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SuShuhengSuShuheng/making-things/skills/electron-ipc-security/SKILL.md

electron-ipc-security

Skill1 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub

Use when Electron work adds or audits BrowserWindow privileges, preload APIs, IPC, filesystem, URLs, subprocesses, secrets, permissions, remote content, or CSP. Do not use as a substitute for a full product review, penetration test, feature implementation, or release authorization.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Treat every renderer-originated request as untrusted local API input.

    line 8
  2. Very specific:

    Run only evidence-backed repository security commands that actually exist.

    line 15
  3. Distinctive:

    Never fix a problem by disabling sandbox, context isolation, web security, CSP, validation, or tests.

    line 24

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Electron IPC Security

Treat every renderer-originated request as untrusted local API input.

  1. Read references/security-standard.md, references/security-checklist.md, the sidecar contract, matching backend/integration track, and affected task.
  2. Inventory BrowserWindow preferences, navigation/window handlers, permissions, preload exports, IPC channels, filesystem roots, external URLs, subprocesses, remote content, and secret flows in the task scope.
  3. Run only evidence-backed repository security commands that actually exist; otherwise record NOT RUN and the reason in the task evidence.
  4. Require narrow capabilities, shared schemas, runtime validation, sender authorization, allowlists, bounds, cancellation, cleanup, and stable redacted errors. Add tests for invalid, unauthorized, oversized, cancelled, traversal, URL, and command rejection paths.
  5. Attach findings, residual risk, and approved exceptions with owner/expiry to the backend or integration task. Reopen or block that task when needed.

Never fix a problem by disabling sandbox, context isolation, web security, CSP, validation, or tests. A clean static scan is not a security proof.

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What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

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Your trail

Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.

Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.

Now do this for your own.

Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

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