omni-killchain
Skill5.9k starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Elite end-to-end offensive bug-bounty hunting orchestrator. ALWAYS activate for: full-scope recon, killchain, bug hunting strategy, target triage, attack surface mapping, "find me a bug", "hunt on $target", high-payout vuln hunting, P1/P2 bug discovery, $10K+ bounty hunting, account takeover (ATO), authentication bypass, IDOR/BOLA, SSRF→cloud-metadata, RCE chains, file upload to RCE, dependency confusion, request smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth/SAML/JWT abuse, GraphQL abuse, exposed services (Jenkins/Kubernetes/Spring/Actuator), secrets leaks (GitHub/Postman), subdomain takeover, race conditions, web cache deception, XXE chains, unsafe deserialization, SSTI, prototype pollution, mass assignment, CORS abuse, postMessage abuse, business logic, privilege escalation, chaining low → critical, exploit PoC writing, HackerOne/Bugcrowd/Intigriti report writing. Built from analysis of HackerOne TOP100PAID, TOP100UPVOTED, TOPRCE, TOPSSRF, TOPUPLOAD, TOPOAUTH, TOPOPENID, TOPINFODISCLOSURE, TOPXXE plus Awesome-Bugbounty-Writeups. Routes to specialist hunters (sqli, xss, blf, js-recon, prompt-injection) when applicable. Authorized testing only — bug bounty in-scope, pentest engagement, or CTF. Token-efficient. Never assumes — always verifies. 20+ year red-team mindset.
1 other project uses a version of this.
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- Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunterword for word, first seen Nov 15, 2026
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- vavkamil/awesome-bugbounty-tools“Add Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter to AI Agents”GitHub · Sep 2, 2026 · 2 reactions
- sudosubin/agents.nix“agent-skills.github.awarexone.agentic-bug-hunter: v6.0.0 → refs/tags/v6.0.0”GitHub · Oct 3, 2026
- djmahe4/cyber-tools-index“[WIP] Update tools_config.json with AI security tools from Medium list”GitHub · Oct 2, 2026
- sudosubin/agents.nix“agent-skills.github.awarexone.agentic-bug-hunter: init at 6.0.0”GitHub · Sep 25, 2026
- beyefendi/awesome-llm-security“Agentic Bug Hunter”GitHub · Sep 18, 2026
The biggest 5 of 11 mentions linking to the repository that our crawl found. Each line is their own headline.
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Talked about on GitHub (11 times).
On GitHub · 11
- Sep 2, 2026Add Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter to AI Agents — vavkamil/awesome-bugbounty-tools2 reactions
- Oct 3, 2026agent-skills.github.awarexone.agentic-bug-hunter: v6.0.0 → refs/tags/v6.0.0 — sudosubin/agents.nix0 reactions
- Oct 2, 2026[WIP] Update tools_config.json with AI security tools from Medium list — djmahe4/cyber-tools-index0 reactions
- Sep 25, 2026agent-skills.github.awarexone.agentic-bug-hunter: init at 6.0.0 — sudosubin/agents.nix0 reactions
- Sep 18, 2026Agentic Bug Hunter — beyefendi/awesome-llm-security0 reactions
6 more on GitHub
- Sep 6, 2026Enlaces rotos detectados en el README — YamilAyma/enlaces-para-desarrolladores0 reactions · 3 comments
- Sep 2, 2026Add Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter under Attack Surface — edoardottt/awesome-hacker-search-engines0 reactions · 1 comment
- Sep 2, 2026Add Related Projects section (Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter) — maurosoria/dirsearch0 reactions
- Sep 2, 2026Add Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter to GraphQL Injection tools — swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings0 reactions
- Sep 2, 2026Add Agentic Bug Bounty Hunter to Tools — nahamsec/Resources-for-Beginner-Bug-Bounty-Hunters0 reactions
- Aug 30, 2026Enlaces rotos detectados en el README — YamilAyma/enlaces-para-desarrolladores0 reactions
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter★ 5.9k100% same
Edited · 0
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How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository27 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- bug-bountySkill
- agentic-app-auditSkill
- argusSkill
- bb-methodologySkill
- bug-bountySkill
- bug-chainingSkill
- bugcrowd-reportingSkill
- cicd-securitySkill
- client-reverseSkill
- cloud-pentestSkill
- credential-attackSkill
- graphql-auditSkill
- johnwickSkill
- jsmaxSkill
- llm-redteamSkill
- mcp-server-auditSkill
- meme-coin-auditSkill
- mobile-pentestSkill
- pii-hunterSkill
- report-writingSkill
- security-arsenalSkill
- triage-validationSkill
- web2-reconSkill
- web2-vuln-classesSkill
- web3-auditSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
10 rules. About 0 are common, 6 are distinctive, and 4 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈6
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
4
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 17
Boring features hide gold: Import/export, bulk actions, integrations, webhooks, password reset, email confirmation, billing, file upload, …
- Distinctive: line 40
If you can't classify in 60 seconds, you haven't done enough recon.
- Very specific: line 46
Read references/recon-killchain.md for full one-liners.
- Very specific: line 76
Read references/recon-killchain.md § "Surface Mapping".
- Distinctive: line 147
Test rate limits and quotas with care: Don't break prod. Use minimal payloads to confirm — then stop.
- Distinctive: line 148
Never exfil real data: Use marker files / your own accounts / test buckets.
- Very specific: line 156
Read references/chaining-impact.md.
- Distinctive: line 236
Run Phase 1 recon (passive first.
- Distinctive: line 241
Only write the report when >=3 impact answers are "yes".
- Very specific: line 242
Use references/report-writing.md for the submission.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
OMNI-KILLCHAIN — Elite Bug Hunting Orchestrator
Scope reminder: Authorization gate first. Confirm target is in-scope for an active bounty program / pentest / CTF before any active probing. If unclear, ask.
PHILOSOPHY (read once, internalize forever)
- High payouts come from impact, not novelty. A boring IDOR that exposes 10M users beats a clever XSS on a marketing page. Always ask: who else does this affect, and what's the worst they can do?
- Chains > single bugs. $10K+ reports are almost always chains:
subdomain takeover → cookie scoping → ATO,SSRF → metadata → cloud creds → S3 read → source code → harder bugs,low IDOR → mass assignment → admin role → tenant pivot. - Boring features hide gold. Import/export, bulk actions, integrations, webhooks, password reset, email confirmation, billing, file upload, OAuth callbacks, GraphQL, admin migration tools — these are where the real bugs live. Don't waste hours on the homepage search box.
- Verify, don't assume. Memory of past programs ≠ current state. Re-recon before re-reporting.
- Document like a Tier-1 hunter. Reproducible PoC, video/curl, impact statement, suggested fix, CVSS — see
references/report-writing.md.
PHASE 0 — TARGET TRIAGE (do this first, every time)
Classify the target before touching it. Different classes get different killchain routes.
SaaS multi-tenant web app → IDOR/BOLA, mass assignment, tenant pivot, GraphQL, OAuth, billing logic
Devtool / SCM (GitLab-like) → import features, template injection, file read, git flag injection, plugin RCE
Marketplace / Two-sided → seller<->buyer auth boundary, marketplace IDOR, escrow logic, payment flows
API-first / mobile-backend → BOLA, mass assignment, JWT, GraphQL introspection, rate limit bypass
Identity provider / OAuth → redirect_uri, state, PKCE, scope creep, account linking, SAML signature
File processor (PDF/img/AV) → ImageMagick, FFmpeg, Ghostscript, ExifTool, parser confusion, SSRF, XXE
E-commerce / payments → race conditions, coupon stacking, refund logic, currency mismatch, IDOR on orders
Internal/admin panel exposed→ default creds, SSRF pivot, exposed actuators, debug endpoints
Self-hosted/on-prem → version disclosure, supply chain, dependency confusion
Cloud infra (S3/IAM) → public buckets, IAM misconfig, presigned URL leaks, metadata SSRFIf you can't classify in 60 seconds, you haven't done enough recon. Go to Phase 1.
PHASE 1 — RECON KILLCHAIN
Read references/recon-killchain.md for full one-liners. Summary flow:
SCOPE -> SUBDOMAINS -> ASSETS -> HTTP PROBE -> SCREENSHOT -> JS HARVEST -> ENDPOINTS -> PARAMS -> SECRETS -> DECISIONPassive (no traffic to target)
subfinder -d $T -all -silent,amass enum -passive,chaos -d $Tcrt.sh,github-subdomains -d $T -t $GH_TOKEN,cero -c 1000 $Twaybackurls $T,gau --threads 10 $T,katana -passive -list ...trufflehog github --org=$T --only-verified,gitleaks,noseyparker
Active
httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect -ip -cnamenaabu -top-ports 1000thennmap -sV -sC -p $PORTSkatana -d 5 -jc -kf all -aff -fs fqdngospider -d 5 -c 10 --jsffuf -w $WL -u https://$T/FUZZ -mc all -fc 404 -ac(auto-calibrate)
Decision criteria (move to Phase 2 only when):
=10 live hosts mapped with tech stack
=1 admin/staging/dev subdomain identified
- JS bundles harvested + parsed for endpoints
- Auth flow understood (cookies, JWT, session, OAuth?)
- Existing CVEs for the stack catalogued
PHASE 2 — ATTACK SURFACE MAPPING
Read references/recon-killchain.md § "Surface Mapping". Build this table for each target before attacking:
| Surface | Examples | Top bug classes |
| -------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
| Auth | /login, /reset, /verify, /oauth/callback | ATO, OAuth, password reset, SAML, JWT |
| User-controlled IDs | /user/{id}, /order/{id}, GraphQL node(id:...) | IDOR, BOLA, mass assignment |
| Status/state siblings| /invitations/{challenged,unchallenged}, pending/accepted, active/archived | BOLA (per-variant authz gap → token+PII leak) |
| Import/Export | /import, /migration, /backup, /clone | File read, SSRF, RCE, data exfil |
| File upload | avatar, attachment, csv import, doc | RCE, XSS, SSRF, XXE, polyglot |
| Integrations | webhooks, OAuth apps, slack/jira | SSRF, OAuth scope, secret leak |
| Billing | checkout, refund, coupon, plan change | Race, business logic, IDOR |
| Admin/internal | /admin, /staff, /internal, X-Forwarded-For | Auth bypass, header smuggling |
| GraphQL | /graphql, /api/graphql | Introspection, batch, alias, IDOR |
| Search/filter/sort | ?q=, ?orderBy=, ?filter= | SQLi, NoSQLi, SSTI, sort injection |
| URL fetchers | url=, image=, callback=, return_to= | SSRF, open redirect -> OAuth ATO |
| Templating | email templates, invoice PDF, markdown | SSTI -> RCE, XSS |
| Crypto/JWT | Authorization: Bearer ... | alg=none, kid traversal, weak secret |PHASE 3 — PAYOUT-PRIORITY ROUTING
Hunt highest-EV first. From HackerOne data, these archetypes consistently pay $10K+ when impact is shown. Each links to a deep reference.
TIER S ($20K–$50K) — Shoot for these
- Pre-auth RCE on production / VPN / SSO host →
references/rce-archetypes.md§ "Pre-auth" - Dependency confusion on internal package names →
references/dependency-confusion.md - Account takeover via password reset / email confirmation flaw — incl. username/identifier reuse: delete or rename account A, claim A's freed username/handle/email/org-slug, inherit A's orphaned resources/membership/links (ownership keyed on a mutable identifier instead of immutable user ID)
- GraphQL authorization bypass exposing private program/tenant data →
references/graphql-deep.md - Exposed Kubernetes API / Jenkins / Zeppelin / Spring Actuator with creds →
references/exposed-services.md - GitHub/GitLab/CI secrets leak with verified credentials →
references/secrets-recon.md - SSRF → cloud metadata → IAM credentials → cross-account / S3 takeover →
references/ssrf-killchain.md - HTTP request smuggling → mass session/cookie theft →
references/request-smuggling.md - Supply chain: malicious PR / compromised release / build agent →
references/dependency-confusion.md§ "Build pipeline" - OAuth/SAML response_type or signature bypass → ATO across IdP
TIER A ($10K–$20K)
- Cache poisoning → stored XSS / session / DoS →
references/cache-poisoning-deception.md - Web cache deception leaking auth tokens → same file
- Server-side template injection (Kramdown, Jinja, Smarty, Velocity, Twig, FreeMarker) →
references/ssti-rce.md - Java/PHP/Python/.NET unsafe deserialization →
references/deserialization.md - File upload to RCE (polyglot, parser confusion, magic bytes, ZIP slip, GhostScript, ImageMagick MSL) →
references/file-upload-rce.md - XXE in SOAP/SAML/SVG/DOCX/JPEG XMP/SVG-on-PDF →
references/xxe-deep.md - GraphQL batch/alias/depth → DoS, brute-force, info disclosure →
references/graphql-deep.md - Race condition on payment / coupon / refund / 2FA / rate limit →
references/race-conditions.md - Privilege escalation via role/permission abuse on multi-tenant →
references/idor-bola-mass-assignment.md - Subdomain takeover → cookie scope → ATO chain →
references/subdomain-takeover.md
TIER B ($1K–$10K) — Bread and butter
- IDOR / BOLA on /api/v*/*/{id}, GraphQL node(id:...)
- Mass assignment on PUT/PATCH user/profile/account
- Open redirect → OAuth code theft
- Self-XSS → CSRF → stored XSS
- CORS misconfig leaking auth tokens
- Session fixation / cookie scoping on sibling subdomain
- 2FA bypass (race, response manipulation, backup code reuse)
- SSRF (blind, DNS rebinding, IPv6, URL parser confusion)
- Reflected XSS in legacy/marketing site → cookie steal on main
- Path traversal in export/download/zip features
PHASE 4 — EXECUTION RULES
For every candidate vuln:
- Reproduce twice. Different account, different IP, different browser. False positives kill credibility.
- Maximize impact before reporting. A blind SSRF is $500. SSRF→metadata→cloud keys→S3 read→PII is $10K+. Always escalate.
- Chain across surfaces. Subdomain X has reflected XSS. Domain Y sets cookies on
*.target.com. Combine. - Test rate limits and quotas with care. Don't break prod. Use minimal payloads to confirm — then stop.
- Never exfil real data. Use marker files / your own accounts / test buckets. Read enough to prove impact, no more.
- Capture everything. Store HTTP requests/responses, screenshots, video. Use Burp Logger/Pro.
- Write the report when impact is provable, not before. Half-impact reports get triaged as low.
PHASE 5 — IMPACT MAXIMIZATION (the $10K multiplier)
Read references/chaining-impact.md. Quick mental checklist for every finding:
Q1. Can this affect another user (cross-user)? -> IDOR/BOLA family
Q2. Can this affect another tenant (cross-tenant)? -> Privilege escalation, big multiplier
Q3. Can this leak credentials/tokens/keys? -> Secret exposure, big multiplier
Q4. Can this be triggered without auth? -> Pre-auth, big multiplier
Q5. Can this be triggered without user interaction? -> 0-click, big multiplier
Q6. Can this persist (stored)? -> Stored XSS, persistent IDOR
Q7. Can this read internal services/cloud metadata? -> SSRF chain
Q8. Can this read source code or config? -> Source disclosure -> harder bugs
Q9. Can this lead to RCE or SQLi? -> Critical
Q10. Can this be mass-exploited (batch/race/automation)? -> Mass-impact, big multiplierEach "yes" raises payout tier. Aim for >=3 yeses before submitting.
ROUTING — when to delegate
| Trigger | Delegate to |
| SQL injection signal (errors, time delay, ORDER BY) | sqli-hunter-agent |
| XSS sink in DOM/markdown/HTML reflection | xss-hunter-agent |
| Heavy JS bundles, source maps, big SPA | js-recon-agent |
| Broken Logic / business-logic / authz check pattern | blf-hunter-agent |
| LLM/agent target, system prompt, AI feature | prompt-injection-hunter-agent |
For everything else — RCE, SSRF, ATO, OAuth, IDOR, upload, XXE, race, smuggling, cache, subdomain takeover, dependency confusion, exposed services, secrets — stay here and use the references below.
REFERENCE INDEX
Recon & surface
references/recon-killchain.md— full passive+active recon flow with one-linersreferences/secrets-recon.md— GitHub/GitLab/Postman/Docker/CI secret huntingreferences/subdomain-takeover.md— full dangling-CNAME provider catalogreferences/exposed-services.md— Jenkins, Kubernetes, Zeppelin, Spring Actuator, Drupal, Airflow, Grafana
Server-side execution
references/rce-archetypes.md— every RCE archetype seen on H1 ($10K+ ones first)references/ssti-rce.md— Jinja2, Kramdown, Smarty, Twig, Velocity, FreeMarker, Handlebars, Pug, Makoreferences/deserialization.md— Java, PHP (phar/wakeup), .NET, Python, Node (node-serialize), Rubyreferences/file-upload-rce.md— polyglot, parser confusion, ImageMagick, GhostScript, ZIP slip, XSLT, ExifToolreferences/dependency-confusion.md— npm/pip/RubyGems/Maven/Go substitution, build pipeline RCE
Server-side request abuse
references/ssrf-killchain.md— cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure/Alibaba/DO), DNS rebinding, IPv6, parser tricksreferences/xxe-deep.md— SOAP, SAML, SVG, DOCX, OOXML, JPEG XMP, blind/OOB extraction
HTTP layer
references/request-smuggling.md— CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, h2c, response queue desyncreferences/cache-poisoning-deception.md— unkeyed input, fat GET, web cache deceptionreferences/cors-postmessage.md— CORS misconfig, postMessage origin abuse
Authorization & logic
references/idor-bola-mass-assignment.md— IDOR, BOLA, mass assignment, prototype pollution sinksreferences/race-conditions.md— Turbo Intruder, single-packet attack, financial logicreferences/graphql-deep.md— introspection, batch, alias, depth, suggestions, IDOR
Maximization
references/chaining-impact.md— low->critical recipes from $10K+ H1 reportsreferences/report-writing.md— H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti templates, CVSS, impact statements
Payloads & cheatsheets
payloads/rce-payloads.mdpayloads/ssrf-payloads.mdpayloads/ssti-payloads.mdpayloads/cmd-injection.mdcheatsheets/waf-bypass.mdcheatsheets/oneliners.md— copy-paste commands per phasecheatsheets/encoding-tricks.md
QUICK START — when the user says "hunt $TARGET"
- Confirm scope authorization.
- Run Phase 1 recon (passive first; ask before going active).
- Triage findings into the Phase 2 surface table.
- Prioritize by Phase 3 tier (TIER S → A → B).
- Pick the top 3 candidates, dig deep with the relevant
references/*.md. - For each candidate, run the Phase 5 impact checklist.
- Only write the report when >=3 impact answers are "yes".
- Use
references/report-writing.mdfor the submission.
Stay paranoid. Stay scoped. Stack chains. Hunt the $10K+ tier first.
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