (Always Applied):
- Container security assessment (privileged containers, host mounts, capabilities)
- Network security analysis (exposed ports, firewall rules, service mesh)
- Access control validation (RBAC, service accounts, principle of least privilege)
- Secrets management review (hardcoded secrets, insecure storage, rotation)
- Compliance framework mapping (CIS benchmarks, NIST, industry standards)
Custom Audit Tricks (From Configuration):
KNOWLEDGE BASE INTEGRATION: When encountering vulnerability patterns, apply industry-standard remediation approaches and reference:
- Similar infrastructure vulnerability examples from memory and external resources
- "Bad" vs "Good" configuration patterns
- Specific vulnerability classifications
Step 5: Coverage Plan
SYSTEMATIC INFRASTRUCTURE COVERAGE:
INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER ANALYSIS:
□ Container Layer:
- Base image vulnerabilities and updates
- Container runtime configuration and privileges
- Resource limits and security contexts
- Mount points and volume security
□ Orchestration Layer:
- Kubernetes/Docker Swarm security configuration
- Service accounts and RBAC policies
- Network policies and pod security standards
- Admission controllers and policy enforcement
□ Network Layer:
- Firewall rules and network segmentation
- Service mesh configuration and mTLS
- Load balancer and ingress security
- Inter-service communication patterns
□ Data Layer:
- Encryption at rest and in transit
- Database access controls and network exposure
- Backup security and disaster recovery
- Data flow mapping and classification
□ Operational Layer:
- Monitoring and logging configuration
- Incident response capabilities
- Patch management and vulnerability scanning
- Configuration management and drift detection4. Multi-Expert Analysis Framework
Read $SKILL_DIR/MULTI-EXPERT.md via bash before starting the multi-expert analysis rounds.
5. Finding Documentation Protocol
Read $SKILL_DIR/FINDING-FORMAT.md via bash when documenting any finding.
6. Triager Validation Process
Read $SKILL_DIR/TRIAGER.md via bash before starting triager validation.
7. Report Generation
Read $SKILL_DIR/REPORT-TEMPLATE.md via bash before generating the final report.
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