use-personal-data
Skill68 starsChanged 2 days agoMITView on GitHub
How this project holds data about PEOPLE — names, contacts, documents, health, anything that identifies someone — and what may cross the border to a model provider. Load it BEFORE designing any table that will hold a person, any support or medical feature, any AI call whose input comes from a user's own words. Also load it when the owner says "the data may not leave the country", "this is medical", "GDPR", "personal data", "we may not send that to OpenAI". The rule the whole skill turns on: the model receives the CASE, never the PERSON — the two are separate tables, and they are joined again only on the owner's own server, after the answer comes back.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Fractera/web4-node-starter-kitword for word, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- Fractera/Agent-Engineering-Infrastructureword for word, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- Fractera/Agent-Engineering-Infrastructure★ 68100% same
- Fractera/web4-node-starter-kit★ 68100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository91 other files it gives its agents.
- app/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- adopt-suggested-skillSkill
- ai-elementsSkill
- ai-sdkSkill
- answer-elementSkill
- ask-elementSkill
- audit-broken-charactersSkill
- build-product-with-ownerSkill
- content-factorySkill
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- create-elementSkill
- create-multilingual-content-entrySkill
- dedicated-serverSkill
- design-and-settings-of-elementsSkill
- element-permissionSkill
- element-powerSkill
- expand-site-languageSkill
- explain-this-projectSkill
- find-skillsSkill
- fractera-vs-anthropicSkill
- handle-needSkill
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- help-in-browserSkill
- humanizerSkill
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- know-the-architectSkill
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- money-and-resourcesSkill
- node-typeSkill
- own-agentsSkill
- persist-env-var-with-rebuildSkill
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- translate-pendingSkill
- ultracode-sessionSkill
- use-agentic-ragSkill
- use-ai-generationSkill
- use-aioSkill
- use-app-configSkill
- use-auth-providersSkill
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- use-browserSkill
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- use-dataSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 92
Never present option 2 as if it were option 1.
- Distinctive: line 148
Every regime that regulates personal data grants deletion.
- Very specific: line 192
Put a recognisable synthetic person in the database — Zzz Testovich, +7 000 000 0000.
- Very specific: line 193
Run the feature end to end with the browser's network panel open (Claude's Chrome extension reads it — see use-browser when that skill …
- Very specific: line 195
Search every outbound request body for Zzz.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
use-personal-data
Informational, not binding. Know a better way for the case in front of you — do it your way and say so. You are trusted with the creative work on this project.
The starter puts a real database on the owner's own machine, and the moment a table starts holding people rather than products, one question outranks every other design question:
What is allowed to leave this server — and what must be rejoined here, after the answer returns?
Everything below is one answer to that question, applied to the cases that actually come up.
The structural rule: two tables, one join, and the join happens here
A person and their case are not one row. Split them the day the table is created, not the day a regulator asks:
| Table | Holds | May it leave the server? |
<entity>_people | name, contact, document number, address, date of birth | never |
<entity>_cases | person_id, the question, the state, the outcome | only pseudonymously, and only the fields the model needs |
The outbound door sends person_id — an opaque identifier that means nothing outside this database
— plus the minimum the model must read to be useful. The provider answers keyed by that same
identifier. The route joins the answer back to the person here, on the owner's hardware, and
only the joined result reaches the screen.
Both tables are declared in one place: the SCHEMA constant in lib/db/index.ts. Local SQLite
and the remote data service both execute it at startup, so a table added there exists in both
environments without a migration file.
The identifier must be meaningless. p_8f3c… is an identifier; ivanov_1978 is personal data
wearing a costume, and an email address is personal data with no costume at all. If the value could
be recognised by someone who never saw your database, it is not pseudonymous.
Case 1 — the state forbids personal data leaving its borders
The requirement the owner named, and the reason this skill exists. The law does not forbid using a model; it forbids exporting the person. Those are different prohibitions, and the second one is satisfiable.
What the outbound door sends:
{ caseId: "c_41d9…", personRef: "p_8f3c…", question: "…", locale: "ru" }What it must never send: name, contact, document, address, employer, exact date of birth, or the raw text of anything a person wrote about themselves before it has been read (Case 2).
What comes back is keyed by caseId. The route looks the person up locally, composes the reply
with their name in it, and answers. The person's name existed on this server the entire time. From
the provider's side there was a case, and no human being.
The line to hold in review: point at the exact object handed to fetch. Not the function that
builds it, not the type — the value that goes over the wire. If a name can reach that object through
any branch, the design has not been done yet.
Case 2 — free text is where the leak actually happens
The hardest case, and the one that defeats a careful schema: support written by a human.
A ticket body reads "I'm Maria Petrova, my insurance card is 4412…, my son's rash started Tuesday."
The name column is clean. The table is split. The identifier is opaque. And the person went abroad
anyway — inside a sentence, in a column nobody classified as personal.
So free text has its own rule: a field a person composed themselves is untrusted until it has been read. Three honest options, in the order they should be considered:
- Do not send the body. Send the structured case instead — category, symptom codes, dates — which the interface collected as fields rather than prose. Most support flows can be redesigned this way, and the redesign is cheaper than the compliance argument.
- Scrub, then send — strip what a scrubber finds, and mark the record as scrubbed. Understand what you bought: a scrubber catches patterns, not the sentence "my mother works at the school on Lenin Street". Scrubbing lowers the volume of the leak; it does not close it.
- Send it and accept the export. A legitimate choice in a jurisdiction that permits it, but it must be the owner's explicit decision, written down where the next session will find it — not a default that arrived because nobody looked at the payload.
Never present option 2 as if it were option 1.
Case 3 — health data, and why "special category" is not a synonym for "sensitive"
Health, biometrics, religion, ethnicity, sexual life, political opinion and criminal record are a separate legal class in the EU and most of its imitators: the default is that processing them is prohibited, and permission has to be earned — by explicit consent, or by a professional duty of care. This inverts the usual habit. Elsewhere you ask "is anything forbidding this?"; here you ask "what specifically permits this?"
Three consequences for the build, all structural rather than procedural:
- Consent is a row, not a checkbox. Store what was consented to, when, in which wording version,
and how it can be withdrawn. A boolean
agreed = 1answers none of the questions that get asked later, and the questions get asked exactly when the answer matters. - Health facts and identity are never in the same table, even locally. The join above is what makes "who has this diagnosis" a query that has to be written deliberately, rather than a column anyone reading the table sees by accident.
- Role gates are per route, and health routes are their own group.
lib/roles.tsholds the vocabulary,lib/auth/require-roles.tsenforces it in the door, and the subgrouplayout.tsxstands in front of the pages. A health feature dropped into an existing group inherits that group's audience, which is almost never the audience it should have.
The support scenario the owner named — technical support about a person's health — is Case 1 and Case 2 and Case 3 at once. That combination is the normal case, not an unlucky one.
Case 4 — the doors you will forget: vector memory and the knowledge graph
The storage is local. The ingest is not.
lib/fractera/vectors.ts and lib/fractera/knowledge.ts keep their data in the owner's own data
service — and to store it they send the text to the model provider to be embedded or read for
entities. Putting a support ticket into vector memory exports it just as surely as a chat call does,
while looking like a database write.
The knowledge graph is worse on this axis and better on another: loading is where the model reads everything, so a corpus loaded once is a corpus exported once, in full. Asking afterwards is cheap. Decide what may be loaded before loading anything.
Case 5 — the four channels nobody classifies
Personal data leaves through more doors than the ones marked "API":
- Logs. A route that logs its request body on error has published every field it received. Log identifiers and status codes; never the payload.
- Error text on screen. A refusal that echoes the input to be helpful — "no patient found for
Maria Petrova" — puts the name into a screenshot, a support chat, and a bug report. Refusals live
in
lib/i18n/platform-errors.tsand are written once, in general terms, on purpose. - URLs. A query string lands in server logs, browser history and any referrer header. Identifiers in the path, data in the body — always.
- Prerender and cache. The protected layer is static shell plus dynamic holes precisely so a person's data is never baked into a prerendered page. Fetching personal data in a server component of a cached route bakes one visitor's data into the page every later visitor gets.
Case 6 — erasure, decided at schema time
Every regime that regulates personal data grants deletion. Whether that is one statement or a week of work is decided by the schema, months earlier:
- Person in their own table, referenced by opaque id → erasure is one
DELETE, and the case history survives as anonymous statistics, which is usually both legal and desirable. - Person's name copied into every case row, and into logs, and into the vector store → erasure means rewriting all of it, and the copies in the model provider's systems are not yours to delete at all.
The second shape is what a starter's convenience produces by default. Refuse it when you build the table, because that is the only cheap moment.
Where these doors are in this project
Three routes reach a model provider, all server-side, and the key never enters a browser
(lib/openai-key.ts is the single reader):
| Door | Sends | Watch for |
app/api/i18n/translate | the record's fields | translating a person's own words exports them |
app/api/transcribe | recorded speech | a voice is biometric in several regimes, and people say their name out loud |
app/api/openai-models | nothing but the key | safe, listed for completeness |
Anything else that leaves is code somebody adds. Add it as a route with an @api line, never as a
fetch inside a component: a door that is not a route is a door nobody can review, and the browser
would carry the key.
When the honest answer is "not here"
Sometimes the requirement is that the model reason over identified data — read the medical file as a whole, with the name — and the law forbids that data leaving. Then pseudonymisation does not save the design, and saying so early is the service:
- a model running on the owner's own server, or with an in-country provider, or
- the feature without AI on that field, or
- the feature with AI on the non-identifying part only, which is usually most of the value.
Naming the choice is the work. Quietly shipping option four — export it and hope — is the failure this skill exists to prevent.
Proof
Types being green proves nothing here; the payload is the only evidence. Prove it the way a regulator would:
- Put a recognisable synthetic person in the database —
Zzz Testovich,+7 000 000 0000. - Run the feature end to end with the browser's network panel open (Claude's Chrome extension reads
it — see
use-browserwhen that skill exists). - Search every outbound request body for
Zzz. One hit is a failed design, not a small bug. - Negative control: confirm the same string IS present in the local database and in what the person finally sees on screen. If it is absent from both, you did not test the path you think you tested.
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