audit-security
Skill1 starsChanged 3 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security and memory-safety audit of the whole project in passes run back to back - memory errors that can crash it or be exploited (overflows, use after free, leaks a client can trigger, races), injection (shell, SQL, path, format strings), authentication / authorization holes, secrets, crypto, network exposure, files and permissions, untrusted input, known vulnerable dependencies - each finding verified with evidence and fixed at once, then a new full pass, again and again while the last pass still found something; ends with a PDF report (report skill) of everything found and fixed. Use whenever the user asks for a security audit, a vulnerability / flaw / exploit hunt, a hacking-proof check, a memory-error audit that must be fixed until clean, or "passe sur tout le projet pour les failles".
18 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- MangroveTechnologies/mangrove-agenttheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- tounsils/claude-code-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 25, 2026
- VelimirMueller/ai-development-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 25, 2026
- ChariereFiedler/ronce-racinetheir own version, first seen Oct 22, 2026
- krixon/skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- VelimirMueller/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use retro, implement and 2 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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Other versions18 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 18
- ChariereFiedler/ronce-racine★ 9same name
- kensaurus/cursor-kenji★ 9same name
- kensaurus/skills★ 9same name
- MangroveTechnologies/mangrove-agent★ 8same name
- VelimirMueller/ai-development-skills★ 7same name
- VelimirMueller/claude-skills★ 7same name
- VoxTechnologies/transmute-framework★ 5same name
- daanvandenbergh/claudekit★ 2same name
- engineering-workshops/react-alicante-agentic-workflow★ 2same name
- jasonmichaelbell78-creator/sonash-v0★ 2same name
8 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository70 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ask-at-endSkill
- clarifySkill
- continue-workSkill
- exportSkill
- full-permissionSkill
- ideationSkill
- interactive-questionsSkill
- onboardSkill
- pauseSkill
- presentationSkill
- rtkSkill
- setup-contextSkill
- write-like-meSkill
- audit-bugsSkill
- audit-depsSkill
- audit-qualitySkill
- benchmarkSkill
- cmake-styleSkill
- cpp-classSkill
- cpp-commentsSkill
- cpp-projectSkill
- cpp-styleSkill
- better-explain-docSkill
- better-html-docSkill
- better-html-styleSkill
- better-protocol-docSkill
- docs-updateSkill
- explain-docSkill
- html-docSkill
- html-styleSkill
- protocol-docSkill
- readme-styleSkill
- reportSkill
- wiki-styleSkill
- ci-cdSkill
- git-commitSkill
- git-conventionsSkill
- pre-commitSkill
- legal-checkSkill
- legal-setupSkill
- licenseSkill
- libutils-exceptionSkill
- libutils-installSkill
- libutils-setupSkill
- libutilsSkill
- python-classSkill
- python-commentsSkill
- python-projectSkill
- python-styleSkill
- auditSkill
- cppSkill
- devSkill
- docSkill
- gitSkill
- legalSkill
- pythonSkill
- setup-projectSkill
- styleSkill
- setup-studioSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 17 edited versions we read keep these.
2
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 37
Static tools: when installed (ask before installing): clang-tidy (bugprone-*,cert-*,clang-analyzer-security*, concurrency-*), cppcheck …
- Very specific: line 43
Run it: start the program (or its server) in an isolated environment (its own config / data / port / socket) and try what an attacker …
- Distinctive: line 72
After a pass that found and fixed anything: start the next full pass right away, without asking (the fixed code is read again, and what the …
- Distinctive: line 74
Stop only after a pass that finds nothing new (its tooling clean, its review empty).
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 17 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security audit (until a clean pass)
<name> (a skill) = the folder of that skill: ~/.claude/skills/<name> (setup.sh) or ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../*/<name> (plugin of the marketplace).
What the user wants: the whole project gone through for every flaw that crashes it, leaks, or lets someone in, fixed as found, and the passes started again at once as long as the last one still found something - insisting, not one pass and a list. The end: a PDF only report of what was found and fixed.
1. Before the first pass
- Scope: the whole repository (
git rev-parse --show-toplevel, or the current folder), unless the request names a part. - What it is: languages, build system, how it runs (binary, server, library, web page, mobile app), what reaches it from outside (network ports, HTTP routes, sockets, files it reads, command line, environment, IPC, plugins) - the attack surface, written down once and kept up to date across the passes.
- Its tests and how to build them: a pass ends with the build and the tests green.
- Fixes are part of this skill (the user asked for them): no question for each one. Ask (one AskUserQuestion call, French) only when a fix changes a behaviour the user relies on (a protocol, an option, a default, data on disk) or needs an architectural choice; the rest is fixed directly. Never commit or push (the user's git rules), never delete data.
- Mode: one agent by default. Subagents in parallel (one per area of the attack surface) only when the user asks or agrees (propose it with the number of agents and why); never a fork agent.
2. One pass (always the whole scope)
A pass covers everything, every time (a fix can open a new hole elsewhere): the tooling, then the review, then the verification, then the fixes.
Tooling
- Sanitizers (C / C++):
bash <audit-bugs>/scripts/sanitize_build.sh <project> all [--run "<cmd>"](a copy in /tmp, ASan + UBSan then TSan, the tests run): every report is a lead. - Dependencies:
python3 <audit-deps>/scripts/vulns.py <project> --json /tmp/vulns.json --md /tmp/vulns.md(known vulnerabilities, compromised versions, transitive too): a finding when the vulnerable code is reachable. - Static tools when installed (ask before installing):
clang-tidy(bugprone-*,cert-*,clang-analyzer-security*, concurrency-*),cppcheck --enable=all,semgrep --config auto,bandit(Python),shellcheck,gosec,cargo audit,npm audit,gitleaks/trufflehog(secrets in the files and the history).xstyle --rtkwhen installed (the rules that hide bugs: casts, unchecked returns, silent excepts). - Fuzz the parsers that read outside input when a harness is cheap (libFuzzer / AFL on a C/C++ parser, a short
hypothesisrun in Python): a few minutes per parser, crashes are findings. - Run it: start the program (or its server) in an isolated environment (its own config / data / port / socket) and
try what an attacker would: oversized inputs, malformed frames, path traversal (
../), shell metacharacters, no auth, replayed or forged tokens, concurrent requests, a client that disconnects mid-request.
Review (read the code, every item searched explicitly)
| Category | Look for |
| Memory | buffer / heap / stack overflows, out-of-bounds reads ([], memcpy, strcpy, sprintf, pointer arithmetic), use after free / move, double free, dangling references and views, uninitialized reads, integer overflow on sizes and lengths, signed / unsigned conversions, unbounded allocations from a length an outsider gives |
| Crash / DoS | unchecked syscalls and returns, exceptions escaping threads or callbacks (the process ended), unbounded loops, recursion or queues an input controls, resources never released (fds, threads, sockets), timeouts missing, a lock held on a slow call, a panic / abort reachable from input |
| Injection | shell (system, popen, sh -c with data), SQL, path traversal and symlink following, format strings, template / HTML / JS injection (XSS), header and log injection, deserialization of untrusted data, regex DoS |
| Auth & access | missing or bypassable authentication, authorization checked on the client only, a default password / token, tokens predictable or never expired, session fixation, CSRF, CORS / origin checks, privilege of what runs (root, setuid), a local socket or file other users can open |
| Secrets & crypto | keys, tokens, passwords in code, logs, errors, URLs, crash dumps or the git history; weak or home-made crypto, no TLS / certificate checks skipped, random numbers not cryptographic for secrets, comparisons not constant-time |
| Files & system | world-readable / writable files and folders (umask, chmod), temp files with fixed names, TOCTOU, unsafe PATH lookups, environment trusted blindly, untrusted downloads executed, update / install steps without verification |
| Network | listening on all interfaces when local is enough, no rate limit, no size limits on requests / frames, trust in Host / X-Forwarded-*, open redirects, SSRF |
| Concurrency | data races on shared state, check-then-act on files or maps, signals handlers doing too much |
Other languages: the same categories adapted (eval, pickle, subprocess(shell=True), prototype pollution...). |
Verification (every finding, before fixing)
Prove it: a reproduction (a test, a request, an input, a sanitizer report) or the exact code path from the outside input to the flaw. A finding without evidence is dropped (said in the report as a false positive with its reason). Rank it: critical (remote code execution, auth bypass, secrets leaked, crash from the network), high, medium, low.
Fixes (in the same pass)
- The root cause, minimal, in the project's style (
cpp-style,coding-style,comments); never a check that hides the symptom only. - A regression test for each fix when the project has tests (the reproduction becomes the test).
- Then rebuild and run every test: a fix that breaks something is reworked before the pass ends.
3. Insist: the next pass at once
- After a pass that found and fixed anything: start the next full pass right away, without asking (the fixed code is read again, and what the fixes changed is in the scope).
- Stop only after a pass that finds nothing new (its tooling clean, its review empty); then one last confirmation run of the tests and the sanitizers.
- A finding that cannot be fixed now (a choice for the user, a dependency without a fixed version): listed as open, it does not keep the loop going by itself.
- Safety cap: 10 passes; reaching it is said plainly in the report with what still came up.
- Between passes, a one-line status in the chat (pass n: found x, fixed y), nothing more.
4. Report (PDF only)
Through the report skill, format PDF only (no question about it): audit/<YYYY-MM-DD>-security.pdf at the root of
the repository (or of the current folder), never docs/; English unless asked otherwise (md2pdf.py ... --format pdf,
the Markdown source written in /tmp only).
- Summary: passes run (and why it stopped), findings per severity, fixed / open / false positives, the commit audited.
- Attack surface: what reaches the project from outside and how each entry is now protected.
- Fixed: per finding (most severe first) -
file:line, category, severity, what an attacker could do, the evidence / reproduction, the fix, the regression test, the pass it was found in. - Open: what was not fixed and why, the decision needed.
- Tools: what ran each pass, what was missing (and the command to install it). In the chat: the verdict (counts per severity, passes) and the path of the PDF only.
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