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soc2-evidence

MaheshAwasare/claude-skills-pro/skills/soc2-evidence/SKILL.md

Map SOC 2 controls to actual code and CI artifacts an auditor can verify — access reviews, change management, vulnerability scanning, encryption, monitoring, incident response. Use when starting SOC 2 Type 1/Type 2 prep, working with Vanta/Drata/Secureframe, or responding to a customer security questionnaire that asks for SOC 2 evidence.

Skill1 starsChanged 5 months ago

What's in it

  1. SOC 2 Evidence (Engineering View)
  2. When to use
  3. When NOT to use
  4. Trust Services Criteria you'll actually face
  5. The mapping (sample controls → engineering artifacts)
  6. CC6.1: Logical access controls
  7. CC6.6: Encryption in transit and at rest
  8. CC7.1: System monitoring
  9. CC7.4: Incident response
  10. CC8.1: Change management
  11. CC9.1: Risk assessment
  12. A1.2: Availability
  13. The artifact list (what you actually produce)
  14. Engineering-side actions to make audit easy
  15. 1. Branch protection on main
  16. 2. CODEOWNERS file
  17. 3. Mandatory CI security scan
  18. 4. Centralized logging with retention
  19. 5. Audit log table for admin actions
  20. 6. Quarterly access review
  21. 7. Annual penetration test
  22. Type 1 vs Type 2
  23. GRC tool tips
  24. Anti-patterns
  25. Verify it worked
---
name: soc2-evidence
description: Map SOC 2 controls to actual code and CI artifacts an auditor can verify — access reviews, change management, vulnerability scanning, encryption, monitoring, incident response. Use when starting SOC 2 Type 1/Type 2 prep, working with Vanta/Drata/Secureframe, or responding to a customer security questionnaire that asks for SOC 2 evidence.
---

# SOC 2 Evidence (Engineering View)

SOC 2 isn't a prescriptive standard — auditors evaluate whether your controls *as designed* and *as operating* meet the Trust Services Criteria. The art is mapping abstract criteria (CC6.1, CC7.4, etc.) to concrete code/CI artifacts. This skill is that mapping.

## When to use

- Starting SOC 2 Type 1 or Type 2 prep (typically 6–12 months out from audit).
- Working with Vanta / Drata / Secureframe / Sprinto and they ask "what evidence do you have for control X?"
- Sales-driven: customer asks "are you SOC 2 compliant?" and you need to articulate posture.
- Pre-audit gap assessment.

## When NOT to use

- Looking for legal advice — work with an auditor.
- ISO 27001 — overlaps but distinct framework; mapping is different.
- Pure compliance "checkbox" mode — SOC 2 done well changes how engineering operates.

## Trust Services Criteria you'll actually face

| Category | Required for most | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| **Common Criteria (CC)** | Yes — required | Security; the bulk of controls |
| **Availability (A)** | Common | Uptime, DR, capacity |
| **Confidentiality (C)** | Common | Encryption, access |
| **Processing Integrity (PI)** | Less common | Data accuracy, completeness |
| **Privacy (P)** | Common for B2C | Notice, consent, data subject rights |

Most SaaS vendors do CC + A + C. PI is often skipped (hard, less audited). Privacy added if processing consumer PII heavily.

## The mapping (sample controls → engineering artifacts)

### CC6.1: Logical access controls

> "The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets."

| Evidence auditor wants | Where in your stack |
|---|---|
| Authentication enforces MFA | Clerk/Okta config screenshot + SSO policy |
| Password complexity policy | Clerk password policy / Okta config |
| Auto-disable inactive accounts | Cron job in Vanta/Drata, or HR-driven offboarding |
| Privileged access reviewed quarterly | Documented review meeting + ticket per user |
| Service accounts have rotation | KMS rotation policy + last rotation date |

### CC6.6: Encryption in transit and at rest

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| TLS 1.2+ enforced on all endpoints | nginx/cloudfront/cloudflare config; SSL Labs scan |
| Database encryption at rest | RDS / Cloud SQL config screenshot |
| S3/GCS bucket encryption | Bucket policy; AWS Config rule |
| Backup encryption | Automated backup config |
| Customer-managed keys (CMK) where applicable | KMS key rotation, separation of duty |

### CC7.1: System monitoring

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| Centralized logging | CloudWatch / Datadog / Loki |
| Alerts on critical events | Sentry / PagerDuty / OpsGenie config |
| Log retention ≥ 1 year | Storage class config |
| Anomaly detection | GuardDuty, custom alerts on auth failures |
| Audit logs of admin actions | CloudTrail + app-level audit log |

### CC7.4: Incident response

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| Documented incident response procedure | `docs/runbooks/incident-response.md` |
| Incident tickets in tracker | Linear / Jira project for incidents |
| Post-mortem for severity 1/2 incidents | Filed within 5 business days |
| On-call rotation | PagerDuty schedule |

### CC8.1: Change management

> "The entity authorizes, designs, develops or acquires, configures, documents, tests, approves, and implements changes to infrastructure, data, software, and procedures to meet its objectives."

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| All code changes via PR | GitHub branch protection rules |
| Required reviewers | CODEOWNERS file; protected branch settings |
| CI runs tests before merge | GitHub Actions workflow + required checks |
| Production deploys are auditable | CD logs, deploy notifications in Slack |
| Database migrations reviewed | PR labels, migration approval workflow |
| Emergency change procedure | Runbook documenting break-glass deploy |

### CC9.1: Risk assessment

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| Annual risk assessment | Spreadsheet / Vanta module |
| Vendor risk reviews | Vendor list + assessment per vendor |
| Penetration test (annual) | Third-party report |
| Vulnerability scanning | Dependabot / Snyk / GitHub Advanced Security |

### A1.2: Availability

| Evidence | Where |
|---|---|
| SLA / SLO documented | Public uptime page or internal SLO doc |
| Backups run successfully | Automated backup logs |
| DR test (annual) | Restore-from-backup test report |
| Capacity monitoring | Dashboards showing headroom |

## The artifact list (what you actually produce)

Across all controls, these are the buckets:

1. **Configurations** — screenshots or as-code definitions (Terraform, IaC).
2. **Logs and reports** — exported from systems, retained.
3. **Tickets** — change requests, access requests, incidents in Linear/Jira.
4. **Policies** — written documents (security policy, data retention, etc.).
5. **Training records** — annual security training completion.
6. **Reviews** — periodic access reviews, vendor reviews.

GRC tools (Vanta, Drata, Secureframe) automate evidence collection by hooking into AWS, GitHub, Okta, etc., and pulling configurations / running checks continuously.

## Engineering-side actions to make audit easy

### 1. Branch protection on `main`

```yaml
# Repo settings → Branches → main
require_pull_request_reviews: true
required_approving_review_count: 1
dismiss_stale_reviews: true
require_code_owner_reviews: true
require_status_checks_to_pass: true
required_status_checks: [ci, security-scan]
require_signed_commits: true
require_linear_history: true
include_administrators: true
```

This single config covers a chunk of CC8.1.

### 2. CODEOWNERS file

```
# .github/CODEOWNERS
*                          @platform-team
/infra/                    @platform-team @security-team
/migrations/               @platform-team @data-team
/payments/                 @payments-team @security-team
```

Required reviewers for sensitive paths. Auditors love this.

### 3. Mandatory CI security scan

```yaml
# .github/workflows/security.yml
on: [pull_request]
jobs:
  scan:
    steps:
      - uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
      - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3
      - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@0.20.0     # container scan
      - uses: snyk/actions/node@master              # dep scan
```

Required check on `main`. Evidence of "automated vulnerability scanning."

### 4. Centralized logging with retention

CloudWatch log groups with `retention_in_days = 365` (or longer). Application logs flow to CloudWatch / Loki / Datadog. CloudTrail captures all AWS API calls; retain ≥ 1y.

### 5. Audit log table for admin actions

Every admin action in your app writes to an audit_log table:
```ts
await db.auditLog.create({ data: {
  actor: adminUser.id,
  action: "view_user_pii",
  resource: targetUserId,
  context: { ip, userAgent, route },
}});
```

Auditors will sample this. Make it real.

### 6. Quarterly access review

Cron a script that exports user list with roles → manager reviews → ticket attached as evidence. Tools like Vanta automate the workflow.

### 7. Annual penetration test

Hire a reputable firm (HackerOne, Bishop Fox, Cobalt). Get the report. Track findings to closure.

## Type 1 vs Type 2

- **Type 1**: design of controls at a point in time. Shorter; cheaper. Good first audit.
- **Type 2**: design + operating effectiveness over a period (typically 6 or 12 months). What customers actually want.

Most SaaS targets Type 2 with a 12-month observation window after a Type 1.

## GRC tool tips

Vanta / Drata / Secureframe / Sprinto automate ~70% of evidence collection. They'll flag failing checks daily. Worth the cost; saves the engineering team from manual evidence gathering.

But:
- Tools detect what's *connected*. They won't catch the third-party service that's not integrated.
- "Vanta says we're 99% compliant" ≠ "auditor will pass us 99% compliant." Tools are heuristics.
- Engineering still has to *build* the controls; tools just monitor them.

## Anti-patterns

- **Treating SOC 2 as a checkbox** — controls have to actually operate. "We have a policy" without enforcement fails Type 2.
- **Buying a GRC tool first, building controls later** — tool monitors emptiness.
- **Branch protection skipped for "speed"** — change management is the most-audited control area.
- **No CODEOWNERS** — auditor question: "who reviews production-impacting code?"
- **Audit log writable by application** — must be tamper-resistant.
- **Vendor list out of date** — listing only old vendors, missing the 5 added this year.
- **No backup restore test** — backups exist but never tested. Auditor asks "when did you last restore?"
- **Pen test findings ignored** — needs a tracked remediation path.
- **Access review = "I looked at the list once"** — must be documented; outcome (approve/revoke per user) recorded.
- **Generic incident response policy nobody's read** — auditor asks "walk me through what would happen for incident X."

## Verify it worked

- [ ] Controls mapped to evidence in a spreadsheet (or GRC tool).
- [ ] Branch protection active on default branch; bypasses require approval.
- [ ] CODEOWNERS file enforces reviewers on sensitive paths.
- [ ] CI runs security scans (CodeQL, Snyk, Trivy) and blocks merges on critical findings.
- [ ] All admin actions in app are audit-logged; sample query produces sensible results.
- [ ] Access reviews documented quarterly with manager sign-off.
- [ ] Backup restore tested annually; report retained.
- [ ] Penetration test report from current year on file; findings tracked to closure.
- [ ] Incident response runbook exists; on-call has been trained.
- [ ] Encryption at rest and in transit verified by config and external scan.
- [ ] No production access from personal laptops without MDM-enforced disk encryption.
- [ ] All workforce members completed annual security training.
- [ ] Vendor list current; BAAs / DPAs / SOC 2 reports collected from material vendors.

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