mitre-attack
Skill3 starsChanged yesterdayMITView on GitHub
Use for any MITRE ATT&CK work: map incidents/reports to TTPs, validate IDs, detection coverage and gaps, Navigator layers, group profiling, emulation plans, Sigma/Atomic mapping, version migration.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Liberty91LTD/cti-skillstheir own version, first seen Sep 30, 2026
- mukul975/Threatswarmtheir own version, first seen Apr 29, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 2
- mukul975/Threatswarm★ 77same name
- Liberty91LTD/cti-skills★ 35same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
9 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 5 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈4
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
5
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 13
Verify every ID and name against live data: before output (get, or validate on the finished draft).
- Distinctive: line 14
Never invent behavior: Every mapping cites evidence (quote, log line, report page).
- Distinctive: line 17
Use the most specific sub-technique the evidence supports.
- Distinctive: line 138
Test for each behavior: is the actor hiding (Stealth) or breaking a defense (Defense Impairment)?
- Very specific: line 150
Write the table (template in section 9).
- Distinctive: line 163
Check the CTID Adversary Emulation Library for an existing plan for that actor.
- Very specific: line 166
Use attack layer (never hand-write tactic names).
- Very specific: line 170
Every Enterprise "Defense Evasion" label: look up the technique's current tactic (attack get), which is Stealth or Defense Impairment (or …
- Very specific: line 251
Follow with: unmapped behaviors and why, assumptions, validation result (attack validate: PASS).
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
MITRE ATT&CK skill
Baseline: ATT&CK v20.1 (v20 released 2026-10-13; v20.1 data patch modified 2026-11-05). Facts and the tool below were checked against live STIX data on 2026-11-14. When live data disagrees with this text (a newer ATT&CK release), trust the live data. ATT&CK ships major releases in April and October plus smaller "Agile" releases (groups/software/campaigns) in between (first: v19.2, Aug 2026).
Hard rules
- State the ATT&CK version (and domain) in every deliverable. Get it from
attack.py version. - Verify every ID and name against live data before output (
get, orvalidateon the finished draft). Never quote IDs from memory. - Never invent behavior. Every mapping cites evidence (quote, log line, report page). No evidence, no mapping; inference is marked Low confidence with the reason.
- Redact before output. Strip secrets, API keys, tokens, passwords, hashes of credentials, PII, salary data, and card numbers from any log, ticket, or connector data before it goes into a table, layer comment, or report. Use
[REDACTED-<type>]. - No weaponization. Atomic Red Team output is test names, GUIDs, platforms, and executor type only. Do not write exploit code, payloads, or step-by-step attack commands. Emulation plans reference test IDs and are for authorized scope only.
- Use the most specific sub-technique the evidence supports; otherwise the parent.
- Enterprise content that says "Defense Evasion" or "14 tactics" is pre-v19: migrate it (workflow E).
0. Run the tool and load data (always first)
One standard-library-only CLI ships with this skill at scripts/attack.py (in this skill's base directory). Do not rewrite or re-download it; run the bundled file:
python3 -I <skill-dir>/scripts/attack.py update && python3 -I <skill-dir>/scripts/attack.py versionAlways run it as python3 -I <skill-dir>/scripts/attack.py (below: attack), where <skill-dir> is this skill's base directory. Data is downloaded to ~/attack-data. Bundles come from raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data (<domain>-attack/<domain>-attack.json, pinned releases <domain>-attack-<X.Y>.json, version list in index.json). If GitHub is unreachable, use WebFetch on https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/<ID>/ and say the data came from the website.
Commands
Global options (after the command): -d enterprise|mobile|ics (default auto: enterprise, then mobile, then ics), --json, --limit N (table rows, 0 = all), --full (untruncated descriptions). Default output is markdown tables. Exit code: 0 ok, 1 validation failed, 2 error.
| Command | What it does |
attack update [--force] [--release 19.1] | Refresh bundles (skips if < 24h old); --release saves <domain>-<X.Y>.json |
attack version / attack stats | Data version per domain / live object counts |
attack get <ID or name> | Full detail for any object (T, TA, G, S, C, M, DET, AN, DC, A): tactics, platforms, parent/subs, mitigations, DET -> AN -> DC with log sources, groups/software/campaigns using it, revoked/deprecated status with replacement chain and what it supersedes |
attack search "<text>" [--type group] [--all] | Ranked search over names, aliases, descriptions (finds "Cozy Bear" -> G0016 APT29) |
attack group|software|campaign <ID, name or alias> | Profile: techniques with tactic and source (direct or via campaign), software, campaigns, attribution |
attack validate <file or -> [--fix out] [--all] | Extracts every ID from text/CSV/JSON/Sigma YAML. Flags unknown, revoked (with replacement and its tactic), deprecated, legacy Defense Evasion, tactic-tag mismatch (single Sigma rule), bad sub-technique, parent-vs-sub overlap. --fix writes a copy with revoked IDs replaced |
attack layer --techniques <csv or -> | Navigator layer from technique_id[,score][,comment] rows (or free text). Revoked IDs are auto-replaced with a warning |
attack layer --from <ID...> [--op union|intersection|diff] [--with-software] | Layer for a group/software/campaign, or overlap of several (score = how many use the technique) |
attack coverage <detections.csv> [--groups G0016,FIN7] [--top 25] [--layer out.json] | Rows technique_id,detection_name,status with status none|logs|rule|tested. Per-tactic coverage %, gaps ranked by number of groups using each technique, optional layer |
attack sigma <dir> [--csv out.csv] [--layer out.json] [--groups ...] | Reads attack.tXXXX tags from Sigma rules, reports tag issues, then the same coverage report |
attack diff <old> <new> [--type all] | Added/revoked/deprecated/changed objects between bundles; args are files or enterprise@19.1 (auto-download) |
attack atomic <technique> [--no-subs] [--legacy] | Atomic Red Team test names, platforms, executor, GUID for a technique and its subs (no commands) |
Examples:
A="python3 -I <skill-dir>/scripts/attack.py"
$A get T1562 # revoked -> shows replacement T1685
$A get T0886 --json # ICS technique, JSON
$A group "Cozy Bear" --limit 0 # full APT29 profile
$A validate draft_report.md # run on every deliverable before sending
$A layer --from G0016 G0032 --op intersection -o overlap.json
$A coverage detections.csv --groups "APT29,Lazarus Group" --layer coverage.json
$A diff enterprise@19.1 enterprise@20.1Layers use Navigator layer format 4.5 (Navigator 5.3.2, checked 2026-11-14 in mitre-attack/attack-navigator: layers/spec/v4.5/layerformat.md, nav-app/package.json). The tool writes one entry per tactic the technique belongs to, the right domain, and the ATT&CK major version from the data. Coverage scoring: none 0, logs 1, rule 2, tested 3; a parent inherits its best sub-technique score, a sub never inherits from its parent.
1. ID formats
| Prefix | Object | STIX type |
| TA#### | Tactic | x-mitre-tactic |
| T#### / T####.### | Technique / sub-technique | attack-pattern |
| G#### | Group | intrusion-set |
| S#### | Software | malware / tool |
| C#### | Campaign | campaign |
| M#### | Mitigation | course-of-action |
| DET#### | Detection strategy | x-mitre-detection-strategy |
| AN#### | Analytic | x-mitre-analytic |
| DC#### | Data component | x-mitre-data-component |
| A#### | Asset (ICS) | x-mitre-asset |
Relationships: uses, mitigates, detects (DET -> technique), subtechnique-of, attributed-to (campaign -> group), revoked-by, targets (ICS technique -> asset). Analytics hang off a detection strategy via x_mitre_analytic_refs; data components via each analytic's x_mitre_log_source_references. Filter out revoked and x_mitre_deprecated unless doing history. ICS techniques are T08xx/T09xx; mobile and enterprise share the T1xxx range, and groups/software can exist in several domains.
2. Current structure (v20.1)
Enterprise: 15 tactics (since v19)
| ID | Tactic | Shortname |
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | reconnaissance |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | resource-development |
| TA0001 | Initial Access | initial-access |
| TA0002 | Execution | execution |
| TA0003 | Persistence | persistence |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | privilege-escalation |
| TA0005 | Stealth (was Defense Evasion, same ID) | stealth |
| TA0112 | Defense Impairment (new in v19) | defense-impairment |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | credential-access |
| TA0007 | Discovery | discovery |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | lateral-movement |
| TA0009 | Collection | collection |
| TA0011 | Command and Control | command-and-control |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | exfiltration |
| TA0040 | Impact | impact |
Platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux, ESXi, IaaS, Network Devices, PRE, Office Suite, SaaS, Identity Provider, Containers.
Mobile: 12 tactics (Android, iOS)
Initial Access TA0027, Execution TA0041, Persistence TA0028, Privilege Escalation TA0029, Defense Evasion TA0030 (the Stealth split was Enterprise only), Credential Access TA0031, Discovery TA0032, Lateral Movement TA0033, Collection TA0035, Command and Control TA0037, Exfiltration TA0036, Impact TA0034.
ICS: 12 tactics
Initial Access TA0108, Execution TA0104, Persistence TA0110, Privilege Escalation TA0111, Evasion TA0103, Discovery TA0102, Lateral Movement TA0109, Collection TA0100, Command and Control TA0101, Inhibit Response Function TA0107, Impair Process Control TA0106, Impact TA0105. ICS also has 18 assets (A####).
Live counts, v20.1 (active objects; recompute with attack stats)
| Domain | Techniques | Subs | Groups | Software | Campaigns | Mitigations | DET | AN | DC |
| Enterprise | 227 | 479 | 178 | 842 | 57 | 44 | 706 | 1773 | 106 |
| Mobile | 78 | 47 | 20 | 129 | 3 | 13 | 125 | 213 | 29 |
| ICS | 78 | 26 | 14 | 25 | 10 | 53 | 104 | 300 | 40 |
3. Recent changes you must know (all verified in data)
v18 (Oct 2025): detection model rebuilt. Data sources were replaced by Detection Strategies (DET) -> Analytics (AN, platform-specific logic with tunables) -> Data Components (DC, with log source name and channel). One DET per technique.
v19 (2026-04-28): Defense Evasion split (Enterprise only).
- TA0005 renamed Stealth (hiding: masquerading, obfuscation, hide artifacts, indicator removal).
- New TA0112 Defense Impairment (breaking defenses), 57 techniques incl. subs. 60 existing techniques had their tactic list changed.
- 23 new techniques, 17 revoked. Replacement map (
revoked-by):
| Revoked | Replacement |
| T1562 Impair Defenses, T1562.001, T1562.006 | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| T1562.002 / .008 / .011 / .012 | T1685.001 Windows Event Log / T1685.002 Cloud Log / T1685.003 Modify or Spoof Tool UI / T1685.004 Linux Audit System Log |
| T1070.001 / T1070.002 (log clearing) | T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs / T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs |
| T1562.004 / .007 / .013 | T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall / T1686.001 Cloud Firewall / T1686.002 Network Device Firewall (T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall is new) |
| T1562.009 / T1562.010 / T1562.003 | T1688 Safe Mode Boot / T1689 Downgrade Attack / T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
| T1656 Impersonation / T1672 Email Spoofing | T1684.001 Impersonation / T1684.002 Email Spoofing (under new T1684 Social Engineering, tactic Stealth) |
- Also new in v19: T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment, T1682 Query Public AI Services, T1683 Generate Content (.001 Written, .002 Audio-Visual), T1027.018 Invisible Unicode. T1211 renamed Exploitation for Stealth.
- Test for each behavior: is the actor hiding (Stealth) or breaking a defense (Defense Impairment)?
v19.2 (2026-08-05): first Agile release (groups/software/campaigns).
v20 (2026-10-13): AI-related techniques. T1699 Direct Prompt Injection and T1698 Indirect Prompt Injection (Execution), T1700 AI-Enabled Exfiltration (Exfiltration), T1608.007 Stage Capabilities: AI Result Poisoning (Resource Development), T1685.007 Disable or Modify Tools: Impair Autonomous Defenses (Defense Impairment), T1696 Anti-Automation Evasion with .001 Automate CAPTCHA Completion and .002 Avoid CAPTCHA (Stealth), T1697 Steal Application Specific Passwords (Credential Access). Also present: T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence. No technique revocations between v19.1 and v20.1. Use MITRE ATLAS alongside ATT&CK for attacks on AI systems themselves.
4. Workflows
A. Map a report or incident
- List each observed behavior as one sentence: actor did X, with Y, on platform Z. Keep the evidence quote and source location. Redact secrets and PII now.
- For each behavior pick the tactic by the actor's goal at that step (table in section 5), then find the technique:
attack search "<verb + object>", readattack get <ID>description and compare. - Choose the most specific sub-technique the evidence supports. Assign confidence.
- Write the table (template in section 9). Run
attack validateon the draft; fix every finding. - Optional:
attack layer --techniques mapped.csv -o incident.json.
B. Detection coverage and gaps
- Build
detections.csv(technique_id,detection_name,status). From Sigma:attack sigma rules/ --csv detections.csv. From SIEM/EDR exports: map each rule to technique IDs, thenvalidate. attack coverage detections.csv --groups <relevant groups> --layer coverage.json.- For each top gap run
attack get <ID>: read its DET -> AN -> DC rows and compare the log sources to what is actually collected. Missing log source means status staysnone; collected but no rule meanslogs. - Report with the coverage template. Say plainly that coverage % measures mapped rules, not detection quality.
C. Threat-informed emulation plan
attack group <name>(or campaign). Addattack layer --from <ID> --with-softwarefor the picture including tooling.- Order techniques by tactic flow. For each,
attack atomic <ID>and pick tests by platform; note test GUIDs only. - For each step list expected telemetry (DC and log source from
attack get) and the detection that should fire. - Check the CTID Adversary Emulation Library for an existing plan for that actor. Use the emulation template.
D. Navigator layers
Use attack layer (never hand-write tactic names). Open at https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/ -> Open Existing Layer. Group overlap: --op intersection for shared tradecraft, --op diff for what is unique to the first entity, union score = number of entities using each technique (heat map for prioritization).
E. Migrate pre-v19 or older content
attack validate old.md --fix migrated.mdreplaces revoked IDs. It does not change tactic labels or technique names: fix those by hand from the findings.- Every Enterprise "Defense Evasion" label: look up the technique's current tactic (
attack get), which is Stealth or Defense Impairment (or both removed). attack diff enterprise@<old> enterprise@<new>lists added, revoked, renamed, and tactic-moved techniques for release notes. Official changelogs:https://attack.mitre.org/docs/changelogs/.- Record old and new ATT&CK versions in the deliverable.
5. Mapping methodology (CISA "Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping" style)
Order of work: find the behavior -> research it -> identify the tactic (why) -> identify the technique (how) -> identify the sub-technique -> peer check. Map behaviors, not indicators: an IP address or hash is not a technique.
| Actor goal at this step | Tactic |
| Learn about the target before access | Reconnaissance |
| Build or buy infrastructure, accounts, tools | Resource Development |
| Get in | Initial Access |
| Run code | Execution |
| Keep access across restarts or credential changes | Persistence |
| Get higher permissions | Privilege Escalation |
| Avoid being noticed | Stealth |
| Disable, break, or blind a security control or log | Defense Impairment |
| Steal credentials or tokens | Credential Access |
| Learn the environment after access | Discovery |
| Move to other systems | Lateral Movement |
| Gather target data | Collection |
| Talk to compromised systems | Command and Control |
| Take data out | Exfiltration |
| Destroy, encrypt, disrupt, manipulate | Impact |
Confidence levels:
- High: direct evidence of the behavior (command line, log event, malware analysis) matches the technique description.
- Medium: behavior is clear but the sub-technique or tactic is inferred from context.
- Low: inferred from an outcome or a tool's known capability; state the assumption.
Common mistakes:
- Mapping a tool's full capability list instead of what was observed in this incident.
- One technique per sentence by reflex: one behavior can need two mappings (e.g., a scheduled task is Execution and Persistence only if evidence shows both goals), and many sentences need none.
- Picking the tactic from the technique's first listed tactic instead of the actor's goal.
- Parent used when a sub fits, or a sub guessed when evidence only supports the parent.
- Confusing look-alikes: Valid Accounts (using creds) vs Brute Force (getting them); Exploit Public-Facing Application (initial access) vs Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; Ingress Tool Transfer vs Lateral Tool Transfer; Phishing vs Phishing for Information.
- Using revoked IDs or pre-v19 tactic names. Mixing domains (ICS T08xx in an Enterprise layer).
- Treating mitigations or CVEs as techniques.
6. Detection engineering
- Start from
attack get <technique>: each analytic row gives platform, data components, log source names (e.g.,WinEventLog:Sysmon,auditd:SYSCALL,AWS:CloudTrail), and a logic summary.attack get AN####adds log channels (event codes) and tunable fields.attack get DC####lists every technique detectable from that data component: use it to justify onboarding a log source. - Analytics are behavioral descriptions, not ready rules. Translate to your SIEM, tune the listed mutable fields, test with an Atomic test, then mark
tested. - Tag rules at the most specific level; one rule may carry several techniques.
- Sigma tags: lowercase
attack.<tactic-shortname>andattack.t1059.001; alsoattack.g0016,attack.s0002. Checked 2026-11-14: sampled rules in SigmaHQ/sigma master already useattack.defense-impairmentwithattack.t1685/attack.t1685.005, and the Atomic Red Team index usesstealthanddefense-impairment. The Sigma tags appendix (v2.1.0, 2025-08-02) still listsdefense-evasion, so check the target repo's validators before bulk retagging.attack sigmareports legacy tags, revoked IDs, and tactic mismatches per rule. - Rate robustness, not only presence: CTID Summiting the Pyramid (Sigma
stp.*tags) scores how hard an analytic is to evade. - Coverage numbers overstate reality. Report rule count, tested count, and log source availability separately.
7. Threat intelligence
- Profile:
attack group <alias>gives techniques (direct and via attributed campaigns), software, and campaigns. Group pages lag current reporting; note the group object's modified date and add recent vendor reporting with citations. - Aliases are vendor-specific and overlap imperfectly. Say "tracked by MITRE as G0016 (APT29)" and keep vendor names as reported.
- Overlap:
attack layer --from A B C --op intersectionfor common tradecraft worth detecting first;unionscores for sector heat maps. Shared techniques do not prove shared identity. - Prioritize by: groups targeting the organization's sector and region, then techniques seen in recent campaigns (C####), then prevalence (
coveragegap ranking). - Software-heavy actors (and most Mobile/ICS groups) need
--with-softwareto show real technique use.
8. Purple teaming and cross-framework links
| Resource | Use | Note |
| Atomic Red Team (redcanaryco/atomic-red-team) | Small per-technique tests; attack atomic <ID> | Enterprise only; already on v19+ IDs. Names and GUIDs only in outputs |
| MITRE Caldera (github.com/mitre/caldera) | Automated adversary emulation with ability-to-technique mapping | README now references apache/caldera; confirm current home |
| CTID Adversary Emulation Library (center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library) | Full and micro emulation plans per actor | Check which ATT&CK version each plan used |
| D3FEND (d3fend.mitre.org) | Defensive countermeasures mapped to ATT&CK techniques | Use for "what control counters this" |
| MITRE Engage (engage.mitre.org) | Adversary engagement, deception, and denial activities | Pair with emulation and detection plans |
| ATLAS (atlas.mitre.org) | Attacks on AI/ML systems | Pair with T1698-T1700, T1608.007, T1685.007 |
| CAPEC / CWE | Attack patterns and weaknesses | Some techniques carry capec external references |
| CTID Mappings Explorer (ctid.mitre.org/mappings) | NIST 800-53, cloud platform controls, CVE and KEV to ATT&CK | Each mapping set is pinned to an ATT&CK version: check it, then validate the IDs |
| CISA KEV catalog | Exploited CVEs for prioritizing T1190 / T1203 / T1068-type gaps | Map CVE -> technique via Mappings Explorer, not by guess |
| Mitigations (M####) | attack get <technique> lists them; attack get M#### lists techniques covered | Link to NIST 800-53 through Mappings Explorer |
Purple team loop: pick techniques from the gap list -> select Atomic tests -> run in authorized scope -> record which detection fired -> update detections.csv status to tested -> regenerate the layer.
9. Output templates
Incident / report mapping (header line: "ATT&CK Enterprise v20.1, mapped <date>, source <doc>")
| # | Time (UTC) | Evidence (redacted quote + source) | Tactic | Technique ID | Technique name | Confidence | Notes |
Follow with: unmapped behaviors and why, assumptions, validation result (attack validate: PASS).
Coverage report
- Scope: ATT&CK version, domain, platforms, rule sources, date.
- Summary: techniques with rule or better (n of N), tested (n), by tactic table (from
coverage). - Top gaps table: Technique | Tactic | Groups using | Required data components | Log source present? | Recommended action | Owner.
- Tag hygiene issues (revoked IDs, legacy tactics). 5. Navigator layer file. 6. Limits: coverage is not efficacy.
Emulation plan
- Objective, authorized scope, rules of engagement, ATT&CK version, actor (G####/C####) with sources.
- Step table: # | Tactic | Technique ID and name | Test reference (Atomic GUID or Caldera ability) | Platform | Expected telemetry (DC / log source) | Expected detection | Result.
- Safety: test accounts and hosts only, cleanup steps, stop conditions. 4. Findings feed back into
detections.csv.
Sources
- Data: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data (index.json lists releases)
- Release notes: https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/ ; changelogs: https://attack.mitre.org/docs/changelogs/
- Navigator: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator (layers/spec/v4.5/layerformat.md)
- Sigma tags: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma-specification (specification/sigma-appendix-tags.md)
- Atomic Red Team: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team (atomics/Indexes/Indexes-CSV/index.csv)
- CISA mapping guide: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping
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