credential-dump-detect
Skill0 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Detect credential dumping: LSASS access, SAM and registry hive theft, and the telemetry that catches them. Use when hunting or building detections for credential theft.
In this repository30 other files it gives its agents.
- aide-fimSkill
- binary-exploitSkill
- bloodhoundSkill
- cis-linux-hardeningSkill
- deserializationSkill
- dns-enumSkill
- dns-exfil-analysisSkill
- dns-exfil-detectSkill
- docker-forensicsSkill
- docker-hardeningSkill
- hashcatSkill
- internal-pentestSkill
- jwt-attackSkill
- kerberoastingSkill
- lateral-movement-detectSkill
- linux-audit-logsSkill
- nmap-advancedSkill
- privesc-linuxSkill
- race-conditionSkill
- security-headersSkill
- sqli-sqlmapSkill
- ssrfSkill
- sstiSkill
- subdomain-enumSkill
- suricata-configSkill
- syslog-centralSkill
- wazuh-detectionSkill
- web-pentestSkill
- wireshark-analysisSkill
- xss-testingSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈5
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 16
When investigating security incidents that require detecting credential dumping techniques
- Distinctive: line 17
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- Distinctive: line 18
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- Distinctive: line 19
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
- Distinctive: line 32
Create detection rules for known GrantedAccess patterns (0x1010, 0x1FFFFF)
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Detecting Credential Dumping Techniques
Overview
Credential dumping (MITRE ATT&CK T1003) is a post-exploitation technique where adversaries extract authentication credentials from OS memory, registry hives, or domain controller databases. This skill covers detection of LSASS memory access via Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess), SAM registry hive export via reg.exe, NTDS.dit extraction via ntdsutil/vssadmin, and comsvcs.dll MiniDump abuse. Detection rules analyze GrantedAccess bitmasks, suspicious calling processes, and known tool signatures.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting credential dumping techniques
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Sysmon v14+ deployed with ProcessAccess logging (Event ID 10) for lsass.exe
- Windows Security audit policy enabling process creation (Event ID 4688) with command line logging
- Splunk or Elastic SIEM ingesting Sysmon and Windows Security logs
- Python 3.8+ for log analysis
Steps
- Configure Sysmon to log ProcessAccess events targeting lsass.exe
- Forward Sysmon Event ID 10 and Windows Event ID 4688 to SIEM
- Create detection rules for known GrantedAccess patterns (0x1010, 0x1FFFFF)
- Detect comsvcs.dll MiniDump and procdump.exe targeting LSASS PID
- Alert on reg.exe SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM hive export commands
- Detect ntdsutil/vssadmin shadow copy creation for NTDS.dit theft
- Correlate detections with user/host context for risk scoring
Expected Output
JSON report containing detected credential dumping indicators with technique classification, severity ratings, process details, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and Splunk/Elastic detection queries.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

