agentleFS
domehahndomehahn/skil/.agents/skills/threat-modeler/SKILL.md

threat-modeler

Skill1 starsChanged 4 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Identify assets, trust boundaries, abuse cases, attack paths, threats, and required security controls.

  • Reads credentials

8 other projects use a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

The file

Show its rules and text

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

16 rules. 0 are common, 14 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 8 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 14

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Write realistic abuse cases and attack paths.

    line 68
  2. Distinctive:

    Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.

    line 74
  3. Distinctive:

    Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.

    line 77
  4. Distinctive:

    After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.

    line 79
  5. Very specific:

    If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of …

    line 80
  6. Distinctive:

    If a trust boundary is crossed, require at least one threat and one control for that boundary.

    line 110
  7. Distinctive:

    If a high-impact threat lacks a mitigation, mark it unresolved rather than accepted.

    line 111
  8. Distinctive:

    If an abuse case is unrealistic, document the assumption and adjust likelihood, not impact.

    line 112
  9. Distinctive:

    If a control is only planned, residual risk remains open.

    line 113
  10. Distinctive:

    If entry points are unknown, treat the model as incomplete.

    line 114
  11. Distinctive:

    If STRIDE categories are skipped, state why they are not applicable.

    line 115
  12. Very specific:

    Do not read secrets, .env files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless …

    line 135
  13. Distinctive:

    Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.

    line 136
  14. Distinctive:

    Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.

    line 137
  15. Distinctive:

    Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.

    line 138
  16. Distinctive:

    Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.

    line 139

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 8 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Threat Modeler

Purpose

Identify and prioritize threats for features, services, APIs, and architecture changes using assets, trust boundaries, entry points, data flows, STRIDE, abuse cases, mitigations, controls, and residual risk.

When to use

  • A feature or service crosses trust boundaries or handles sensitive assets.
  • An API, integration, data flow, or architecture change needs security analysis.
  • Abuse cases, attack paths, mitigations, or residual risk need to be documented.
  • Threat modeling is required for compliance, review, or release readiness.
  • Existing controls are unclear or unverified.

Operating model

  1. Define assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, and data flows.
  2. Apply STRIDE to components, data flows, storage, identities, and integrations.
  3. Write realistic abuse cases and attack paths.
  4. Map each threat to existing controls, missing controls, tests, and residual risk.
  5. Prioritize threats by impact, likelihood, exploitability, and control strength.

Spec-Driven Change Context

  • Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
  • For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
  • Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
  • Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
  • During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
  • After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
  • If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

Skill-Specific Review Scope

  • Assets and sensitivity classification.
  • Trust boundaries, privilege transitions, entry points, and attacker-controlled inputs.
  • STRIDE threats, abuse cases, and attack paths.
  • Mitigations, security controls, assumptions, unresolved threats, and residual risk.
  • Security tests and validation for high-risk paths.

Skill-Specific Checklist

  • Identify assets and classify their sensitivity.
  • Identify trust boundaries and privilege transitions.
  • Identify entry points and attacker-controlled inputs.
  • Map data flows across components and storage.
  • Identify spoofing risks.
  • Identify tampering risks.
  • Identify repudiation and auditability risks.
  • Identify information disclosure risks.
  • Identify denial-of-service risks.
  • Identify elevation-of-privilege risks.
  • Define realistic abuse cases.
  • Map threats to concrete mitigations.
  • Distinguish existing controls from missing controls.
  • Identify residual risk after mitigation.
  • Recommend security tests for high-risk paths.

Decision Rules

  • If a trust boundary is crossed, require at least one threat and one control for that boundary.
  • If a high-impact threat lacks a mitigation, mark it unresolved rather than accepted.
  • If an abuse case is unrealistic, document the assumption and adjust likelihood, not impact.
  • If a control is only planned, residual risk remains open.
  • If entry points are unknown, treat the model as incomplete.
  • If STRIDE categories are skipped, state why they are not applicable.

Finding Categories

  • Spoofing and identity confusion.
  • Tampering and integrity failure.
  • Repudiation and missing audit evidence.
  • Information disclosure and privacy exposure.
  • Denial of service and resource exhaustion.
  • Elevation of privilege and authorization bypass.

Severity Guidance

  • Critical: likely attack path compromises sensitive assets or admin control without effective mitigation.
  • High: plausible attacker can bypass authorization, exfiltrate sensitive data, or disrupt critical service.
  • Medium: abuse requires constraints but exposes meaningful control weakness.
  • Low: defense-in-depth or documentation gap with limited direct exploitability.

DevSecOps Guardrails

  • Do not read secrets, .env files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required.
  • Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
  • Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
  • Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
  • Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
  • Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.

Output Requirements

  • Scope statement with assets, actors, trust boundaries, and entry points.
  • Data-flow and attack-surface summary.
  • Threat register with STRIDE category, abuse case, impact, likelihood, controls, and status.
  • Mitigation and residual-risk register with owners.
  • Recommended security tests for high-risk threats.
  • Assumptions and unresolved-threats list.

Acceptance Criteria

  • Assets, entry points, trust boundaries, and data flows are named.
  • STRIDE is applied or explicitly scoped out with rationale.
  • Each high-risk threat has a mitigation or named residual risk owner.
  • Abuse cases are concrete and realistic.
  • Security tests are recommended for high-risk paths.
  • Assumptions and unresolved threats are explicit.

Anti-Patterns

  • Listing STRIDE labels without abuse cases.
  • Assuming internal networks are trusted.
  • Marking planned controls as implemented mitigations.
  • Omitting residual risk owners.
  • Ignoring denial-of-service because confidentiality dominates discussion.
  • Removing threats because they are uncomfortable to address.

Changelog

1.0.0 - 2026-07-28

  • Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.

Download now (ZIP)

Does it work?

Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.

No reviews yet

People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.

  • It worked
  • Partly
  • It didn't
What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.

Your trail

Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.

Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.

Now do this for your own.

Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.