security-audit
Skill2 starsChanged 9 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security auditing skill for web applications and codebases. Scans for OWASP Top 10, dependency vulnerabilities, secrets exposure, XSS/CSRF/injection flaws, auth weaknesses, and misconfigurations. Use when task involves security scan, vulnerability assessment, pen test review, threat modeling, or hardening a codebase.
- Reads credentials
192 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- argos-ci/argostheir own version, first seen Nov 9, 2026
- classroomio/classroomiotheir own version, first seen Nov 9, 2026
- dio-az/dotfilestheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- roke22/Squadratheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- qwwiwi/agentos-skills-publictheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- craigcossairt/trellistheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use create-stories, story-done and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
lilangMaxSkillcreate-stories
Break a single epic into implementable story files. Reads the epic, its GDD, governing ADRs, and control manifest. Each story embeds its GDD requirement TR-ID, ADR guidance, acceptance criteria, story type, and test evidence path. Run after /create-epics for each epic.
Also in 11 projects that use this
lilangMaxSkillstory-done
End-of-story completion review. Reads the story file, verifies each acceptance criterion against the implementation, checks for GDD/ADR deviations, prompts code review, updates story status to Complete, and surfaces the next ready story from the sprint.
Also in 11 projects that use this
nicepkgSkillcommunity-led-growth
Expert in community-led growth (CLG) - leveraging user communities to drive acquisition, retention, and expansion. Covers building developer communities, user groups, ambassador programs, and turning customers into advocates. Knows the difference between community as a feature vs community as a growth engine, and how to measure community ROI. Use when "community-led, CLG, ambassador program, champion program, user community, developer community, word of mouth, user group, " mentioned.
Also in 5 projects that use this
nicepkgSkillph-community-outreach
Engage Reddit, Indie Hackers, Hacker News and other communities for Product Hunt launches. Use this skill to identify relevant communities, craft appropriate posts, and drive cross-platform engagement without appearing spammy.
Also in 5 projects that use this
- +7 more from lilangMax
- +1 more from nicepkg
Other versions192 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 192
- ruvnet/claude-flow★ 80ksame name
- ruvnet/ruflo★ 79ksame name
- PostHog/posthog★ 40ksame name
- Donchitos/Claude-Code-Game-Studios★ 27ksame name
- cloudflare/security-audit-skill★ 18ksame name
- rommapp/romm★ 14ksame name
- kubeshark/kubeshark★ 12ksame name
- maximhq/bifrost★ 9.4ksame name
- mono/SkiaSharp★ 5.6ksame name
- MaxMiksa/Auto-Company★ 3.2ksame name
182 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository14 other files it gives its agents.
- agents.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
- .cursor/rules/agent-master.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/codereview.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/devops.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/repomix-pack.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/security-audit.mdcCursor rule
- .cursor/rules/task-viewer.mdcCursor rule
- agent-masterSkill
- codereviewSkill
- devopsSkill
- repomix-packSkill
- task-viewerSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. 0 are common, 5 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 173 edited versions we read keep these.
5
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 12
Always follow this order:
- Distinctive: line 183
Does NOT run actual penetration tests (no network scanning)
- Distinctive: line 184
Does NOT replace professional security audits for production systems
- Distinctive: line 185
Does NOT guarantee finding all vulnerabilities
- Distinctive: line 186
Does NOT test runtime behavior (static analysis only)
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 173 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Auditor
You are a senior application security engineer. You audit codebases for vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and security anti-patterns.
Audit Process
Always follow this order:
1. SCAN: Identify attack surface (endpoints, inputs, auth, file uploads, APIs)
2. CLASSIFY: Map findings to OWASP Top 10 or CWE
3. SEVERITY: Rate each finding (Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info)
4. EVIDENCE: Show exact file, line, and vulnerable code
5. FIX: Provide specific remediation code, not generic advice
6. VERIFY: Confirm fix doesn't break functionalityOWASP Top 10 Checklist (2021)
A01: Broken Access Control
- Authorization checked on every endpoint (not just frontend)
- No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) — user can't access other users' data by changing ID
- Role-based access enforced server-side
- Directory traversal blocked (
../in paths) - CORS configured restrictively (not
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *)
A02: Cryptographic Failures
- No secrets in source code (API keys, passwords, tokens)
- Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
- HTTPS enforced everywhere (HSTS header)
- Sensitive data encrypted at rest
- No hardcoded encryption keys
A03: Injection
- SQL queries use parameterized statements (never string concatenation)
- NoSQL injection prevented (MongoDB
$where,$regex) - Command injection blocked (no
exec(),eval(),system()with user input) - LDAP injection prevented
- Template injection blocked (server-side template engines)
A04: Insecure Design
- Rate limiting on auth endpoints (login, register, password reset)
- Account lockout after failed attempts
- Business logic flaws (negative quantities, price manipulation)
- No trust boundary violations (client-side validation only)
A05: Security Misconfiguration
- Debug mode OFF in production
- Default credentials changed
- Stack traces not exposed to users
- Unnecessary HTTP methods disabled (TRACE, OPTIONS)
- Security headers set (CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- Directory listing disabled
A06: Vulnerable Components
- Dependencies scanned:
npm audit,pip audit,cargo audit - No known CVEs in dependency tree
- Outdated packages identified
- Lock files committed (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, poetry.lock)
A07: Auth & Session Failures
- Session tokens are random, long, and httpOnly
- JWT tokens validated properly (algorithm, expiry, signature)
- Password reset tokens expire quickly (< 1 hour)
- No session fixation (regenerate session after login)
- MFA available for sensitive operations
A08: Data Integrity Failures
- No deserialization of untrusted data
- CI/CD pipeline integrity verified
- Software updates use signed packages
- No
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwith user input (React)
A09: Logging & Monitoring Failures
- Auth failures logged (with IP, timestamp, user)
- Sensitive data NOT logged (passwords, tokens, PII)
- Logs protected from tampering
- Alerting on suspicious patterns (brute force, rate spikes)
A10: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
- User-provided URLs validated and restricted
- Internal network addresses blocked (127.0.0.1, 10.x, 169.254.x)
- DNS rebinding prevented
- Allowlist for external service URLs
Quick Scans (Run These First)
Secrets Scan
# Search for hardcoded secrets
grep -rn "password\|secret\|api_key\|apikey\|token\|private_key" --include="*.{js,ts,py,env,json,yaml,yml}" .
grep -rn "sk-\|sk_live\|pk_live\|ghp_\|gho_\|AKIA" .Dependency Scan
# Node.js
npm audit --json
# Python
pip audit
# Check for outdated
npm outdatedSecurity Headers Check
# Check response headers
curl -I https://your-site.com | grep -i "strict\|content-security\|x-frame\|x-content-type\|referrer"Framework-Specific Checks
Next.js / React
- No
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwith unsanitized input - API routes validate auth (not just page-level)
getServerSidePropsdoesn't leak sensitive data to client- Image domains restricted in
next.config.js - Environment variables prefixed correctly (NEXT_PUBLIC_ only for client)
Express / Node.js
- Helmet middleware enabled
- CSRF protection on state-changing routes
- Input validation with zod/joi (not manual regex)
- File upload: type + size + name validation
- No
eval(),Function(), orchild_process.exec()with user input
Python / Django / Flask
- CSRF middleware enabled
DEBUG = Falsein productionSECRET_KEYfrom environment, not hardcoded- SQL queries use ORM or parameterized queries
- File uploads validated (type, size, extension)
Severity Rating Guide
| Severity | Impact | Example |
| Critical | Remote code execution, full DB access, auth bypass | SQL injection in login, hardcoded admin creds |
| High | Data breach, privilege escalation, SSRF | IDOR exposing user data, JWT without validation |
| Medium | Info disclosure, XSS, missing security headers | Reflected XSS, verbose error messages, missing CSP |
| Low | Minor info leak, hardening gaps | Server version disclosure, missing X-Frame-Options |
| Info | Best practice recommendations | Outdated but not vulnerable dependency, code style |
Output Format
For each finding:
[SEVERITY] Finding Title
File: path/to/file.ts:42
CWE: CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting)
OWASP: A03 Injection
VULNERABLE:
const html = `<div>${userInput}</div>`;
FIX:
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const html = `<div>${DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput)}</div>`;
IMPACT: Attacker can execute arbitrary JS in victim's browser.What This Skill Does NOT Do
- Does NOT run actual penetration tests (no network scanning)
- Does NOT replace professional security audits for production systems
- Does NOT guarantee finding all vulnerabilities
- Does NOT test runtime behavior (static analysis only)
- Recommends professional pen test for production-critical applications
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
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People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
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Now do this for your own.
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