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FlyFissionFlyFission/nuclear-grade-context-engineering/skills/proving-claims/SKILL.md

proving-claims

Skill33 starsChanged 16 days agoMITView on GitHub

Builds claim-to-evidence trace rows with statuses, gaps, tests, evals, reviews, and narrower non-claims. Use when a packet asserts something a reviewer must trust. Do not use to make the final ship decision, judge public legal wording, or invent evidence that does not exist.

1 other project uses a version of this.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

6 rules. About 0 are common, 6 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈6

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Claim checked: every material claim is tied to evidence, a stated gap, or a deliberate deferral, no claim reaches past its evidence, and …

    line 16
  2. Distinctive:

    Test commands, CI runs, reviews, logs, diffs, screenshots, and source links.

    line 39
  3. Distinctive:

    Before a long static replay, freeze and record exact source, tool/helper, configuration, and runtime hashes.

    line 56
  4. Distinctive:

    Every important claim has evidence, a stated gap, or a deliberate deferral.

    line 72
  5. Distinctive:

    No test result is used to imply unrelated safety, security, compliance, or approval.

    line 73
  6. Distinctive:

    Stop when the evidence is missing but the record still wants to ship.

    line 77

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Proving Claims

Overview

Evidence should answer named claims. It should not just create a vague sense that the change is fine. This skill turns each claim into a proof you can trace. It keeps six things apart: a fact, an assumption, an unknown, a source claim (something a source says), local proof (something you checked yourself), and decision authority (who gets to decide).

Boundary: this skill builds the claim-to-evidence trace that feeds other decisions. It does not decide whether to ship (checking-release-readiness), determine whether public legal/safety wording overpromises (checking-legal-and-safety-wording), validate source lineage (checking-source-claims), or create packet files (creating-change-records).

Decision contract

  • Claim checked: every material claim is tied to evidence, a stated gap, or a deliberate deferral, no claim reaches past its evidence, and the load-bearing claim's evidence is reproducible by an independent party or independently authored — not the actor's own narration.
  • Artifact observed: basis.md, test, and review evidence -> claim-to-evidence rows with a status (pass/fail/gap/deferred/not applicable/planned) in trace.md/verification.md.
  • Decision affected: warn -- the evidence posture that later ship.md release-readiness weighs.
  • Failure class: overreaching-claim (a claim stated past its evidence, or a fail/unowned gap carried as shippable).
  • Next action: record the gap as residual risk for ship.md; a fail or unowned gap escalates to block.

When to Use

  • A change record makes claims about the code, says something about safety or security, claims release readiness, or claims a dependency can be trusted.
  • Tests pass, but reviewers cannot see which claim each test backs up.
  • Evidence gaps have to be accepted, put off, or treated as blockers.
  • The proof needs the right kind of check. The kinds are self-check, peer-check, concurrent verification (a second person checks as you go), independent verification (a separate person checks afterward), peer review, a test, or an eval.

When Not to Use

  • The request is to make the final ship/defer/block decision; use checking-release-readiness after the trace is built.
  • The request is to judge public legal, safety, security, certification, or compliance wording; use checking-legal-and-safety-wording.
  • The request is to validate citation lineage or source authority; use checking-source-claims.
  • The claim is an assertion about the outside world (a number, quote, version, or API behavior) rather than about this change; use checking-facts.

Inputs

  • basis.md, trace.md, verification.md, and ship.md.
  • Test commands, CI runs, reviews, logs, diffs, screenshots, and source links.
  • Known gaps and leftover risks. For expensive runs, apply "Scope expensive proof to the actual boundary" below.

Process

  1. Pull out each important claim.
  2. Pick the kind of check each claim needs, and match its depth to the mode: Quick shows the path ran; Standard exercises the branches that matter; Nuclear shows that the conditions which carry consequence independently change the outcome. A green bar at statement level is not condition-level evidence.
  3. Sort the support behind each claim into one of these: fact, assumption, unknown, source claim, local proof, or decision authority.
  4. Link each claim to its basis, the control or design feature, the code, the evidence, and the release posture.
  5. Give each claim an evidence status: pass, fail, gap, deferred, not applicable, or planned.
  6. Trim any claim that reaches too far, until the evidence truly backs it.
  7. Record the gaps and how they affect the release.
  8. For each load-bearing claim, record evidence custody: who generated, selected, transformed or summarized, executed or captured, retained, and presented it.
  9. Record the actor–evidence coupling profile on the actor, context, mechanism, authority, and resource axes. Do not collapse the profile into a score or rung. If the profile is too coupled for the consequence, add independent reproduction or diverse verification, or carry the gap as residual risk — do not count the actor's self-check as independent. See docs/02-operating-system/actor-evidence-independence.md.

Scope expensive proof to the actual boundary

  • Before a long static replay, freeze and record exact source, tool/helper, configuration, and runtime hashes. Check them again at completion; concurrent changes invalidate the affected proof. Schedule edits before the freeze rather than repeatedly rerunning an unstable target.
  • Reuse a pinned core proof only while its dependencies remain unchanged. A hash-only output inventory update may derive metadata from that proof when the dependency check and derivation are explicit; label it metadata-derived, retain the original evidence, and never report a fresh semantic replay. Audit the actual delivered inventory separately.
  • Test the actual native client ingress separately from its canonical downstream envelope. Wrapper bytes can exceed a local bound even when the provider body fits. Use a bounded no-forward native probe before paid generation, then a regression through the real bridge and independent overflow rejection at each guard. A local ingress repair does not authorize higher provider, source, output, reservation, or default limits.
  • Measure the specific bottleneck before expanding tooling. Prefer a small optimization with exact serialized-output parity and unchanged rejection behavior, including ordering, gaps, and overlaps, over a replacement engine. Keep packet sizing separate from full-plan construction; reuse frozen phase proof instead of repeating costly diagnostic compiles. A single timing or memory observation does not establish a speed multiplier or root cause.

Outputs

  • Claim-to-evidence rows in trace.md or verification.md.
  • A clear split between fact, source, and proof for each important claim.
  • Evidence commands anyone can rerun, or links to the artifacts.
  • The kind of check used for each important claim.
  • An updated release posture when the evidence changes.

Verification

  • python tools/ng.py validate .nuclear/changes/<slug> passes for Quick or Standard records.
  • Every important claim has evidence, a stated gap, or a deliberate deferral.
  • No test result is used to imply unrelated safety, security, compliance, or approval.

Escalation

  • Stop when the evidence is missing but the record still wants to ship.
  • Escalate when claims affect public trust, regulated use, procurement, security, or safety.

Common Rationalizations

  • "CI passed, so all claims pass." CI only proves what it checks.
  • "A reviewer can read the code." Review counts as evidence only when its scope and result are written down.
  • "The same agent checked itself." That can be a self-check, but it is not an independent check — the actor that made the change also wrote the proof, so the gate is downstream of the same mistake.
  • "The write-up says it passed." A confident narrative the actor authored is a claim, not evidence. Verify it; do not read it as the verification.
  • "The code that renders the figure is correct, so the figure is correct." When a load-bearing claim is about a produced artifact (a figure, PDF, screenshot, build, or deployed response), the evidence is a fresh observation of that artifact, not a reading of its generator — the generator is not the output. Route it to verifying-final-artifacts.
  • "We should not mention gaps." Hidden gaps lead to worse release decisions.

Red Flags

  • The evidence status is missing.
  • A claim says "safe", "secure", "compliant", or "approved" with no scope around it.
  • A claim about a rendered or produced artifact is backed only by a reading of its generator, with no fresh observation of the output itself (route to verifying-final-artifacts).
  • The release decision ignores failed or deferred evidence.
  • The only evidence for the load-bearing claim is the actor's own narration, or the custody/profile disclosure is missing, internally inconsistent, or below the consequence-specific minimum.

Prompt

Prove the important Nuclear-grade claims in this packet.

Inputs:
- packet: .nuclear/changes/<slug>/
- claims: <list or source file>
- evidence available: <commands/links/reviews/logs>
- known gaps: <list>

Return:
- claim -> basis -> control/design feature -> support type -> verification type -> evidence -> status -> ship posture
- for each load-bearing claim: evidence custody (generated, selected, transformed/summarized, executed/captured, retained, presented)
- the five-axis actor–evidence coupling profile (actor, context, mechanism, authority, resource), the consequence-specific minimum, and any residual coupling or blocker
- narrower wording for any claim that is too broad
- the gaps, deferrals, or blockers, stated plainly
- the validator command to run

Source-lineage note

This skill is an authored claim-evidence workflow influenced by public professional self-review, software assurance, verification, provenance, and secure-development sources mapped in docs/00-standards-foundation/source-map.md. It is not formal verification and does not establish evidence independence.

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