agent-guardrails
Skill3 starsChanged 38 days agoMITView on GitHub
Assemble and verify layered runtime guardrails for an AI system without confusing guidance with enforcement. Use when designing agent safety/quality containment, abstention gates, policy enforcement, permissions, runtime limits or approval layers, or reviewing a prompt-only guardrail claim. Do not use for security threat modeling alone, writing admission code alone, generic input validation, or making a system prompt sound safer.
7 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- milad-ahmd/agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- wilbeibi/wilbeibi-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- vindreshsingh/engineering-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
- guerrilla2799/ops-and-scale-ostheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- produckyou-design/agent-guardrailstheir own version, first seen Aug 18, 2026
- antonioneto11/agent-dev-frameworktheir own version, first seen Jul 11, 2026
Other versions7 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 7
- jzOcb/agent-guardrails★ 15same name
- milad-ahmd/agent-skills★ 5same name
- wilbeibi/wilbeibi-skills★ 2same name
- guerrilla2799/ops-and-scale-os★ 1same name
- produckyou-design/agent-guardrails★ 1same name
- antonioneto11/agent-dev-framework★ 0same name
- vindreshsingh/engineering-skills★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository18 other files it gives its agents.
- agent-architectureSkill
- agent-cost-and-latencySkill
- agent-development-workflowSkill
- agent-evalsSkill
- agent-failure-recoverySkill
- agent-observabilitySkill
- agent-orchestrationSkill
- agent-securitySkill
- agent-state-and-memorySkill
- agent-testingSkill
- deterministic-authoritySkill
- evidence-provenanceSkill
- human-in-the-loopSkill
- prompt-engineeringSkill
- rag-engineeringSkill
- structured-output-designSkill
- tool-designSkill
- tool-evalsSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 6 edited versions we read keep these.
3
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 25
Start with the action/outcome inventory and failure taxonomy.
- Distinctive: line 27
Place critical deterministic controls at every execution entry point, including retries, workers and resume.
- Distinctive: line 33
Test bypass paths, contradictory layer outputs, outage, stale grants, false blocking of legitimate tasks, poisoned inputs and cumulative …
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 6 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Agent Guardrails
Assign each control a concrete boundary, owner and failure mode. A system prompt alone is never a security boundary; probabilistic advice can improve behavior but cannot authorize execution.
Build a control matrix
| Layer | Role | Failure handling |
| Probabilistic guidance/classifier | Steer or detect ambiguous content | Measure false negatives/positives; never sole protection for critical effects |
| Deterministic validation | Enforce shape, meaning and invariants | Reject current candidate; bound safe reconstruction under unchanged constraints |
| Policy enforcement | Decide allowed, denied or approval-required actions | Trusted rules; missing/error states fail closed for effects |
| Permissions | Limit caller/resource/capability scope | Least privilege; recheck at executor |
| Runtime limits | Bound time, calls, spend, concurrency and output | Stop/cancel with honest partial/failed status |
| Human approval | Supply authorized judgment for consequential choices | Exact bounded grant; silence/expiry does not approve |
- Start with the action/outcome inventory and failure taxonomy. Select controls proportionate to impact and uncertainty; harmless read-only answers do not require every layer. Specify disallowed effects and acceptable abstention/partial behavior before adding detectors.
- Map each risk to an enforceable layer and test. Distinguish input-content checks, model proposal validation, pre-execution admission, output grounding/privacy checks and post-execution evidence evaluation. Post-hoc blocking cannot undo an already sent email.
- Place critical deterministic controls at every execution entry point, including retries, workers and resume. Separate model outputs from trusted state. A classifier score or second model's agreement cannot bypass permissions or hard business constraints.
- Define fail-closed behavior for malformed proposals, missing policy, unavailable required checker, expired approval or unsupported action. Safe read-only degradation or a typed abstention can continue if policy permits; do not silently disable a required boundary during an outage.
- Bound repair/escalation loops. State when to retry eligible failures, construct/repair supported candidates, retrieve missing evidence, use validated fallback, seek human review, deny permanently or terminate. Prefer construct → verify → admit when safe admissible solutions may exist; terminal fail-closed behavior is not a reason to skip bounded search. Calibrate uncertainty against data; do not treat model confidence as permission. Record control/version decisions and evidence with privacy-aware run IDs.
Validate the composition
- Test bypass paths, contradictory layer outputs, outage, stale grants, false blocking of legitimate tasks, poisoned inputs and cumulative budget exhaustion. Assert actual effects/state, not merely reassuring response text.
- Measure violations, task success, safe abstention, false-positive/negative rates, review burden, added latency and cost. Set severity-aware acceptance thresholds; zero observed critical violations is necessary test evidence but not a universal guarantee.
- Ablate optional probabilistic layers in a sandbox to measure benefit, while preserving mandatory deterministic permissions/policy. Remove redundant checks that add friction without coverage. Keep rollback/version compatibility and an operator path for investigation.
Deliver a risk-to-control matrix, enforcement locations, failure/escalation table, bypass/outage tests and measured release decision. agent-security owns attack-path analysis; deterministic-authority owns admission implementation; human-in-the-loop owns approval design. This skill owns how those controls compose and whether gaps remain.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

