shadow-sec
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Application & SDLC Security Audit. Use when performing STRIDE threat modeling, SAST/DAST, secret scanning, SBOM/supply-chain checks, or verifying NIST SSDF (SP 800-218) & OWASP ASVS 5.0 controls. Do NOT use for UU PDP privacy (/shadow-privacy) or COBIT/OJK GRC (/shadow-grc).
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 8
Use this skill whenever the Monarch invokes /shadow-sec, before releasing to Staging/Production (SDLC Stage 4 & Stage 6 Security Gate), or …
- Very specific: line 28
Verify .gitignore blocks .env*, *.pem, *.key, *.p12, credentials.json, and local SQLite/dump files.
- Very specific: line 37
Read references/NIST-SSDF-AND-OWASP-ASVS-5.md and verify:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
/shadow-sec — SDLC Security, Threat Modeling, Supply-Chain & OWASP ASVS 5.0 Auditor
Use this skill whenever the Monarch invokes /shadow-sec, before releasing to Staging/Production (SDLC Stage 4 & Stage 6 Security Gate), or when performing a security / VAPT review.
Grounded in two authoritative international standards documented in references/NIST-SSDF-AND-OWASP-ASVS-5.md:
- NIST SSDF (SP 800-218) — Secure Software Development Framework across the entire SDLC (
PO,PS,PW,RV). - OWASP ASVS 5.0.0 — Application Security Verification Standard (Level 2 standard for enterprise/production apps; Level 3 for critical financial/government apps).
1. The 5-Pillar Security Audit Workflow (Read-Only by Default)
Pillar 1: STRIDE Threat Modeling (Architecture & Feature Level)
Evaluate affected components against the 6 STRIDE threat categories:
- S — Spoofing: Can an attacker forge identity, webhook signatures, or JWT claims? (Check
/shadow-auth&/shadow-integrate). - T — Tampering: Can request parameters (
role,price,tenant_id,status) be mass-assigned or modified in transit? - R — Repudiation: Are sensitive state transitions and approvals recorded in an immutable
audit_logstable? - I — Information Disclosure: Are stack traces, internal IDs, other tenants' records (IDOR), or PII leaked in API responses or logs?
- D — Denial of Service: Are login, file upload, export, and expensive search routes protected by rate limits, pagination bounds, and timeouts?
- E — Elevation of Privilege: Are server-side RBAC/ABAC guards enforced on every controller/resolver?
Pillar 2: Secret Scanning & Provenance Protection (NIST SSDF PS.1)
- Verify
.gitignoreblocks.env*,*.pem,*.key,*.p12,credentials.json, and local SQLite/dump files. - Scan both working files and
git ls-filesfor hardcoded API keys, database DSNs with passwords, private keys, or Bearer tokens.
Pillar 3: Supply-Chain Security, Lockfile Integrity & Attack-Surface Diffs (NIST SSDF PW.4 & ASVS V14)
- Hand Off SBOM/Attestation Deep Audits to
/shadow-supplychain: For CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM generation, SLSA provenance verification, unpinned digest/floating tag scans, typosquatting checks, and license gates, invoke/shadow-supplychain(supplychain_sbom_gate.py). In/shadow-sec, focus on vulnerability triage, lockfile commit presence, and dependency-to-runtime risk. - Exploitability & Reachability Triage: Separate noisy SCA CVE alerts from reachable exploit paths by tracing whether vulnerable symbols are actually imported, invoked on untrusted input paths, and missing runtime mitigations.
- Multi-Hop AuthZ & Attack-Surface Diff Review: Audit every diff/PR for newly exposed routes, auth middleware bypasses, trust-boundary crossings, and multi-hop authorization gaps (e.g., Gateway -> Internal Service -> Batch Query / Indirect IDOR / Confused Deputy across background workers via
/shadow-auth).
Pillar 4: Verifiable OWASP ASVS 5.0 Control Audit (SAST Code Inspection)
Read references/NIST-SSDF-AND-OWASP-ASVS-5.md and verify:
- V1 Architecture & Tenant Isolation: Zero cross-tenant data leakage (
tenant_idscoped on all queries). - V2 & V3 AuthN & Session: Argon2id/bcrypt hashing,
HttpOnly/Secure/SameSitecookies, refresh token rotation. - V4 Access Control: Zero BOLA/IDOR; server-side permission checks on every route.
- V5 Validation & Injection Prevention: Parameterized SQL queries only (
0string interpolation in SQL/shell commands); strict schema validation; XSS output encoding. - V8 Data Protection: Secrets/PII redacted from logs; sensitive fields encrypted at rest; strict
Cache-Control: no-storeon private responses. - V12 Files & SSRF: File uploads validated by MIME magic bytes + size limits + randomized storage filenames; outbound URLs checked against private IP ranges (
127.0.0.1,169.254.169.254,10.0.0.0/8) to prevent SSRF.
Pillar 5: Actionable Security Report Format
Deliver findings ordered by severity (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) with:
- ASVS / NIST SSDF Control ID (e.g.,
ASVS V4.2.1 — IDOR,NIST PW.8) - Exact Location (
file:lineor endpoint route) - Exploit Scenario & Business Impact
- Concrete Remediation Patch
Pillar 6: Execution Approval & Security Scan Boundary (L0–L4)
- Static SAST, STRIDE analysis, and secret scanning are
L0_READ_ONLY. High-volume active fuzzing / aggressive DAST against live services isL3: RESOURCE_INTENSIVE, while secret rotation, permission edits, or external payload transmission areL4: HIGH_IMPACTrequiring explicit Monarch approval (shadow-monarch/scripts/execution_approval_gate.py).
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