agentleFS
ai-agent-assemblyai-agent-assembly/agent-assembly/.claude/skills/shell-development/SKILL.md

shell-development

Skill4 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Safe, portable, low-noise Bash/sh automation. Company-common per governance/engineering/agent-skill-architecture.md (HORO-969) §1 — it owns shell scripting technique and the process/filesystem safety non-negotiables; it does not own any other language's build/test tooling. Auto-used, no manifest.yaml — deliberately, matching the five original company-process skills (governance-doctor, jira-delivery, public-release-reconcile, release-assurance, repo-bootstrap). agents/common/project_skills.py's resolve_applicable_skills() treats a skill with no manifest as always applicable, which is correct here: every repo has shell scripts somewhere (CI glue, dev scripts, hooks), so there is no single stack-evidence file that…

  • Reads credentials
  • Deletes or force-pushes

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

7 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 7 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈0

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 7

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  • could be automatic: a setting could enforce it
  1. Very specific:

    Use engineering-loop's Explore → Narrow → Validate → Escalate → Full Gate loop for iterating on a script.

    line 41
  2. Very specific:

    Never: use raw env, printenv, set (no args), export -p, or cat .env* for credential discovery — these dump every variable in scope, secret …

    line 55
  3. Very specific:

    Never: run set -x (or bash -x) around a command that constructs or passes a credential — xtrace echoes literal argv, including secret …

    line 58
  4. Very specific:

    Never: put a secret value in argv or debug output when a safer channel (stdin, a file descriptor, an env var passed by reference) is …

    line 61
  5. Very specific:

    Never: use pkill <generic-name> or killall <generic-name> — identify the exact PID and confirm its owning process/worktree/session before …

    line 64
  6. Very specific:

    Before deleting, killing, or reading credentials, check references/process-and-filesystem-safety.md's prohibited-pattern list and its "what …

    line 78
  7. Very specific:

    Run ShellCheck/shfmt (see references/safe-shell-patterns.md) as the Narrow-stage check before considering a script done.

    line 81

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md
<!-- horonom:generated --><!-- Source: horonomy/.github agents/skills/shell-development/SKILL.md. Do not hand-edit — rerun `python3 agents/common/project_skills.py`. -->

SKILL.md — shell-development

Purpose

Safe, portable, low-noise Bash/sh automation. Company-common per governance/engineering/agent-skill-architecture.md (HORO-969) §1 — it owns shell scripting technique and the process/filesystem safety non-negotiables; it does not own any other language's build/test tooling.

Type

Auto-used, no manifest.yaml — deliberately, matching the five original company-process skills (governance-doctor, jira-delivery, public-release-reconcile, release-assurance, repo-bootstrap). agents/common/project_skills.py's resolve_applicable_skills() treats a skill with no manifest as always applicable, which is correct here: every repo has shell scripts somewhere (CI glue, dev scripts, hooks), so there is no single stack-evidence file that could gate this the way Cargo.toml gates rust-development.

When to use

Writing, editing, or debugging any Bash or POSIX sh script or inline shell snippet — CI steps, dev/build scripts, git hooks, wrapper commands around a noisy tool.

When NOT to use

  • As a substitute for a language skill's own build/test commands invoked from a shell script — the script glue is this skill's concern, the underlying cargo/pytest/etc. invocation is the relevant *-development skill's.
  • For non-shell scripting languages (Python, Node) even when they replace a shell script — use the matching language skill instead.

Composes with engineering-loop

Use engineering-loop's Explore → Narrow → Validate → Escalate → Full Gate loop for iterating on a script. references/safe-shell-patterns.md's guidance on avoiding blind tail -N truncation is a shell-specific instance of engineering-loop's L0–L3 diagnostic contract (agents/skills/engineering-loop/references/diagnostic-contract.md rule 4): a wrapper that truncates a failing pipeline's output can hide the actual error the same way a naive test summarizer can.

Non-negotiables (see references/process-and-filesystem-safety.md)

These mirror governance/engineering/security.md's non-waivable invariants and must never be relaxed by a script, wrapper, or one-off command:

  • Never use raw env, printenv, set (no args), export -p, or cat .env* for credential discovery — these dump every variable in scope, secret or not, straight into command output.
  • Never run set -x (or bash -x) around a command that constructs or passes a credential — xtrace echoes literal argv, including secret values, to stderr.
  • Never put a secret value in argv or debug output when a safer channel (stdin, a file descriptor, an env var passed by reference) is available — argv is visible via ps and shell history.
  • Never use pkill <generic-name> or killall <generic-name> — identify the exact PID and confirm its owning process/worktree/session before terminating anything.
  • Never recursively delete an ambiguous or unowned directory — confirm the target's contents match what the script expects before rm -rf.

Routing decision

  1. Detect target interpreter (Bash-only features vs. POSIX sh) — see references/safe-shell-patterns.md's shell-detection section — before writing anything, since the two have materially different safe-quoting and array semantics.
  2. Apply quoting/array/pipeline-exit-status patterns from references/safe-shell-patterns.md.
  3. Before deleting, killing, or reading credentials, check references/process-and-filesystem-safety.md's prohibited-pattern list and its "what to do instead" for the safe replacement.
  4. Run ShellCheck/shfmt (see references/safe-shell-patterns.md) as the Narrow-stage check before considering a script done.

Worked example

  • examples/safe-wrapper-with-preserved-exit-code.md — wrapping a noisy command for compact output without losing $? through a pipeline.

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