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AssppWeb

Lakr233/AssppWeb/AGENTS.md

The server is a blind TCP proxy. It NEVER sees Apple credentials. Key invariant: The server NEVER sees Apple credentials. All Apple TLS terminates at the browser via libcurl.js WASM (Mbed TLS 1.3). The server only receives public CDN URLs and non-secret metadata for IPA compilation. The bag proxy (/api/bag) only returns public Apple service URLs — no credentials pass through it. The Swift reference at references/ApplePackage/ is the source of truth for Apple protocol behavior: The backend (backend/src/routes/search.ts) maps…

AGENTS.md3.9k starsChanged 8 months ago

What's in it

  1. Agent Instructions for AssppWeb
  2. TypeScript Code Style
  3. Project Structure
  4. Architecture — Zero-Trust
  5. Reference Implementation
  6. iTunes API Field Mapping
  7. Per-Account Device Identifiers
  8. Pod-Based Host Routing
  9. Dynamic Host Validation (Backend)
  10. Bag Proxy (Backend)
  11. Backend
  12. Backend Shared Utilities
  13. Frontend
  14. Frontend Shared Components (components/common/)
  15. Frontend Shared Utilities (utils/)
  16. Import Ordering Convention
  17. Security Model
  18. Account Hash Is Public
  19. Trusted Sources
  20. Browser as Security Boundary
  21. Backend Does Not Reflect Request Headers
  22. Error Handling
  23. Apple Protocol Error Codes
  24. Testing
  25. Unit Tests
  26. E2E Tests (Playwright)
  27. Test Account
  28. Deployment
  29. Docker E2E Testing
  30. Interface Design System
# Agent Instructions for AssppWeb

## TypeScript Code Style

- **Indentation**: 2 spaces
- **Semicolons**: Required
- **Quotes**: Single quotes for strings
- **Naming**: PascalCase for types/interfaces, camelCase for variables/functions

## Project Structure

- `backend/` — Node.js/Express server (TypeScript, ESM)
- `frontend/` — React SPA (TypeScript, Vite, Tailwind CSS)
- `e2e/` — Playwright E2E tests (pnpm)
- `references/ApplePackage/` — Swift reference implementation (source of truth)
- Multi-stage Docker build (single container serves both)

## Architecture — Zero-Trust

The server is a blind TCP proxy. It NEVER sees Apple credentials.

```
┌─ Browser (Client) ─────────────────────────────────┐
│  Credentials (IndexedDB): email, password, cookies, │
│    passwordToken, DSID, deviceIdentifier, pod       │
│                                                      │
│  Apple Protocol (libcurl.js WASM + Mbed TLS 1.3):   │
│    1. Bag fetch → backend proxy → resolve auth URL   │
│       (fallback to default auth endpoint if missing)  │
│    2. Authenticate → get token, cookies, pod         │
│    3. Purchase → acquire license                     │
│    4. Download info → get CDN URL + SINFs + metadata │
│    5. Version listing/lookup                         │
│                                                      │
│  TLS 1.3 encrypted via Wisp protocol over WebSocket  │
└──────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┘
                       │ Wisp-multiplexed TCP (server cannot read)
┌─ Server (Wisp Proxy) ┴──────────────────────────────┐
│  Wisp server (@mercuryworkshop/wisp-js) on /wisp/    │
│  → multiplexed TCP relay (blind tunnel, no decrypt)  │
│                                                      │
│  Bag proxy: GET /api/bag?guid=<id>                   │
│    - Fetches init.itunes.apple.com/bag.xml via HTTPS │
│    - Returns public Apple service URLs (no creds)    │
│                                                      │
│  After client obtains download info:                 │
│    Client POSTs: { downloadURL, sinfs, metadata }    │
│    - downloadURL = Apple CDN (public, no auth)       │
│    - sinfs = DRM signatures (base64)                 │
│    - iTunesMetadata = app metadata plist (base64)    │
│                                                      │
│  Server downloads IPA from CDN, injects SINFs +      │
│  iTunesMetadata, stores compiled IPA, serves via     │
│  public install URL (itms-services manifest)         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

**Key invariant**: The server NEVER sees Apple credentials. All Apple TLS terminates at the browser via libcurl.js WASM (Mbed TLS 1.3). The server only receives public CDN URLs and non-secret metadata for IPA compilation. The bag proxy (`/api/bag`) only returns public Apple service URLs — no credentials pass through it.

## Reference Implementation

The Swift reference at `references/ApplePackage/` is the source of truth for Apple protocol behavior:

- Field mappings (iTunes API → Software type) use Swift `CodingKeys`
- Authentication flow, bag endpoint, pod routing, error codes
- Always consult the reference when making protocol changes

### iTunes API Field Mapping

The backend (`backend/src/routes/search.ts`) maps raw iTunes API fields to our `Software` type, matching the Swift CodingKeys in `references/ApplePackage/Sources/ApplePackage/Models/Software.swift`:

| iTunes Field                | Software Field |
| --------------------------- | -------------- |
| `trackId`                   | `id`           |
| `bundleId`                  | `bundleID`     |
| `trackName`                 | `name`         |
| `artworkUrl512`             | `artworkUrl`   |
| `currentVersionReleaseDate` | `releaseDate`  |

All other fields (`version`, `price`, `artistName`, `sellerName`, `description`, `averageUserRating`, `userRatingCount`, `screenshotUrls`, `minimumOsVersion`, `fileSizeBytes`, `releaseNotes`, `formattedPrice`, `primaryGenreName`) keep their original names.

The backend also extracts the `results` array from the iTunes wrapper `{ resultCount, results }` before sending to the frontend.

## Per-Account Device Identifiers

Device identifiers are **per-account**, not global:

- Generated as 12 random hex chars (6 bytes) at account creation via `generateDeviceId()`
- Editable during login, immutable after authentication
- Stored in IndexedDB on the `Account` object as `deviceIdentifier`
- Passed to all Apple protocol calls (auth, purchase, download, version listing)

## Pod-Based Host Routing

After authentication, Apple returns a `pod` header:

- Store API: `p{pod}-buy.itunes.apple.com` (default: `p25-buy.itunes.apple.com`)
- Purchase API: `p{pod}-buy.itunes.apple.com` (default: `buy.itunes.apple.com`)
- Pod is stored on the Account object and used for all subsequent API calls
- Functions: `storeAPIHost(pod?)` and `purchaseAPIHost(pod?)` in `frontend/src/apple/config.ts`

## Dynamic Host Validation (Backend)

The Wisp server validates target hosts via `hostname_whitelist` in `backend/src/services/wsProxy.ts`:

- `auth.itunes.apple.com` — bag-resolved auth endpoint
- `buy.itunes.apple.com` — purchase endpoint
- `init.itunes.apple.com` — bag endpoint
- `/^p\d+-buy\.itunes\.apple\.com$/` — pod-based hosts
- `downloaddispatch.itunes.apple.com` — redownload dispatch endpoint (failureType 5002 fallback)
- Port restricted to `443` only
- Direct IP targets blocked (`allow_direct_ip = false`)
- Loopback IP targets blocked (`allow_loopback_ips = false`)
- Private/reserved resolved IPs allowed (`allow_private_ips = true`) for Docker/OrbStack DNS translation while hostname allowlist remains the primary control

## Bag Proxy (Backend)

The backend proxies the bag endpoint via `GET /api/bag?guid=<deviceId>` using Node.js native HTTPS. It sends Configurator-compatible request headers (`User-Agent`, `Accept: application/xml`). The bag response is public data (Apple service URLs) — no credentials are involved. See `backend/src/routes/bag.ts`.

## Backend

- Express + `@mercuryworkshop/wisp-js` for HTTP and Wisp proxy
- ESM modules (`"type": "module"` in package.json)
- `tsx` for development, `tsc` for production build
- SINF injector also handles optional `iTunesMetadata.plist` injection at IPA root
- Bag proxy for `init.itunes.apple.com`

### Backend Shared Utilities

- `backend/src/utils/route.ts` — shared Express route helpers (`getIdParam`, `requireAccountHash`, `verifyTaskOwnership`)
- `backend/src/config.ts` — centralized constants (`MAX_DOWNLOAD_SIZE`, `DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_MS`, `BAG_TIMEOUT_MS`, `BAG_MAX_BYTES`, `MIN_ACCOUNT_HASH_LENGTH`) and env-var config (`disableHttpsRedirect` via `UNSAFE_DANGEROUSLY_DISABLE_HTTPS_REDIRECT`)

## Frontend

- React 19, React Router 7, Zustand for state
- Tailwind CSS 4 for styling
- Vite for build tooling
- IndexedDB for credential storage (via `idb`)
- `libcurl.js` (WASM) for browser-side TLS 1.3 via Mbed TLS — connects through Wisp protocol
- `appleRequest()` in `frontend/src/apple/request.ts` wraps `libcurl.fetch` for all Apple API calls and forces HTTP/1.1 (`_libcurl_http_version: 1.1`)
- Bag endpoint (`frontend/src/apple/bag.ts`) uses backend proxy (`/api/bag`) and falls back to `https://buy.itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZFinance.woa/wa/authenticate` when `authenticateAccount` is missing or bag fetch fails
- Authentication (`frontend/src/apple/authenticate.ts`) resolves bag endpoint, then sets `guid` via URL query manipulation to avoid duplicate/malformed query parameters
- Plist build/parse (`frontend/src/apple/plist.ts`) uses native XML builder and browser-native `DOMParser`
- Cookie helper (`frontend/src/apple/cookies.ts`) — `extractAndMergeCookies(rawHeaders, existingCookies)` replaces the repeated extract-and-merge pattern across all Apple protocol files

### Frontend Shared Components (`components/common/`)

- **Alert** — `<Alert type="error|success|warning">` for status messages (replaces inline alert divs)
- **Modal** — `<Modal open={bool} onClose={fn} title={string}>` for dialog overlays
- **Spinner** — inline SVG loading spinner for buttons
- **CountrySelect** — optgroup-based country dropdown with "Available Regions" + "All Regions"
- **AppIcon** — 3 sizes (40/56/80px), rounded corners, letter fallback
- **Badge** — color-coded status pill
- **ProgressBar** — gray track, blue fill, percentage label
- **icons** — shared SVG icon components (`HomeIcon`, `AccountsIcon`, `SearchIcon`, `DownloadsIcon`, `SettingsIcon`, `SunIcon`, `MoonIcon`, `SystemIcon`) used by Sidebar, MobileNav, and MobileHeader

### Frontend Shared Utilities (`utils/`)

- `utils/error.ts` — `getErrorMessage(e, fallback)` for standardized catch-block error extraction
- `utils/crypto.ts` — AES-GCM encrypt/decrypt for account export/import
- `utils/account.ts` — `accountHash()`, `accountStoreCountry()`, `firstAccountCountry()`

### Import Ordering Convention

1. React / library imports (`useState`, `useNavigate`, `useTranslation`)
2. Layout components (`PageContainer`)
3. Common components (`AppIcon`, `Alert`, `Spinner`, `Modal`, `CountrySelect`)
4. Sibling components within the same feature folder (e.g., `DownloadItem` inside `Download/`)
5. Hooks / stores (`useAccounts`, `useSettingsStore`)
6. Apple protocol / API modules (`authenticate`, `purchaseApp`, `apiPost`)
7. Utilities (`accountHash`, `getErrorMessage`)
8. Config (`countryCodeMap`, `storeIdToCountry`)
9. Types (`type Software`)

**Enforcement**: Every PR must verify import ordering. Common mistakes:

- Putting hooks/stores before layout/common components
- Putting config before utilities
- Putting type imports in the middle instead of last

## Security Model

### Account Hash Is Public

`accountHash` is a SHA-256 of the account email. It is treated as **public, non-secret data** — it identifies which account owns a download but does not grant any privileged access. No authentication is bound to it. This is by design: the server is a blind proxy and does not manage user sessions.

### Trusted Sources

- **Apple API responses** (bag XML, iTunes search results, `customerMessage` fields) are treated as trusted content. No additional sanitization is applied beyond what React's text rendering provides (no `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`).
- **Apple CDN redirects** during IPA download are trusted. The initial URL is validated against `*.apple.com`, and redirect targets from Apple's CDN infrastructure (e.g., Akamai) are followed. The response body is saved to disk — it is never reflected back to the requester.

### Browser as Security Boundary

Credentials (passwords, `passwordToken`, cookies) stored in IndexedDB are protected by the browser's same-origin policy. Encrypting them at rest would be security theater — the decryption key would also live in JS. The threat model assumes the browser environment is trusted; if an attacker has XSS, they can exfiltrate credentials regardless of at-rest encryption.

### Backend Does Not Reflect Request Headers

The settings endpoint (`/api/settings`) must never reflect request headers (`x-forwarded-host`, `host`, etc.) in its response body. Use server-side values only (`config.*`, `process.uptime()`).

## Error Handling

- Early returns to reduce nesting
- `try/catch` for async operations
- Express error middleware for centralized handling
- Type-safe error responses

### Apple Protocol Error Codes

- `2034` / `2042`: Token expired — re-authentication required
- `customerMessage === 'Your password has changed.'`: Password token invalid
- `action.url` ending in `termsPage`: Terms acceptance required (throw with URL)

## Testing

### Unit Tests

```bash
cd backend && npx vitest run    # Node environment
cd frontend && npx vitest run   # jsdom environment with fake-indexeddb
```

### E2E Tests (Playwright)

```bash
cd e2e && pnpm test                            # Local (requires Docker on port 8080)
docker compose --profile test run --rm playwright  # Docker-based
bash e2e/docker-test.sh                        # Full: build + test + zero-trust verify
```

E2E tests import from `./fixtures` instead of `@playwright/test`.

WebSocket proxy tests use `location.host` to derive URLs dynamically, so they work both locally (`localhost:8080`) and in Docker (`asspp:8080`).

Real-account Docker verification (2026-02-22): authentication succeeds through Wisp, and backend logs contain only connection/stream metadata (no Apple credentials, password tokens, or cookies).

E2E tests cover:

- Wisp proxy (accepts /wisp/ WebSocket, rejects non-wisp paths)
- Add account flow (device ID field, randomize button, auth)
- Account detail (device ID, pod display)
- Settings page (no global device ID section)
- Search/lookup by bundle ID (verifies iTunes field mapping)
- Downloads API (iTunesMetadata support, backward compatibility)

### Test Account

Test credentials are stored in environment variables (`TEST_EMAIL`, `TEST_PASSWORD`, `TEST_DEVICE_ID`, `TEST_BUNDLE_ID`) and must never be committed to the repository.

## Deployment

```bash
docker compose up --build -d   # Builds and runs on port 8080
```

Single container serves both the Express backend and the Vite-built React SPA. SPA routes are handled by serving `index.html` for all non-API paths.

### Docker E2E Testing

The `compose.yml` includes a `playwright` service under the `test` profile:

```bash
docker compose --profile test run --rm playwright
```

This runs Playwright inside the official `mcr.microsoft.com/playwright` image, connecting to the app container via Docker internal DNS (`http://asspp:8080`). The `asspp` service has a healthcheck so the test container waits until the app is ready.

The `e2e/docker-test.sh` script automates the full flow: build, test, and verify zero-trust by scanning backend logs for credential leaks.

## Interface Design System

### Intent

**Who**: Developers and power users managing Apple app downloads outside the App Store — sideloading IPAs, managing multiple Apple IDs, tracking licenses. Technical audience, likely running this alongside terminals or Xcode.

**Task**: Authenticate Apple accounts → search apps → acquire licenses → download/compile IPAs → install.

**Feel**: A sharp utility. Precise like a package manager, clear like Apple's developer tools. Confident, quiet, functional. Not playful, not corporate.

### Design Tokens

- **Primary accent**: `blue-600` / `blue-700` (hover) — trust + system authority, echoes Apple dev tooling
- **Backgrounds**: `gray-50` (app), `white` (cards/surfaces)
- **Text**: `gray-900` (primary), `gray-600` (secondary), `gray-400` (tertiary)
- **Borders**: `gray-200` (default), `gray-300` (hover) — use sparingly, prefer background tinting for containment
- **Status badges**: Muted tones — `green` (completed), `blue` (downloading), `yellow` (paused), `purple` (injecting), `red` (failed), `gray` (pending)
- **Alerts**: `red-50`/`red-700` (error), `amber-50`/`amber-700` (warning), `green-50`/`green-700` (success)

### Typography

- System font stack (Inter / SF Pro fallback)
- Weight scale: `500` (medium, workhorse), `600` (semibold, page titles and key labels only). Avoid `700` in body.
- Size scale: `xs` (12px), `sm` (14px), `base` (16px), `lg` (18px), `xl` (20px), `2xl` (24px)

### Spacing

- Base unit: `4px`
- Consistent vertical rhythm: `space-y-4` within sections, `space-y-6` between sections
- Page padding: `px-4 sm:px-6`, `py-6`
- Container: `max-w-5xl` (1024px)

### Depth & Surfaces

- Single elevation: white cards on `gray-50` background
- No shadows. Borders only where they serve function (form inputs, dividers, interactive boundaries)
- Rounded corners: `rounded-lg` (8px) for cards, `rounded-md` (6px) for inputs/buttons, `rounded-full` for badges
- Prefer background tinting (`gray-50` → `gray-100`) over borders for visual containment

### Layout

- Desktop: fixed sidebar (240px / `w-60`) + scrollable main content
- Mobile: bottom tab bar with safe-area padding
- Breakpoint: `md:` (768px) for sidebar ↔ bottom nav switch
- Page structure: `PageContainer` with title + optional action button, then content

### Component Patterns

- **Buttons**: Primary (`bg-blue-600 text-white`), Secondary (`border border-gray-300 text-gray-700`), Danger (`text-red-600 border-red-300`)
- **Inputs**: `rounded-md border-gray-300 focus:border-blue-500 focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500`
- **Cards**: White background, `border border-gray-200 rounded-lg`, no shadow
- **Badge**: Color-coded pill (`rounded-full px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium`)
- **ProgressBar**: Gray track, blue fill, percentage label
- **AppIcon**: 3 sizes (40/56/80px), rounded corners, letter fallback
- **Nav active state**: `bg-blue-50 text-blue-700` (sidebar), `text-blue-600` (mobile)

## Frontend Cleanup Rules

These rules prevent the codebase from becoming messy after merging PRs. Enforce them on every change.

### `transition-colors` Usage Policy

**Problem**: `transition-colors` on static containers (cards, sections, alerts, badges) causes visible color flashing when the page loads in dark mode — the element briefly renders in light colors then transitions to dark.

**Rule**: Only use `transition-colors` on **interactive elements** that change color on user interaction:

- Buttons (hover state)
- Links (hover state)
- Form inputs and selects (focus state)
- Nav items (hover/active state)

**Never use `transition-colors` on**:

- Card containers (`bg-white dark:bg-gray-900 rounded-lg border ...`)
- Section wrappers (`<section>` with background)
- Alert/warning banners (use the `<Alert>` component)
- Badge pills
- ProgressBar tracks
- Modal containers
- AppIcon fallback containers
- Empty state placeholder containers

**Exception**: Layout chrome (Sidebar, MobileNav, MobileHeader, PageContainer) may keep `transition-colors duration-200` for smooth theme toggle animation, since these persist across navigations.

### Shared Icons

All navigation and theme icons live in `components/common/icons.tsx`. When Sidebar, MobileNav, or MobileHeader need icons, import from there. Never duplicate icon SVG components inline.

### Import Ordering Verification

Before merging any frontend PR, verify imports follow the convention in every changed file:

```
1. React / library imports
2. Layout components
3. Common components
4. Sibling components (same feature folder)
5. Hooks / stores
6. Apple protocol / API modules
7. Utilities
8. Config
9. Types (always last)
```

### Empty State Containers

Empty states (shown when a list has no items) use a consistent pattern:

- `border-2 border-dashed` (not solid border)
- `bg-gray-50 dark:bg-gray-900/30` background
- No `transition-colors` (removed to prevent dark mode flashing)
- Centered icon in a white circle, title, description, optional CTA button

### Dark Mode Color Pairings

Always pair light and dark variants consistently:

- **Primary text**: `text-gray-900 dark:text-white`
- **Secondary text**: `text-gray-600 dark:text-gray-400` or `text-gray-500 dark:text-gray-400`
- **Tertiary text**: `text-gray-400 dark:text-gray-500`
- **Card background**: `bg-white dark:bg-gray-900`
- **Page background**: `bg-gray-50 dark:bg-gray-950`
- **Card border**: `border-gray-200 dark:border-gray-800`
- **Input border**: `border-gray-300 dark:border-gray-700`

### Code Duplication Prevention

When the same UI pattern appears in 3+ components, extract it to `components/common/`. Current shared components:

- `Alert`, `Modal`, `Spinner`, `CountrySelect`, `AppIcon`, `Badge`, `ProgressBar`, `icons`

When adding new common components, update this AGENTS.md file accordingly.

### Authenticated API Downloads

**Problem**: Plain `<a href="/api/...">` tags and `window.open("/api/...")` make regular browser navigations that cannot carry custom HTTP headers. When `ACCESS_PASSWORD` is set, the `accessAuth` middleware requires an `X-Access-Token` header, so these requests fail with 401.

**Rule**: Never use `<a href>` or `window.open` for `/api/` endpoints that require authentication. Instead, use `fetch()` with `authHeaders()` from `api/client.ts`, then trigger a download via blob URL:

```tsx
const res = await fetch(url, { headers: authHeaders() });
const blob = await res.blob();
const blobUrl = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
const a = document.createElement("a");
a.href = blobUrl;
a.download = filename;
a.click();
URL.revokeObjectURL(blobUrl);
```

**Exceptions**: Routes that the backend explicitly skips auth for (`/auth/*`, `/install/*`) may use plain links — e.g., `itms-services://` install URLs are fine since `/install/*` is public.

More agent context in Lakr233/AssppWeb

One other file this repository gives its agents.

CLAUDE.md

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