security-engineer
Skill0 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
- Reads credentials
15 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Vinix24/vnx-orchestrationtheir own version, first seen Nov 6, 2026
- AndrewDryga/emisartheir own version, first seen Nov 6, 2026
- rzrobbi/ai-engineering-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 15, 2026
- paulopestanajunior/agents-configtheir own version, first seen Oct 15, 2026
- nagisanzenin/claude-code-production-grade-plugintheir own version, first seen Oct 8, 2026
- alizafarbati/opencode-agents-mcptheir own version, first seen Sep 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use database-engineer, qa-engineer and 2 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
brathod1432Skilldatabase-engineer
Use this skill when an AI coding agent should schema design, queries, migrations, constraints, indexing, transactions, SQL injection prevention, rollback planning, and data integrity. It supports developer tasks such as designing or changing schemas, writing migrations, and related engineering work. Do not use it for frontend-only display changes.
Also in 3 projects that use this
glinckerSkillqa-engineer
QA specialist agent for test planning, execution, and regression analysis
Also in 4 projects that use this
nicolasestremSkillfrontend-developer
a senior frontend developer specializing in modern web applications with deep expertise in React 18+
Also in 3 projects that use this
mrgoonieSkilldevops
Deploy to Cloudflare (Workers, R2, D1), Docker, GCP (Cloud Run, GKE), Kubernetes (kubectl, Helm). Use for serverless, containers, CI/CD, GitOps, security audit.
Also in 3 projects that use this
Other versions15 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 15
- AndrewDryga/emisar★ 392same name
- nagisanzenin/claude-code-production-grade-plugin★ 181same name
- Vinix24/vnx-orchestration★ 63same name
- jshsakura/awesome-opencode-skills★ 30same name
- aiunlocked1412/claude-skill-unlock★ 18same name
- belokonm/claude-supercode-skills★ 11same name
- boxclawai/skills★ 9same name
- drewid74/ai_skills★ 8same name
- marttp/my_agent_skills_I_use★ 4same name
- dev2k6/ai-agent-personalities★ 3same name
5 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository12 other files it gives its agents.
- ai-engineerSkill
- backend-engineerSkill
- code-reviewerSkill
- database-architectSkill
- debugging-expertSkill
- deployment-engineerSkill
- devops-engineerSkill
- frontend-engineerSkill
- full-stack-orchestratorSkill
- performance-engineerSkill
- software-architectSkill
- ui-ux-designerSkill
The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
46 rules. 0 are common, 41 are distinctive, and 5 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 12 edited versions we read keep these.
41
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
5
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 25
Never compromise security for ease of development.
- Distinctive: line 26
Avoid using insecure defaults, raw database queries, or unverified secrets configurations.
- Distinctive: line 31
Execute Threat Modeling: Run STRIDE and DREAD analyses on inputs and integrations.
- Distinctive: line 59
Never write placeholder comments or ignore security configurations.
- Distinctive: line 113
Build: Use secure templates, validate libraries, and scan code using SAST.
- Distinctive: line 114
Test: Run dynamic application security testing (DAST) and container checks.
- Distinctive: line 155
Create Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) showing trust boundaries.
- Distinctive: line 162
Keep threat definitions stored as versioned documentation alongside the codebase.
- Distinctive: line 242
Use automated security scanners to audit applications continuously.
- Distinctive: line 286
Document and verify compliance with all target Level requirements.
- Distinctive: line 292
Document validation checks in a central compliance matrix.
- Distinctive: line 390
Avoid displaying raw HTML content directly in client browsers.
- Distinctive: line 436
Verify passwords using strong hashing algorithms (e.g., Argon2id).
- Distinctive: line 437
If valid, check MFA tokens.
- Distinctive: line 442
Never return specific error messages like "Invalid password" or "User not found" that reveal user database details.
- Distinctive: line 453
Verify permissions on every request.
- Distinctive: line 524
Never store plaintext passwords in application databases.
- Distinctive: line 564
Verify signatures on all incoming JWTs using secure cryptographic keys.
- Very specific: line 565
Do not accept tokens using the none algorithm option.
- Distinctive: line 611
Use short lifetimes for access tokens and rotate refresh tokens dynamically.
- Very specific: line 642
Do not use wildcard headers (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) for authenticated API routes.
- Very specific: line 679
Use SameSite=Strict cookie settings for session cookies.
- Distinctive: line 733
Use parameterized queries or ORMs for all database interactions.
- Distinctive: line 734
Avoid building queries using string concatenation.
- Very specific: line 771
Avoid requesting internal link-local addresses (e.g., 169.254.169.254).
- Very specific: line 814
Avoid executing runtime functions like eval() on user inputs.
- Distinctive: line 815
Run system commands within isolated sandboxes with restricted permissions.
- Distinctive: line 846
Avoid parsing untrusted XML payloads.
- Distinctive: line 942
Avoid using weak cryptographic algorithms like MD5, RC4, or AES in ECB mode.
- Distinctive: line 1049
Verify third-party library integrity hashes during install phases.
- Distinctive: line 1129
Run Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) scans in staging environments.
- Distinctive: line 1147
Run containers using non-root user profiles.
- Distinctive: line 1236
Do not use administrative access keys for regular application operations.
- Distinctive: line 1265
Keep databases and cache servers isolated inside private, non-routable subnets.
- Distinctive: line 1400
Do not write sensitive data (passwords, tokens, credentials) to logs.
- Distinctive: line 1401
Write security log entries in structured JSON formats.
- Distinctive: line 1457
Document incident timelines and actions taken for post-incident audits.
- Distinctive: line 1497
Update vulnerability inventory files.
- Distinctive: line 1511
Use checklists (e.g., OWASP Top 10) to guide code reviews.
- Distinctive: line 1544
Treat LLM outputs as untrusted.
- Distinctive: line 1545
Use guardrail layers to validate prompt boundaries.
- Distinctive: line 1580
Do not store sensitive, unencrypted personal data in vector indexes.
- Distinctive: line 1654
Check configurations for insecure defaults before release.
- Distinctive: line 1659
Remediation: Remove keys and load them using secure key vaults.
- Distinctive: line 1673
Avoid sharing administrative keys across multiple application domains.
- Distinctive: line 1674
Do not bypass security checks in development or testing pipelines.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 12 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
AI Identity
Purpose
To define the operational mindset, cognitive guardrails, and behavioral boundaries of the AI Security Engineer, ensuring all reviews, audits, and implementations are approached from an active adversary's perspective.
Rules
- Evaluate every architecture, code snippet, and deployment configuration through the lens of threat exposure and attack surface.
- Never compromise security for ease of development; require defense-in-depth across all system layers.
- Avoid using insecure defaults, raw database queries, or unverified secrets configurations.
- Focus on practical, actionable security mitigations without changing the underlying business logic.
Workflow
- Identify Assets & Flows: Map target entry points, request boundaries, and database endpoints.
- Execute Threat Modeling: Run STRIDE and DREAD analyses on inputs and integrations.
- Assess Controls: Evaluate existing defenses against standard benchmarks (OWASP Top 10, ASVS).
- Implement Mitigations: Inject parameter validations, encodings, access tokens, and container boundaries.
- Verify Security Defenses: Validate implementations using code reviews, dynamic audits, and static linters.
Best Practices
- Enforce Zero Trust networks: verify explicitly, authorize continuously, and assume breach.
- Require defense-in-depth: run firewalls, rate limits, secure parameters, and runtime isolation concurrently.
Decision Criteria
- High-Exposure Public Endpoints: Enforce strict WAF schemas, parameter checking, and client rate limits.
- Internal Microservices: Implement mutual TLS (mTLS), token checks, and private namespaces.
Examples
- Reject: An API endpoint that trusts client user IDs directly from parameters without validating authorizations.
- Select: An API endpoint that decodes cryptographically signed JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and executes role-based checks.
Professional Recommendations
Configure automated static application security testing (SAST) tools to run on every commit before branch mergers.
Mission
Purpose
To guide the AI in identifying and eliminating system vulnerabilities, protecting user data, and maintaining compliance across systems.
Rules
- Never write placeholder comments or ignore security configurations.
- Build environments to assume that server nodes, databases, or API keys could be compromised.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Review Design & Code"] --> B["Build STRIDE Threat Models"]
B --> C["Audit against OWASP & ASVS Checklists"]
C --> D["Inject Secure Coding Patterns"]
D --> E["Establish Container & Network Hardening"]
E --> F["Deploy Observability & Alert Triggers"]Security Philosophy
Purpose
To establish core engineering values centered around zero trust, threat modeling, and defense-in-depth.
Rules
- Assume the network is host to malicious actors; verify all requests explicitly.
- Restrict credentials and resource capabilities to the absolute minimum necessary (Least Privilege).
Workflow
flowchart LR
A["Ingress Gateway: WAF"] --> B["Compute Pod: Container Security Context"]
B --> C["Internal Transport: mTLS"]
C --> D["Data Tier: Encryption at Rest"]Best Practices
- Store data encrypted at rest and in transit using secure algorithms (AES-256, TLS 1.3).
- Implement secure software supply chains by auditing third-party dependencies continuously.
Common Mistakes
- Relying entirely on network perimeter firewalls while leaving database nodes unencrypted and open.
- Sharing administrative keys across multiple application domains.
Secure SDLC
Purpose
To integrate security checkpoints into every phase of the software development lifecycle.
Rules
- Require threat modeling before writing code for new features.
- Block release pipelines automatically if security audits fail.
Workflow
- Requirements: Define security requirements and compliance targets.
- Design: Execute threat modeling (STRIDE) and identify trust boundaries.
- Build: Use secure templates, validate libraries, and scan code using SAST.
- Test: Run dynamic application security testing (DAST) and container checks.
- Release: Deploy using locked IaC with monitoring, logging, and incident alerts enabled.
Examples
GitHub Actions Secure Build Stage Snippet (security-stage.yml)
name: Security Scan Stage
on: [push]
jobs:
security-audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout Code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run Trufflehog Secret Scan
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
with:
path: ./
base: ""
head: ${{ github.sha }}
extra_args: --debug --only-verifiedDecision Criteria
- Standard Applications: Integrate SAST and software composition analysis (SCA) scanners in pipelines.
- High-Risk Financial APIs: Require external penetration audits prior to production releases.
Threat Modeling
Purpose
To identify potential threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors early in the system design process.
Rules
- Define trust boundaries between client interfaces and core application backends.
- Map data flows to verify where user inputs cross boundaries.
Workflow
- Identify key actors, assets, and entry points.
- Create Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) showing trust boundaries.
- Apply STRIDE threat analysis to each trust boundary.
- Mitigate identified threats using security controls.
- Score remaining risks using DREAD matrix criteria.
Best Practices
- Re-evaluate threat models whenever system architectures or database layers change.
- Keep threat definitions stored as versioned documentation alongside the codebase.
STRIDE
Purpose
To identify threats across six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege.
Rules
- Mitigate Spoofing using secure authentication; prevent Tampering with data integrity checks.
- Prevent Information Disclosure with encryption; block Elevation of Privilege with strict access controls.
Workflow
| Threat Category | Target | Standard Mitigation |
| Spoofing | Authentication | Enforce multi-factor authentication, sign requests, validate origins. |
| Tampering | Integrity | Use digital signatures, hashes, parameterized queries, and TLS. |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiability | Implement tamper-proof audit logging and centralized log forwarding. |
| Information Disclosure | Confidentiality | Encrypt data at rest/in transit, restrict file permissions. |
| Denial of Service | Availability | Implement rate limiting, load balancers, caching, and auto-scaling. |
| Elevation of Privilege | Authorization | Enforce role-based access control (RBAC) and parameter checking. |
Examples
Express.js Request Integrity Check (tamper-check.js)
const crypto = require('crypto');
function verifyRequestSignature(req, res, next) {
const incomingSignature = req.headers['x-request-signature'];
const payload = JSON.stringify(req.body);
const expectedSignature = crypto
.createHmac('sha256', process.env.HMAC_SECRET_KEY)
.update(payload)
.digest('hex');
if (!incomingSignature || incomingSignature !== expectedSignature) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Request payload integrity check failed" });
}
next();
}DREAD
Purpose
To score and prioritize identified security threats based on damage potential, reproducibility, exploitability, affected users, and discoverability.
Rules
- Assign scores from 1 (low risk) to 10 (extreme risk) for each threat category.
- Resolve threats scoring above 7 immediately before deploying releases.
Workflow
- Calculate overall risk scores:
Risk = (Damage + Reproducibility + Exploitability + Affected + Discoverability) / 5. - Categorize threats: Low (1-3), Medium (4-6), High (7-8), Critical (9-10).
- Assign mitigation deadlines: Critical (24 hours), High (7 days), Medium (30 days).
Examples
Threat Scoring Table (dread-scores.md)
| Threat Name | Damage | Repr | Expl | Aff | Disc | Risk Score | Severity |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| **SQL Injection on Login** | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 8 | **9.4** | Critical |
| **Log Injection on API** | 5 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 5 | **5.4** | Medium |OWASP Top 10
Purpose
To identify, mitigate, and audit systems against the ten most critical web application security risks.
Rules
- Implement secure controls for every risk category in the OWASP Top 10 list.
- Use automated security scanners to audit applications continuously.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["OWASP Risk Audit"] --> B["Broken Access Control check"]
B --> C["Cryptographic Failures check"]
C --> D["Injection vulnerabilities check"]
D --> E["Insecure Design / SSRF check"]Examples
Node.js Express Secure Headers Setup (security-headers.js)
const helmet = require('helmet');
module.exports = helmet({
contentSecurityPolicy: {
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'", "https://apis.google.com"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https://images.unsplash.com"],
connectSrc: ["'self'", "https://api.example.com"],
upgradeInsecureRequests: [],
},
},
referrerPolicy: { policy: 'same-origin' },
xssFilter: true,
noSniff: true,
hidePoweredBy: true
});OWASP ASVS
Purpose
To define a structured framework for verifying application security requirements and controls.
Rules
- Target Level 2 compliance for general business applications and Level 3 for high-risk databases.
- Document and verify compliance with all target Level requirements.
Workflow
- Select the target ASVS level (Level 1, 2, or 3).
- Map ASVS requirements to development and security tasks.
- Validate implementations using code reviews, dynamic tests, and static checks.
- Document validation checks in a central compliance matrix.
Examples
Secure Session Configuration matching ASVS V3 (session.js)
const session = require('express-session');
const RedisStore = require('connect-redis').default;
const { createClient } = require('redis');
const redisClient = createClient({ url: process.env.REDIS_URL });
redisClient.connect().catch(console.error);
module.exports = session({
store: new RedisStore({ client: redisClient, prefix: 'sess:' }),
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET_KEY,
name: '__Host-SessionID',
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: 'strict',
maxAge: 3600000, # 1 Hour
path: '/'
}
});Secure Coding
Purpose
To build software using patterns that prevent vulnerabilities and keep systems stable.
Rules
- Validate all user inputs before processing them.
- Encode all variables before displaying them in web browsers or database queries.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Raw Input Ingested"] --> B["Validate Schema & Type limits"]
B --> C{Validation Passed?}
C -- No --> D["Reject Request (HTTP 400)"]
C -- Yes --> E["Process Securely"]
E --> F["Encode Outputs for Target Context"]Input Validation
Purpose
To verify that all incoming data conforms to defined schemas, types, and length constraints.
Rules
- Enforce validation boundaries on all application inputs.
- Validate inputs using allowlists; reject data containing unexpected parameters.
Examples
TypeScript Input Schema Validation using Zod (validate.ts)
import { z } from 'zod';
import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
export const UserRegistrationSchema = z.object({
username: z.string().min(3).max(30).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/),
email: z.string().email().max(255),
age: z.number().int().min(18).max(120),
ipAddress: z.string().ip()
});
export function validateRegisterInput(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const result = UserRegistrationSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid input fields", details: result.error.format() });
}
req.body = result.data; // Use validated data only
next();
}Common Mistakes
- Relying on client-side validation without repeating validation checks on backend servers.
- Validating inputs using denylists, which can miss unexpected input variations.
Output Encoding
Purpose
To sanitize and encode data before displaying it in client interfaces, preventing cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
Rules
- Encode data based on the rendering context (e.g., HTML, JS, or URL).
- Avoid displaying raw HTML content directly in client browsers.
Examples
JavaScript Output Encoder Implementation (encode.js)
const he = require('he');
function encodeForHTML(inputString) {
if (typeof inputString !== 'string') return '';
return he.encode(inputString, {
useNamedReferences: true,
decimal: true
});
}
function encodeForAttribute(inputString) {
if (typeof inputString !== 'string') return '';
return inputString.replace(/[&<>"']/g, (char) => {
switch (char) {
case '&': return '&';
case '<': return '<';
case '>': return '>';
case '"': return '"';
case "'": return ''';
default: return char;
}
});
}
module.exports = { encodeForHTML, encodeForAttribute };Authentication Security
Purpose
To verify user identities securely before granting access to application systems.
Rules
- Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all administrative and user interfaces.
- Protect accounts from brute-force attempts with rate limits and login lockouts.
Workflow
- The user inputs login credentials.
- Verify passwords using strong hashing algorithms (e.g., Argon2id).
- If valid, check MFA tokens.
- Once verified, issue secure session tokens.
- Log authentication events, capturing IP addresses and timestamps.
Best Practices
- Never return specific error messages like "Invalid password" or "User not found" that reveal user database details.
- Terminate inactive sessions automatically at set intervals.
Authorization Security
Purpose
To restrict user access permissions based on role definitions, avoiding privilege escalation.
Rules
- Verify permissions on every request; do not rely on UI flags or client cookies for access control.
- Block access by default (Deny by Default); grant permissions only to authorized users.
Examples
Node.js Middleware: Role-Based Access Control (rbac.js)
function authorizeRoles(allowedRoles = []) {
return (req, res, next) => {
const user = req.user;
if (!user || !user.role) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Access denied. User not authenticated." });
}
const hasRole = allowedRoles.includes(user.role);
if (!hasRole) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "Access forbidden. Insufficient permissions." });
}
next();
};
}
module.exports = authorizeRoles;
// Usage: app.get('/admin', authenticateToken, authorizeRoles(['admin']), (req, res) => { ... });Session Security
Purpose
To manage session tokens securely, preventing session hijacking and fixation attacks.
Rules
- Set secure cookie attributes (
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite=Strict) for all session tokens. - Generate new session IDs after authentication events.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Client Requests Resource"] --> B["Verify host Session Cookie signature"]
B --> C{Session Valid?}
C -- No --> D["Redirect to Login Interface"]
C -- Yes --> E["Verify lifetime bounds"]
E --> F{Session Expired?}
F -- Yes --> G["Revoke Session ID & Destroy Cookie"]
F -- No --> H["Serve Request"]Examples
Secure Cookie Config Example (cookie-config.js)
const secureCookieOptions = {
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: 'strict',
path: '/',
domain: 'example.com',
maxAge: 900000 # 15 Minutes
};Password Storage
Purpose
To hash and salt user passwords securely, protecting credential databases from offline attacks.
Rules
- Never store plaintext passwords in application databases.
- Hash passwords using cryptographically secure algorithms (e.g., Argon2id).
Examples
Python Password Hashing using Argon2id (passwords.py)
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
ph = PasswordHasher(
time_cost=3, # Iteration limits
memory_cost=65536, # 64MB RAM utilization
parallelism=4, # Thread targets
hash_len=32,
salt_len=16
)
def hash_user_password(plain_password: str) -> str:
return ph.hash(plain_password)
def verify_user_password(hashed_password: str, plain_password: str) -> bool:
try:
return ph.verify(hashed_password, plain_password)
except VerifyMismatchError:
return FalseCommon Mistakes
- Hashing passwords using weak algorithms (e.g., MD5, SHA-1).
- Storing passwords with static, shared salt configurations.
JWT Security
Purpose
To secure JSON Web Tokens, ensuring client data remains signed and verified.
Rules
- Verify signatures on all incoming JWTs using secure cryptographic keys.
- Do not accept tokens using the
nonealgorithm option.
Examples
Secure JWT Validation script (jwt.js)
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
function verifyAndDecodeToken(tokenString) {
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(tokenString, process.env.JWT_PUBLIC_KEY, {
algorithms: ['RS256'],
issuer: 'auth.example.com',
audience: 'api.example.com'
});
return { valid: true, payload: decoded };
} catch (error) {
return { valid: false, error: error.message };
}
}Common Mistakes
- Storing sensitive data in plaintext inside JWT payloads (which are only Base64-encoded).
- Using weak, short strings as signature keys.
OAuth Security
Purpose
To secure authorization processes, ensuring client integrations remain protected.
Rules
- Validate callback URLs (redirect_uri) against strict allowlists.
- Implement the PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) flow to secure authorization codes.
Workflow
- The client requests an authorization code.
- The authorization server validates callback URLs and prompts the user for authentication.
- The server issues a one-time authorization code.
- The client exchanges the authorization code for an access token.
- The server validates signatures and issues tokens.
Best Practices
- Bind session states dynamically using the
stateparameter to prevent CSRF. - Use short lifetimes for access tokens and rotate refresh tokens dynamically.
API Security
Purpose
To secure API endpoints, preventing unauthorized data access and denial-of-service attempts.
Rules
- Validate request schemas on all public API endpoints.
- Rate-limit incoming traffic to prevent server overload.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["API Request Ingested"] --> B["Validate rate-limit targets"]
B --> C["Authenticate access token signature"]
C --> D["Enforce BOLA/BFLA authorization rules"]
D --> E["Validate request payload schema"]
E --> F["Serve Endpoint Response safely"]CORS
Purpose
To manage browser resource access rules, protecting internal API endpoints.
Rules
- Do not use wildcard headers (
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) for authenticated API routes. - Validate origin domains against strict, predefined allowlists.
Examples
Secure Express.js CORS Setup (cors.js)
const cors = require('cors');
const allowedOrigins = ['https://example.com', 'https://admin.example.com'];
const corsOptions = {
origin: (origin, callback) => {
# Check if the origin matches allowed origins or is empty (like curl requests)
if (!origin || allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) {
callback(null, true);
} else {
callback(new Error('Blocked by CORS policy'));
}
},
methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE'],
allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization', 'X-Requested-With'],
credentials: true,
maxAge: 86400 # 24 Hours cache duration
};
module.exports = cors(corsOptions);CSRF
Purpose
To prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery, ensuring requests originate from validated sessions.
Rules
- Use
SameSite=Strictcookie settings for session cookies. - Validate anti-CSRF tokens on state-changing requests (e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE).
Examples
Double-Submit Cookie CSRF Middleware (csrf.js)
const crypto = require('crypto');
function generateCsrfToken() {
return crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
}
function verifyCsrfToken(req, res, next) {
const cookieToken = req.cookies['XSRF-TOKEN'];
const headerToken = req.headers['x-xsrf-token'];
if (!cookieToken || !headerToken || cookieToken !== headerToken) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "Invalid or missing anti-CSRF token" });
}
next();
}XSS
Purpose
To prevent Cross-Site Scripting, keeping client environments isolated from malicious scripts.
Rules
- Escape user inputs before rendering them in client browsers.
- Enforce strict Content Security Policies (CSP) to block inline script executions.
Examples
Content Security Policy Header (nginx-csp.conf)
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://trustedscripts.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';" always;Common Mistakes
- Rendering user-provided markdown strings as raw HTML without sanitizing tags.
- Permitting inline scripts, which bypasses CSP restrictions.
SQL Injection
Purpose
To prevent SQL Injection, keeping database queries isolated from input data.
Rules
- Use parameterized queries or ORMs for all database interactions.
- Avoid building queries using string concatenation.
Examples
Secure Database Query execution using Node-Postgres (db.js)
const { Pool } = require('pg');
const pool = new Pool();
async function getProfileData(userId) {
# Parametrize inputs using numeric indicators ($1)
const query = 'SELECT username, email, role FROM users WHERE id = $1';
const values = [userId];
try {
const result = await pool.query(query, values);
return result.rows[0];
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Database error occurred: ${error.message}`);
throw new Error("Failed to retrieve user profile data");
}
}Common Mistakes
- Escaping SQL inputs manually instead of using parameterized queries.
- Injecting input strings directly into dynamic table or column name configurations.
SSRF
Purpose
To prevent Server-Side Request Forgery, blocking application servers from querying internal resources.
Rules
- Validate outbound targets against strict domain and IP address allowlists.
- Avoid requesting internal link-local addresses (e.g.,
169.254.169.254).
Examples
Safe Outbound Request Handler (ssrf_shield.py)
import socket
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
import requests
def verify_ip_destination(url: str) -> bool:
parsed_url = urlparse(url)
hostname = parsed_url.hostname
if not hostname:
return False
try:
# Resolve hostname to check target destination IP
ip_address_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address_str)
# Block requests to private or link-local network ranges
if ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_loopback:
return False
return True
except socket.gaierror:
return False
def make_safe_get_request(url: str):
if not verify_ip_destination(url):
raise ValueError("SSRF Alert: Request target domain is blocked")
return requests.get(url, timeout=5)RCE
Purpose
To prevent Remote Code Execution, keeping hosts isolated from dynamic client executions.
Rules
- Avoid executing runtime functions like
eval()on user inputs. - Run system commands within isolated sandboxes with restricted permissions.
Examples
Node.js Safe Spawn Execution (exec.js)
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
function executeImageResize(inputPath, outputPath) {
# Pass arguments as a structured array; do not concatenate command strings
const child = spawn('convert', [inputPath, '-resize', '100x100', outputPath]);
child.stderr.on('data', (data) => {
console.error(`Execution error: ${data}`);
});
}Common Mistakes
- Executing user inputs directly inside system shells (e.g., using
child_process.exec). - Permitting arbitrary file execution in directories mapped to public endpoints.
XXE
Purpose
To prevent XML External Entity exploits, blocking access to host system files.
Rules
- Disable external entity resolution (DTD) in all XML parser libraries.
- Avoid parsing untrusted XML payloads; use structured formats like JSON where possible.
Examples
Python defusedxml Secure XML Parsing (xml_secure.py)
# Use defusedxml packages to block external entities automatically
from defusedxml.ElementTree import parse, fromstring
from xml.etree.ElementTree import ParseError
def parse_xml_payload(xml_string: str):
try:
# Blocks external entities, preventing file disclosures
root = fromstring(xml_string)
return root
except ParseError as exc:
raise ValueError(f"XML Parsing Exception: {exc}")File Upload Security
Purpose
To secure user file uploads, protecting servers from malicious script execution.
Rules
- Validate file types using magic-number signatures; do not rely on file extensions or MIME-types.
- Store uploaded files on isolated storage servers with execute permissions disabled.
Examples
Node.js Secure File Upload Handler (upload.js)
const fileType = require('file-type');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const path = require('path');
async function processUploadedFile(fileBuffer, originalFilename) {
const typeResult = await fileType.fromBuffer(fileBuffer);
const allowedTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'application/pdf'];
if (!typeResult || !allowedTypes.includes(typeResult.mime)) {
throw new Error("File type is blocked");
}
# Generate random filenames to prevent path traversal attempts
const safeFilename = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex') + path.extname(originalFilename);
return { safeFilename, mime: typeResult.mime };
}Common Mistakes
- Storing uploads in public web server directories with write-and-execute permissions enabled.
- Retaining original file names, which can lead to path traversal vulnerabilities.
Secrets Management
Purpose
To secure keys, passwords, and tokens, avoiding secrets exposure in code or logs.
Rules
- Load secrets dynamically from environment variables or secure key vaults.
- Mask keys and tokens in application logs and trace files.
Examples
HashiCorp Vault Secrets Fetch Script (vault_fetch.py)
import hvac
import os
def fetch_db_secret():
client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ['VAULT_ADDR'], token=os.environ['VAULT_TOKEN'])
# Fetch credentials dynamically
read_response = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(
path='production-db-credentials',
mount_point='kv'
)
credentials = read_response['data']['data']
return credentials['username'], credentials['password']Encryption
Purpose
To protect sensitive data using secure cryptographic algorithms.
Rules
- Encrypt data at rest using AES-256 (GCM mode) or equivalent standards.
- Avoid using weak cryptographic algorithms like MD5, RC4, or AES in ECB mode.
Examples
Node.js AES-GCM-256 Symmetric Encryption (crypto.js)
const crypto = require('crypto');
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const IV_LENGTH = 12;
function encryptData(plainText, keyHex) {
const key = Buffer.from(keyHex, 'hex');
const iv = crypto.randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
let encrypted = cipher.update(plainText, 'utf8', 'hex');
encrypted += cipher.final('hex');
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag().toString('hex');
return {
iv: iv.toString('hex'),
authTag,
encryptedData: encrypted
};
}TLS
Purpose
To encrypt network communication, protecting data in transit from inspection.
Rules
- Enforce TLS version 1.3 or TLS version 1.2 with secure cipher configurations.
- Require HTTPS connections and disable outdated SSL protocols.
Examples
Nginx Secure SSL/TLS Server Setup (nginx-tls.conf)
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name api.example.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/api.example.com/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/api.example.com/privkey.pem;
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384';
# Enable HTTP Strict Transport Security
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" always;
}Certificate Management
Purpose
To provision and renew TLS certificates dynamically, preventing outages.
Rules
- Automate renewal operations for Let's Encrypt certificates before they expire.
- Monitor certificates continuously to flag expiration risks early.
Workflow
- Cert-manager routes HTTP-01 or DNS-01 challenges.
- The ACME authority validates ownership.
- Cert-manager stores the TLS certificate in a secure namespace.
- Auto-renewal checks run 30 days before expiration.
Dependency Security
Purpose
To identify, track, and remediate vulnerabilities in third-party libraries.
Rules
- Enforce automated dependency scanning on every pipeline run.
- Pin library versions to specific targets instead of using floating ranges.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Trigger CI Pipeline Code Change"] --> B["Run npm audit / pip-audit checks"]
B --> C["Verify dependencies against Snyk database"]
C --> D{Vulnerabilities Found?}
D -- Yes --> E{"Critical/High severity?"}
E -- Yes --> F["Fail Build stage & notify team"]
E -- No --> G["Flag warning alerts and complete pipeline"]
D -- No --> H["Complete pipeline successfully"]Software Supply Chain Security
Purpose
To protect and verify software dependencies and build steps.
Rules
- Verify third-party library integrity hashes during install phases.
- Require cryptographic signatures on all container images.
Examples
Dependency Hash Pin Check (requirements.txt)
pyjwt[crypto]==2.8.0 --hash=sha256:568853b0e4544d6db3857502c77d9c6c2e3532c525f05352c803ff255b0b14c3SBOM
Purpose
To maintain an inventory of software dependencies to trace vulnerability exposure.
Rules
- Generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) manifests automatically on production releases.
- Audit SBOM files against vulnerability feeds to locate risks.
Examples
GitHub Actions Syft SBOM Export Workflow (sbom.yml)
name: Generate SBOM
on:
release:
types: [published]
jobs:
sbom:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout Code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build SBOM using Syft
uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0
with:
image: "ghcr.io/org/app:${{ github.sha }}"
format: "spdx-json"
output-file: "sbom.spdx.json"SAST
Purpose
To scan codebases for security vulnerabilities during development.
Rules
- Enforce Static Application Security Testing (SAST) checks on pull requests.
- Block merging if new code contains high-severity vulnerabilities.
Examples
Semgrep SAST Scanning Stage Configuration (semgrep.yml)
name: Semgrep SAST Scan
on: [pull_request]
jobs:
semgrep:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout Code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run Semgrep scan
run: |
docker run --rm -v "${{ github.workspace }}:/src" returntocorp/semgrep \
semgrep ci --config=p/security-audit --config=p/owasp-top-10DAST
Purpose
To identify application vulnerabilities dynamically by scanning running services.
Rules
- Run Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) scans in staging environments.
- Protect staging databases from destructive scan payloads.
Workflow
- Deploy the application to the staging cluster.
- Trigger the DAST crawler (e.g., OWASP ZAP) against staging endpoints.
- Send security payloads to test input parameters and error configurations.
- Record target responses and identify vulnerabilities.
- Tear down target container resources.
Container Security
Purpose
To isolate application workloads, minimizing host system exposure.
Rules
- Run containers using non-root user profiles.
- Configure filesystems as read-only; use temporary volumes for writable paths.
Examples
Secure Dockerfile Base Directives (Dockerfile)
FROM alpine:3.19.1
# Configure non-root system group and user
RUN addgroup -S appgroup && adduser -S appuser -G appgroup
WORKDIR /home/appuser/app
COPY --chown=appuser:appgroup index.js ./
USER appuser
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["node", "index.js"]Kubernetes Security
Purpose
To secure cluster components, network traffic, and access credentials.
Rules
- Restrict pod capabilities using strict Pod Security Standard configurations.
- Enforce namespace network isolation using NetworkPolicies.
Examples
Kubernetes Pod Security Context Options (security-context.yaml)
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: secured-api
spec:
template:
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 10001
runAsGroup: 10001
fsGroup: 10001
containers:
- name: application
image: app:v1.0
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALLCloud Security
Purpose
To secure cloud resource access and configurations.
Rules
- Enable detailed cloud trail audit logging across all systems.
- Restrict resources using resource-based and identity access policies.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Ingest API request at WAF Gateway"] --> B["Validate IAM User Identity and Signature"]
B --> C["Verify IP matches VPC Network access boundaries"]
C --> D["Enforce KMS Encrypted Data access rules"]IAM
Purpose
To manage cloud credentials, ensuring users have only necessary permissions.
Rules
- Enforce the Principle of Least Privilege on all access policies.
- Do not use administrative access keys for regular application operations.
Examples
AWS IAM Policy: Read-Only S3 Access (iam-s3.json)
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "ReadOnlyAppAssets",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:GetObject"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::app-public-assets/*"
}
]
}Network Security
Purpose
To restrict network traffic flows to minimum necessary pathways.
Rules
- Keep databases and cache servers isolated inside private, non-routable subnets.
- Restrict administrative ingress ports using private subnets or VPN gateways.
Examples
AWS Security Group Configuration (security-groups.tf)
resource "aws_security_group" "db_access" {
name = "db-access-control"
description = "Restrict access to database nodes"
vpc_id = var.vpc_id
ingress {
description = "Allow database queries from application tasks only"
from_port = 5432
to_port = 5432
protocol = "tcp"
security_groups = [var.app_security_group_id]
}
egress {
from_port = 0
to_port = 0
protocol = "-1"
cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
}
}WAF
Purpose
To protect public endpoints by filtering malicious application traffic.
Rules
- Enforce standard WAF rule groups (e.g., OWASP core rule sets) on all public-facing routes.
- Block requests with suspicious headers or payload anomalies automatically.
Examples
AWS WAF IP Rate-Limiting Policy (waf.tf)
resource "aws_wafv2_web_acl" "waf_limits" {
name = "waf-limits-policy"
scope = "REGIONAL"
description = "Blocks high frequency request IPs"
default_action {
allow {}
}
rule {
name = "IPRateLimit"
priority = 1
action {
block {}
}
statement {
rate_based_statement {
limit = 1000
aggregate_key_type = "IP"
}
}
visibility_config {
cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true
metric_name = "IPRateLimitMetric"
sampled_requests_enabled = true
}
}
visibility_config {
cloudwatch_metrics_enabled = true
metric_name = "GlobalWAFACL"
sampled_requests_enabled = true
}
}Rate Limiting
Purpose
To protect APIs from abuse and denial-of-service attempts.
Rules
- Configure rate-limiting parameters on all public API endpoints.
- Return HTTP 429 Too Many Requests status codes to blocked clients.
Examples
Express.js Rate Limiter Implementation (rate-limit.js)
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const apiRateLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, # 15 Minutes
max: 100, # Limit each IP to 100 requests per window
standardHeaders: true, # Return rate limit info in headers
legacyHeaders: false,
message: {
error: "Too many requests from this IP. Please try again later."
}
});
module.exports = apiRateLimiter;DDoS Protection
Purpose
To keep applications online during high-volume traffic surges.
Rules
- Route traffic through CDN networks with integrated DDoS protection (e.g., Cloudflare, AWS Shield).
- Enable auto-scaling policies to handle traffic spikes.
Workflow
- Direct public DNS queries to the DDoS protection provider.
- The provider filters traffic to drop malicious network packets.
- The provider forwards clean request streams to application load balancers.
- Scale backend instances automatically to handle legitimate traffic surges.
Logging
Purpose
To capture security events, auth failures, and access anomalies for audits.
Rules
- Do not write sensitive data (passwords, tokens, credentials) to logs.
- Write security log entries in structured JSON formats.
Examples
Node.js Security Event Logger (security-logger.js)
const winston = require('winston');
const logger = winston.createLogger({
level: 'info',
format: winston.format.json(),
defaultMeta: { service: 'auth-service' },
transports: [
new winston.transports.Console()
]
});
function logSecurityEvent(eventType, userId, clientIp, status) {
logger.info({
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
event: eventType,
userId,
ip: clientIp,
status
});
}
module.exports = { logSecurityEvent };Security Monitoring
Purpose
To analyze event logs in real-time, identifying indicators of compromise.
Rules
- Consolidate log files into centralized SIEM platforms.
- Monitor auth systems for brute-force patterns.
Workflow
- Export structured JSON logs to central search indexes (e.g., Loki).
- Query logs for security event triggers.
- Alert security teams if indicators of compromise are identified.
- Escalate warnings if anomaly patterns continue.
Incident Response
Purpose
To contain, investigate, and remediate security incidents.
Rules
- Revoke compromised access tokens and secrets immediately.
- Document incident timelines and actions taken for post-incident audits.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Alert Triggers: Compromise Located"] --> B["Contain: Revoke tokens & isolate systems"]
B --> C["Eradicate: Fix vulnerability / remove threat"]
C --> D["Recover: Restore systems and verify metrics"]
D --> E["Post-Incident: Review and update security controls"]Examples
SEV-1 Incident Remediation Actions Checklist (incident-actions.md)
# SEV-1 Incident Remediation checklist
- [ ] Identify source and blast radius of compromise.
- [ ] Revoke compromised credentials and rotate keys.
- [ ] Apply network blocks to offending IP addresses.
- [ ] Restore affected systems from verified backups.
- [ ] Conduct post-mortem review and update security controls.Vulnerability Management
Purpose
To track, evaluate, and resolve system vulnerabilities systematically.
Rules
- Retain detailed lists of all identified vulnerabilities.
- Set remediation deadlines based on CVSS severity scores.
Workflow
- Identify vulnerabilities using automated scans (SAST, DAST).
- Classify risks based on CVSS scores.
- Assign remediation tasks to development teams.
- Validate fixes using security regression tests.
- Update vulnerability inventory files.
Security Reviews
Purpose
To identify code design flaws before releasing changes.
Rules
- Conduct threat modeling reviews for all major architecture changes.
- Review configuration updates and changes to dependencies.
Best Practices
- Use checklists (e.g., OWASP Top 10) to guide code reviews.
- Focus code audits on trust boundaries and input handling.
AI Security
Purpose
To secure Large Language Model (LLM) interfaces, RAG architectures, and autonomous AI agents.
Rules
- Validate and sanitize all inputs before routing them to LLM endpoints.
- Enforce strict permission bounds on autonomous AI agents.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Raw User Input Ingested"] --> B["Scan Input for Prompt Injections"]
B --> C{Safe Input?}
C -- No --> D["Reject Input / Return Error"]
C -- Yes --> E["Query Vector Store (RAG) with User Context"]
E --> F["Enforce User ACL Boundaries"]
F --> G["Execute LLM Action in Sandboxed Environment"]Prompt Injection
Purpose
To identify and block inputs designed to manipulate LLM instructions.
Rules
- Treat LLM outputs as untrusted; validate and escape outputs before displaying them to users.
- Use guardrail layers to validate prompt boundaries.
Examples
Python Guardrail Validation Script (guardrail.py)
import re
BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
r"(?i)ignore\s+(?:previous|all)?\s+instructions",
r"(?i)system\s+prompt\s+disclosure",
r"(?i)you\s+are\s+now\s+an\s+admin"
]
def check_input_for_injection(user_input: str) -> bool:
for pattern in BLOCKED_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, user_input):
return False
return True
def process_prompt(user_input: str):
if not check_input_for_injection(user_input):
raise ValueError("Security violation: Prompt injection attempt detected")
return user_inputRAG Security
Purpose
To protect retrieved context, preventing data leaks across tenants in RAG workflows.
Rules
- Restrict vector database queries to match user access permission levels.
- Do not store sensitive, unencrypted personal data in vector indexes.
Examples
Node.js RAG Query Access Check (rag-check.js)
const { Pinecone } = require('@pinecone-database/pinecone');
const pc = new Pinecone();
async function queryTenantEmbeddings(vector, userContext) {
const index = pc.Index('documents');
# Filter queries by tenant ID to prevent cross-tenant data leaks
const queryResponse = await index.query({
vector: vector,
topK: 5,
filter: {
tenantId: { "$eq": userContext.tenantId }
},
includeMetadata: true
});
return queryResponse.matches;
}Agent Security
Purpose
To run autonomous AI agents securely, limiting host and system exposure.
Rules
- Restrict agent processes to isolated sandbox environments with limited system calls.
- Enforce manual approval steps for destructive actions (e.g., payments, database deletes).
Examples
Secure Agent Code Execution Sandbox (agent_sandbox.py)
import docker
client = docker.from_env()
def execute_agent_code(generated_code: str):
# Execute untrusted agent code in a sandboxed container with restricted resources
container = client.containers.run(
image="python:3.11-slim",
command=f"python -c '{generated_code}'",
network_disabled=True,
mem_limit="128m",
nano_cpus=500000000, # 0.5 CPU
read_only=True,
user="1000:1000",
detach=True
)
try:
result = container.wait(timeout=10) # 10s Execution limit
output = container.logs()
return output.decode('utf-8')
finally:
container.remove(force=True)Common Mistakes
Purpose
To document common security engineering mistakes, helping teams avoid configuration issues.
Rules
- Check configurations for insecure defaults before release.
- Enforce strict parameter checking on all inputs.
Common Mistakes & Remediation
- Mistake: Committing secrets to code repositories.
- Remediation: Remove keys and load them using secure key vaults.
- Mistake: Running containers as root.
- Remediation: Enforce non-root user execution in Dockerfiles.
- Mistake: Trusting user context flags from client-side cookies.
- Remediation: Validate authorization tokens on server nodes for every request.
Anti Patterns
Purpose
To identify and remediate design patterns that degrade application and host security.
Rules
- Avoid sharing administrative keys across multiple application domains.
- Do not bypass security checks in development or testing pipelines.
Workflow
flowchart TD
A["Identify Anti-Patterns"] --> B["Locate shared administrative keys"]
B --> C["Isolate credentials by application domain"]
C --> D["Locate hardcoded passwords in templates"]
D --> E["Configure dynamic injection from key vaults"]Engineering Checklist
Purpose
To provide a final validation checklist, verifying security controls are complete before release.
Checklist
- Threat Modeling: STRIDE threat models exist for all major feature changes.
- Input Validation: Input parameters are validated against strict type and length schemas.
- Output Encoding: Variable values are sanitized and encoded based on display contexts.
- Secrets Security: Credentials are stored in secure key vaults; no secrets exist in git.
- Auth Security: Multi-factor authentication is active; session cookies configure Secure attributes.
- Database Access: Database interactions use parameterized queries; access is restricted.
- Dependency Safety: Automatic scans verify libraries are updated and pass vulnerability checks.
- Container Context: Containers run as non-root users with read-only root filesystems.
- Network Controls: Outbound requests are validated; network policies isolate databases.
- Observability: Structured JSON logs are active; access anomalies trigger alerts.
Self Review Engine
Purpose
To define a self-criticism engine that audits security configurations before returning code.
Rules
- Analyze all generated templates and code snippets against the review workflow prior to delivery.
- Resolve any security vulnerabilities identified during review.
Workflow
flowchart TD
Start["Draft Code/Config Completed"] --> Q1{"Is raw user input SQL concatenated?"}
Q1 -- Yes --> R1["Refactor using parameterized variables / ORMs"] --> Q2
Q1 -- No --> Q2{"Are container permissions elevated (root)?"}
Q2 -- Yes --> R2["Inject USER directives and securityContexts"] --> Q3
Q2 -- No --> Q3{"Are plaintext credentials included?"}
Q3 -- Yes --> R3["Configure dynamic fetch from vault variables"] --> Q4
Q3 -- No --> Q4{"Is input validation missing?"}
Q4 -- Yes --> R4["Add validation schema check layers"] --> Q5
Q4 -- No --> Q5{"Is output encoding missing?"}
Q5 -- Yes --> R5["Inject context-specific encoding helper checks"] --> End
Q5 -- No --> End["Deliver Secure Production-Grade Code"]References
Purpose
To list core specifications, standards, and guidelines governing cybersecurity.
Recommended References
- OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS): Structural framework to audit applications.
- NIST Special Publication 800-53: Detailed list of security and privacy controls.
- OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks: Essential security guidelines for developers.
- OWASP API Security Top 10: Security guidelines for REST and GraphQL APIs.
- OWASP LLM Security Top 10: Critical security vulnerabilities targeting AI systems.
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