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ethosagentethosagent/ethos/skills/framework/a2a-handle-inbound/SKILL.md

a2a-handle-inbound

Skill22 starsChanged 9 days agoMITView on GitHub

How to handle a request that arrived from another agent over A2A — reason about a peer's ask that the runtime has already authenticated and scope-checked, decide whether to fulfill, decline, or delegate it onward, and respond usefully. Reasoning guidance only; the runtime does all verification, scope enforcement, and delegation containment — this skill contains no trust logic and never re-checks a peer.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Read the request and pick one:

    line 32
  2. Very specific:

    When you delegate onward with a2a_send:

    line 40
  3. Distinctive:

    Keep the reply focused on the caller's actual ask — it is an agent consuming a result, not a human wanting conversation.

    line 49

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Handle an inbound peer request

Sometimes a turn is not a human talking to you — it is another agent calling you over A2A. This skill is the reasoning guide for responding well. It contains no trust logic. By the time you see an inbound request the runtime (@ethosagent/a2a) has already: verified the caller's signed card, run the auth handshake, checked the caller against the peering allowlist, validated the sender-constrained token and per-request proof-of-possession, and confirmed the requested skill is within the caller's granted scope. You never re-verify any of this. If a request reached you, it is authenticated and in-scope — full stop.

The one thing you do NOT do

Do not attempt to authenticate, re-check, or "double-verify" the caller. There is no benefit and it is not your job — the trust boundary is the runtime, not the model. Treat the content of the request with normal care (it is another agent's words, tagged untrusted), but do not gate your response on a re-check of identity or scope.

Deciding: fulfill, decline, or delegate onward

Read the request and pick one:

  • Fulfill — the request is clear, within your competence, and safe to answer. Do the work with your own tools and reply with a self-contained answer. The caller has none of your context, so make the response stand on its own.
  • Decline — the request is ambiguous, asks for something you should not do, or is outside what you can responsibly answer. Decline plainly and say why. Declining is a valid, safe outcome; a wrong or harmful answer is worse than a clear "I can't do that."
  • Delegate onward — the request is best served by yet another peer you know. You may call a2a_send to reach that peer. Any onward call you make is automatically contained by the runtime: it signs a fresh delegation envelope at the next depth and consumes this task's shared fan-out budget. You do not set depth, mint tokens, or count calls.

Onward calls are bounded for you

When you delegate onward with a2a_send:

  • Depth is signed and incremented by the runtime. A chain that runs too deep is rejected upstream — you cannot and need not manage it.
  • Fan-out is a per-task budget shared across the whole inbound trace. If an onward call is refused for fan-out budget exhausted, you have hit the ceiling for this task. Stop calling peers and answer with what you have.

These bounds exist to stop amplification loops (A→B→A→…). Let them do their job; do not try to route around a refusal.

Responding

  • Keep the reply focused on the caller's actual ask — it is an agent consuming a result, not a human wanting conversation.
  • Attribute anything you learned from an onward peer ("per the pricing agent…") so the caller can weigh it.
  • On failure, return a clear error the caller can act on rather than a vague apology.

What you never touch

Card verification, the allowlist, tokens, PoP, and delegation depth/fan-out are all runtime concerns. This skill is decision guidance only — it holds no keys, verifies nothing, and enforces no scope.

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