Secrets Hygiene

Redact at write time, not before commit

Anything built from prompts or conversation text will eventually contain a live credential, because people paste keys into chat. Scrubbing at commit time is too late — by then it has been synced, backed up or shared.

A memory store here was seeded from real transcripts and picked up seven records containing Razorpay keys, an Anthropic key, a Gemini key, Meta tokens and a Postgres URL. The fix was redaction inside add(), so a secret never reaches disk at all.

const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
  /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,
  /\brzp_(?:test|live)_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}/g,
  /\bAIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
  /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
  /\bEAA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
  /\b(?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^\s:@]+:[^\s@]+@\S+/gi,
  /\b(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|password)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[A-Za-z0-9_\-./+]{12,}["']?/gi,
  /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,}/g,
];

Redact rather than reject — the record keeps its value, the secret does not survive.

Get the character classes right. The first version used [A-Za-z0-9] and missed every Meta token, because those contain _ and -. A pattern that half-matches gives false confidence.

Derived data leaks too

After redacting the text field, secrets were still on disk — in _terms, a tokenized search index built from the text before redaction and then serialized alongside it.

Any cache, index, embedding or log derived from sensitive input inherits the sensitivity. The fix was to stop persisting derived state at all: it is rebuildable, it bloated the file, and it leaked. The store shrank 54KB to 35KB as a side effect.

Before a repo goes public

1. git init in the project, not a parent. Check git rev-parse --show-toplevel — a project inside a home-directory repo will publish far more than intended.
2. Grep the staged set for credential shapes before the first commit.
3. Gitignore user data by default: memory stores, logs, local settings, *.bak.
4. Check what is actually staged. 329 files here turned out to include 246 files of another tool's generated content.

If a secret was already committed

Deleting the file is not enough — git history keeps it. Assume it is compromised:

1. Rotate the key first. Cleaning history without rotating protects nothing.
2. Then purge with git filter-repo or BFG, and force-push with the team warned.
3. If it ever reached a public remote, treat it as fully public regardless of how briefly it was up.

Never put secrets in these

URLs and query strings, log lines, error messages, commit messages, or anything sent to a third-party service — including diagram renderers and pastebins.