arcium
Skill14 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Build and debug encrypted Solana applications with Arcium — data stays private during computation, no single party sees it. Use when writing Arcis circuits (#[encrypted], #[instruction]), wiring Anchor programs with init/queue_computation/callback flows, choosing Shared vs Mxe encrypted state, encrypting inputs with @arcium-hq/client (RescueCipher, x25519), or debugging ArgBuilder ordering, nonce, callback, or computation finalization failures. Covers dark pools, sealed-bid auctions, encrypted voting, hidden game state, confidential DeFi, secure randomness, and threshold signing. Also use for getting started with your first Arcium app. SKIP: generic Solana programs without encrypted compute, AES or wallet-only encryption client code, MPC theory not tied to Arcium, or Token-2022 confidential transfers.
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
9 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 6 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
6
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 31
No MCP?: Use the docs directly: docs.arcium.com/llms.txt for the page index, or llms-full.txt for all docs in one file.
- Very specific: line 59
All data must be fixed-size — no Vec, String, HashMap.
- Distinctive: line 88
Every computation needs three functions in your Solana program:
- Very specific: line 144
NEVER reuse a nonce — every cipher.encrypt() call needs a fresh randomBytes(16)
- Very specific: line 145
NEVER combine multiple ciphertexts into one ArgBuilder call — each encrypted scalar is its own [u8.
- Very specific: line 146
NEVER omit .x25519_pubkey() for Enc<Shared, T> (silent failure).
- Very specific: line 150
Macro string matching: All macro strings must exactly match #[instruction] fn NAME across #[arcium_callback], comp_def_offset(), …
- Distinctive: line 161
Prefer arithmetic over comparisons (cheaper in MPC)
- Distinctive: line 168
When a computation fails, returns wrong results, or never finalizes — check in this order:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 308,232 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Arcium
Encrypted computation on Solana via MPC. Data stays encrypted during computation. Your confidential app — a Solana program + Arcis circuits (the Rust circuit framework) + an on-chain metadata account — is an MXE (MPC eXecution Environment). The arcium CLI (wraps Anchor) handles init, build, test, and deploy — use MCP for current flags and options.
Targets Arcium v0.11.x (Anchor 1.0.2, Solana 3.1.10 — unchanged from v0.10.x). Upgrading from v0.10.x? See the v0.10 → v0.11 migration guide — the one app-facing breaking change is
queue_computation's new 7th argcallback_cu_limit: u32(pass0for default). v0.11 also adds Arcis enums andOption<T>(additive; not usable as circuit input/output). Coming from v0.9.x? Do the v0.9 → v0.10 migration first (init_comp_def→init_computation_def,@coral-xyz/anchor→@anchor-lang/core,Box<…>on queue-side accounts).
MCP Tools: search_arcium_docs for discovery (returns page path), then query_docs_filesystem_arcium_docs with cat <path>.mdx for full-page reads (e.g., cat /developers/arcis/mental-model.mdx).
No MCP? Use the docs directly: docs.arcium.com/llms.txt for the page index, or llms-full.txt for all docs in one file.
When to Use
Use when:
- You need trustless computation -- cryptographically guaranteed, no single party sees the data
- Multiple parties compute on combined data without revealing inputs
- On-chain state must remain encrypted but computable
- Privacy: sealed-bid auctions, voting, hidden game state, dark pools, confidential DeFi
Constraints:
- Fixed loop bounds required (no variable-length iteration)
Mental Model
Arcium apps have three coupled surfaces. Most bugs are mismatches across their boundaries:
| Surface | Responsibility | Common Boundary Bugs |
| Circuit (Arcis/Rust) | Pure fixed-shape MPC logic | Variable loops, dynamic collections, .reveal() inside conditionals |
| Program (Anchor/Rust) | Orchestration: init + queue + callback | Macro name mismatch, callback accounts not writable, wrong ArgBuilder order |
| Client (TypeScript) | Key exchange, encryption, submission, decryption | Nonce reuse, missing .x25519_pubkey() for Shared, param order ≠ circuit order |
MPC constraints (from how secret sharing works):
- Both branches of
if/elseexecute unless the condition is a compile-time constant — cost = sum of both branches, not max. Same rule applies to non-constantmatcharms andif let— all reachable arms execute. - Loops must have fixed bounds — no
while,break,continue - Comparisons are expensive; arithmetic (add/multiply) is nearly free
.reveal()and.from_arcis()cannot be called inside conditionals (exception: compile-time constant conditions; also forbidden inside non-constantmatcharms and guards)- All data must be fixed-size — no
Vec,String,HashMap; use[T; N] - Pattern matching (
match,if let,matches!) is supported in v0.10+. Lastmatcharms cannot have guards. Let chains requireedition = "2024"inencrypted-ixs/Cargo.toml. - Enums and
Option<T>are supported in v0.11+ (fullOptioncombinator surface —.unwrap_or,.map,.and_then, etc.). Two constraints: neither can be a circuit input or output, and enum discriminants cannot be set explicitly.
Intent Router
Identify what you're building, then read the linked reference before coding. For API details, CLI flags, deployment, and versions, use MCP directly.
| Intent | Read | MCP Query |
| First Arcium app | minimal-circuit.md | "hello world tutorial" |
| Core concepts / terminology (MXE, Arx, comp def) | core-concepts | "arcium core concepts" |
| Choose a pattern (stateless, stateful, multi-party) | patterns.md | "arcium examples" |
Circuit syntax (#[encrypted], #[instruction]) | patterns.md | "arcis encrypted instruction" |
| Shared vs Mxe encryption | See Encryption Context below | "Shared vs Mxe encryption" |
| ArgBuilder ordering / ciphertext errors | troubleshooting.md -- ArgBuilder Ordering Errors | "ArgBuilder encrypted plaintext" |
| Callback not firing / computation stuck | troubleshooting.md -- Computation Never Finalizes | "arcium_callback queue_computation" |
| Nonce / decryption errors | troubleshooting.md -- Nonce Errors | "RescueCipher encrypt nonce" |
| Client-side encryption (RescueCipher, x25519) | minimal-circuit.md -- Test section | "RescueCipher encrypt nonce" |
| Threshold signing / secure randomness | patterns.md | "MXESigningKey sign" or "ArcisRNG" |
| Re-encryption / sealing | patterns.md | "arcium sealing re-encryption" |
| Deployment (devnet/mainnet) | — | "arcium deploy cluster-offset" |
| CI / GitHub Actions | setup-arcium | "arcium github actions ci" |
| Version / installation requirements | installation docs | "arcium installation anchor solana" |
Upgrading to v0.11.x (callback_cu_limit, enums/Option) | migration guide | "v0.11 migration" |
| Closing MXE / comp def to reclaim rent | — | "deactivate close computation definition" |
Core Pattern: Three Functions
Every computation needs three functions in your Solana program:
| Function | Purpose | When Called |
init_<name>_comp_def | Init computation definition — on-chain account holding the circuit's compiled bytecode | Once per instruction |
<name> | Build args + queue computation | Each request |
<name>_callback | Handle result from Arx nodes (the cluster's MPC compute nodes) | After MPC completes |
const COMP_DEF_OFFSET_FLIP: u32 = comp_def_offset("flip");
// 1. INIT (once per instruction type) — v0.10+ helper is `init_computation_def` (2 args)
pub fn init_flip_comp_def(ctx: Context<InitFlipCompDef>) -> Result<()> {
init_computation_def(ctx.accounts, None)
}
// 2. QUEUE (each computation)
pub fn flip(ctx: Context<Flip>, offset: u64, ...) -> Result<()> {
let args = ArgBuilder::new()...build();
queue_computation(ctx.accounts, offset, args,
vec![FlipCallback::callback_ix(offset, &ctx.accounts.mxe_account, &[])?],
1, 0, 0, // num_callback_txs, cu_price_micro, callback_cu_limit (v0.11: 7th arg, 0 = default)
)?;
Ok(())
}
// 3. CALLBACK (after MPC completes)
#[arcium_callback(encrypted_ix = "flip")]
pub fn flip_callback(ctx: Context<FlipCallback>,
output: SignedComputationOutputs<FlipOutput>) -> Result<()> {
let result = output.verify_output(...)?;
// Use result...
}Encryption size: RescueCipher encrypts any scalar to 32 bytes regardless of type.
Formula: ciphertext_size = 32 * number_of_scalar_values. See troubleshooting.md for the full size table.
Encryption Context
Enc<Owner, T> — Owner is who can decrypt. Choose before writing the circuit.
| Scenario | Use |
| User submits input / result sealed back to that same user | Enc<Shared, T> |
| Internal state users shouldn't access | Enc<Mxe, T> |
| State persisted across computations (re-read by any party) | Enc<Mxe, T> |
| Result revealed to everyone | .reveal() |
Wrong owner fails quietly: persisted/multi-party state must be Mxe — Shared grants reveal capability to one client's x25519 key, leaking aggregate state to that recipient. If a different client key/nonce is used later, decryption yields garbage (MPC cannot raise a decrypt error without leaking). Shared also seals to one recipient; for a public result use .reveal(), not Shared. (Omitting .x25519_pubkey() on a Shared input is the same silent-failure class — see Gotchas.)
Gotchas
Reference during development to avoid common mistakes.
NEVER:
- NEVER reuse a nonce — every
cipher.encrypt()call needs a freshrandomBytes(16) - NEVER combine multiple ciphertexts into one ArgBuilder call — each encrypted scalar is its own
[u8; 32]call - NEVER omit
.x25519_pubkey()forEnc<Shared, T>(silent failure);Enc<Mxe, T>skips it
Critical (silent failures)
- Box-wrap queue-side Arcium accounts (v0.10+): In
#[queue_computation_accounts], follow generated templates and wrap heavy accounts:Box<Account<'info, MXEAccount>>,Box<Account<'info, Cluster>>,Box<Account<'info, ComputationDefinitionAccount>>. Unboxed queue accounts can exceed Anchor/Solana stack limits. Callback-side (#[callback_accounts]) can stay unboxed. - Macro string matching: All macro strings must exactly match
#[instruction] fn NAMEacross#[arcium_callback],comp_def_offset(),#[init_computation_definition_accounts],#[queue_computation_accounts],#[callback_accounts] - ArgBuilder ordering: Calls must match circuit parameter order left-to-right. For
Enc<Shared, T>:.x25519_pubkey()then.plaintext_u128(nonce)then ciphertexts. ForEnc<Mxe, T>:.plaintext_u128(nonce)then ciphertexts. Missing.x25519_pubkey()for Shared = silent failure. - Division by secret zero: Guard divisors with the safe divisor pattern -- both branches execute in MPC, so the division always runs. See patterns.md — Safe Division.
- Combined ciphertext arrays: Each encrypted scalar needs a separate
[u8; 32]ArgBuilder call — do NOT pass[u8; 64]for a two-scalar type. See troubleshooting.md — Ciphertext Size Mismatch.
Warning (wrong results)
- Nonce reuse: Same nonce for multiple encryptions = garbled output. Use unique
randomBytes(16)per encryption. - Callback account writability: Pass extra accounts via
CallbackAccount { pubkey, is_writable: true }incallback_ix(..., &[...]). Also mark#[account(mut)]in callback struct. Accounts cannot be created or resized during callbacks. - Output struct naming: Circuit
fn add_togethergeneratesAddTogetherOutput. Single returns usefield_0(aSharedEncryptedStruct<1>orMXEEncryptedStruct<1>with.ciphertextsand.nonce). Tuple returns nestfield_0,field_1, etc.
Tips
- Prefer arithmetic over comparisons (cheaper in MPC)
- Comparisons/divisions are cheaper with narrower types (
u64vsu128); storage cost is identical
Debug Triage Order
Start here when a computation fails or returns wrong results.
When a computation fails, returns wrong results, or never finalizes — check in this order:
- Names match exactly —
#[instruction] fn NAMEmust match across#[arcium_callback(encrypted_ix = "NAME")],comp_def_offset("NAME"), and all account macros - Comp def initialized —
init_*_comp_defmust be called once before any computation - ArgBuilder param order — calls must match circuit fn parameters left-to-right
- Shared params include pubkey —
.x25519_pubkey()before.plaintext_u128(nonce)before ciphertexts (missing = silent failure) - Nonce is unique — fresh
randomBytes(16)per encryption, same nonce passed to program - Callback registered and writable —
callback_ix(...)passed inqueue_computationcall, accounts set in BOTHCallbackAccount { pubkey, is_writable: true }AND#[account(mut)]in callback struct - Environment correct — cluster offset matches network, MXE public key available (retry with backoff), RPC endpoint reliable
For detailed error solutions: troubleshooting.md
Verification Checklist
Pre-deploy gate. Run through before deploying or submitting a PR.
Circuit:
arcium buildcompiles without errors- No
break/continue/return/variable-length loops #[instruction]fn names are consistent across all macros
Program:
init_*_comp_defcalled before first computation (once per instruction type)- Every circuit fn has init + invoke + callback instructions
#[arcium_callback(encrypted_ix = "...")]matches circuit fn name exactly- Extra callback accounts passed via
CallbackAccount { pubkey, is_writable: true }AND#[account(mut)]in callback struct
Client:
- Unique nonce per encryption (no reuse across calls)
- ArgBuilder call order matches circuit fn parameter order left-to-right
.x25519_pubkey()included for everyEnc<Shared, T>parameter- Cluster offset matches deployment environment
Deploy:
arcium testpasses locally before deploy- RPC endpoint is reliable (not default Solana RPC)
- CI pins
setup-arciumand explicit Arcium/Anchor/Solana versions for reproducible toolchain installs
Resources
- MCP tools (primary for API details, CLI flags, deployment, versions):
search_arcium_docs+query_docs_filesystem_arcium_docs— docs.arcium.com/mcp - Docs: docs.arcium.com/developers — no-MCP fallback: llms.txt (index), llms-full.txt (full)
- v0.10 → v0.11 migration: migration guide —
callback_cu_limit7th arg onqueue_computation, Arcis enums andOption<T> - Account lifecycle / closing: account-lifecycle —
deactivate-computation-definition→ TTL (180 slots) →close-computation-definition/close-mxe - Examples: github.com/arcium-hq/examples
- CI / GitHub Actions: github.com/arcium-hq/setup-arcium — GitHub Action for CI toolchain installs; set Arcium/Anchor/Solana versions explicitly for v0.11.x instead of relying on defaults
- TypeScript SDK:
@arcium-hq/client+@arcium-hq/reader(subscribe to computation events) — ts.arcium.com/api - Patterns: patterns.md — curated circuit patterns (stateless, stateful, multi-party, randomness, packing, threshold signing, sealing)
- Troubleshooting: troubleshooting.md — hard-to-debug errors
- Minimal working app: minimal-circuit.md — circuit + program + test
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- xeroc/skills★ 1100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
Reviews can't be read right now.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

