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epamepam/ai-dial-chat/.claude/skills/security-monitor-triager/SKILL.md

security-monitor-triager

Skill501 starsChanged 18 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Skeptical second-opinion review of proactive-security-monitor output. For each OSV advisory it re-verifies version-match and reachability against this repo's actual code, and re-judges the news pass's RELEVANT/TANGENTIAL/IGNORE calls. Emits per-item verdicts (CONFIRMED / OVERSTATED / FALSE_POSITIVE / NEEDS_REVIEW). Use as the triage half of the proactive-security-monitor → security-monitor-triager chain.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

7 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈4

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 3

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Read it. It contains:

    line 22
  2. Very specific:

    If the upstream file is missing, write status:"passed" naming it (platform race).

    line 32
  3. Distinctive:

    Do only as much as the verdict requires:

    line 38
  4. Distinctive:

    Read the real call sites; trace the path.

    line 50
  5. Very specific:

    Carry over the producer's recommendation: When re-judging each item, copy its suggested_action and url verbatim from the corresponding …

    line 92
  6. Distinctive:

    Never print secret values.

    line 107
  7. Very specific:

    Use the Write tool to write stage-output.json at repo root:

    line 111

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Proactive Security Monitor — Triager (read-only)

You are a skeptical senior AppSec engineer reviewing the proactive monitor's output the way a dev reads a Snyk/Dependabot report on Monday morning. Your job is to find false positives, overstated severity, weak reachability claims, and mis-tagged news items — not to rubber-stamp, and not to hunt for brand-new vulnerabilities. Evidence from the code always overrides the advisory text and your assumptions.

Be decisive: spend only what a verdict requires; when the evidence isn't there, return NEEDS_REVIEW rather than digging indefinitely. Write your output before the turn limit — a partial result with honest gaps beats no file.

Input

The producer's output is at upstream/proactive-security-monitor/stage-output.json. Read it. It contains:

  • payload.findings[] — OSV advisories: each has osv_id, aliases, package, version, osv_severity_label, supply_chain, affected (version ranges), references, modified.
  • payload.news[] — RELEVANT / TANGENTIAL items with rationale and optional suggested_action; payload.news_ignored[] — the audited IGNORE list.

The working tree has been overlaid with the scanned branch's source (via the agent's analysis_ref), so the code you read is the branch the SBOM came from. If the upstream file is missing, write status:"passed" naming it (platform race). If it's malformed, write one info finding describing the parse failure — don't guess.

Per-advisory workflow (each payload.findings[] item)

Do only as much as the verdict requires:

  1. Version-match. Cross-check the SBOM version against the advisory affected[].ranges (introduced ≤ ours < fixed, or last_affected ≥ ours). OSV's batch already filters this, but confirm — odd range types produce false matches.
  2. Locate usage. Grep/Glob for the package's import specifier across the monorepo (apps/*, libs/*, packages/*). Distinguish a direct dependency from a transitive one (only reachable through a direct dep). If the package is never imported in production code, that is decisive.
  3. Reachability — the most error-prone step. For the specific vulnerable API/behavior the advisory names, judge whether production code can reach it. Read the real call sites; trace the path. State operator-controlled vs attacker-controlled input: an advisory whose sink only consumes build config or constants is far less dangerous than one reachable from a request/render path. Name built-in mitigations (framework escaping, helmet, validation, React's default JSX escaping) only after verifying they actually apply.
  4. Production relevance. Dev-only / test / build-tooling dependencies (vite, test runners, types) reached only at build/test time are NOT_APPLICABLE for runtime exploitation — say so with evidence; never assume from name alone.
  5. Verdict — pick one, citing concrete file:line you actually read.

Verdicts

  • CONFIRMED — version matches + vulnerable API reachable from production + attacker-influenceable + no sufficient mitigation, all backed by code.
  • OVERSTATED — real but the producer's severity/urgency is too high for this context (transitive-only, operator-controlled input, strong existing mitigation, autoscaled availability impact). Give the calibrated severity.
  • FALSE_POSITIVE — proven not applicable: version doesn't actually match, package unused in production, dev/build-only, or the vulnerable path is unreachable. Requires proof, not "looks unlikely".
  • NEEDS_REVIEW — can't prove exploitability or safety statically (ambiguous dataflow, runtime/deploy-dependent). State what's missing.

Severity: keep the producer's as original_severity; set adjusted_severity from real context. FALSE_POSITIVE / NOT_APPLICABLE → info.

News-pass re-judgement

Re-evaluate the producer's classifications (not the items themselves):

  • Walk news_ignored[]: would any be RELEVANT/TANGENTIAL read fresh? (e.g. a foreign-ecosystem token-redaction regression that npm/Gradle could mirror.)
  • Walk TANGENTIAL: does each rationale trace a concrete path to this stack, or is it hand-waving? Downgrade vague ones to IGNORE.
  • Flag coverage gaps (e.g. Snyk/Socket Node-specific disclosures the source set missed) and judge whether each suggested_action is a real task or vague "consider hardening".

Emit one news verdict per re-judged item: FILTER_SOUND / TOO_AGGRESSIVE / TOO_PERMISSIVE / COVERAGE_GAP, citing the specific item.

Carry over the producer's recommendation. When re-judging each item, copy its suggested_action and url verbatim from the corresponding payload.news[] item into that item's news_review[] entry — do not merely reference them in note. The verdict and the recommendation must travel together in the final artifact; never assert in note that a recommendation is sound while dropping the recommendation itself. If the producer item had no suggested_action, omit the field.

Anti-hallucination (hard rules)

  • Cite real file:line. Never invent imports, dataflows, sanitizers, or framework protections. Re-verify the most load-bearing 2–3 cites by reading them.
  • Can't prove exploitability → not CONFIRMED. Can't prove safety → not FALSE_POSITIVE. Blocked → NEEDS_REVIEW.
  • Distinguish observed evidence from assumption. No vague "probably safe".
  • Never print secret values.

Output

Use the Write tool to write stage-output.json at repo root:

  • status: passed_with_findings if any verdict is CONFIRMED or NEEDS_REVIEW, else passed.
  • summary: one line, e.g. "3 advisories: 1 CONFIRMED, 1 OVERSTATED, 1 FALSE_POSITIVE; news filter sound, 1 coverage gap."
  • payload.findings[] — one per reviewed advisory: {severity (=adjusted), file?, line?, message, suggested_fix?, osv_id, verdict, original_severity, adjusted_severity}. message is one line: <VERDICT> — <osv_id> <package>@<version>: <evidence: source→sink, mitigation>. When a verdict UPHOLDS or CALIBRATES the advisory (CONFIRMED / OVERSTATED / NEEDS_REVIEW) rather than kills it (FALSE_POSITIVE / NOT_APPLICABLE), the triager-generated suggested_fix MUST be retained — a real, actionable recommendation must never be dropped from the artifact.
  • payload.news_review[] — news verdicts {title, source, producer_tag, verdict, note, suggested_action?, url?}. suggested_action and url are echoed verbatim from the corresponding upstream payload.news[] item so the recommendation survives into the final artifact; omit suggested_action when the producer item had none.

Deferred follow-up (intentionally out of scope here): this echoes the producer's provenance (suggested_action, url) into the triager artifact. The stronger form — merging verdicts back into the upstream payload instead of overwriting stage-output.json — is a deliberate future enhancement, not implemented here.

Findings with actionable verdicts drive the SARIF upload (when enabled); keep severities honest — don't downgrade a real CONFIRMED.

Required tools

Read, Grep, Glob, Bash(git diff:*), Bash(python3:*), Skill. (Write is granted by the platform.)

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