hunting-threats
Skill11 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Run hypothesis-driven threat hunts across endpoint, network, cloud, and identity telemetry using stack counting, outlier analysis, and ATT&CK-based hypotheses, with SIEM query patterns for Splunk, KQL, and Elastic. Use when proactively searching for undetected compromise, validating an intel report against your environment, or converting a hunch into a repeatable hunt.
1 other project uses a version of this.
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Most recently taken up by
- EvilFreelancer/secasword for word, first seen Oct 15, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- EvilFreelancer/secas★ 11100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository50 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- analyzing-binariesSkill
- analyzing-malwareSkill
- analyzing-memory-imagesSkill
- analyzing-network-trafficSkill
- analyzing-phishing-emailsSkill
- attacking-active-directorySkill
- attacking-wireless-networksSkill
- auditing-code-for-vulnerabilitiesSkill
- auditing-mcp-serversSkill
- auditing-supply-chainSkill
- container-securitySkill
- cracking-passwordsSkill
- engineering-detectionsSkill
- enumerating-network-servicesSkill
- escalating-linux-privilegesSkill
- escalating-windows-privilegesSkill
- establishing-persistenceSkill
- exploiting-cloud-platformsSkill
- hardening-cloud-postureSkill
- hunting-web-backdoorsSkill
- iac-securitySkill
- investigating-aws-incidentsSkill
- investigating-azure-incidentsSkill
- investigating-gcp-incidentsSkill
- investigating-m365-entraSkill
- investigating-windows-endpointsSkill
- maintaining-engagement-stateSkill
- managing-vulnerabilitiesSkill
- mapping-attack-techniquesSkill
- orchestrating-vulnerability-researchSkill
- performing-reconnaissanceSkill
- performing-social-engineeringSkill
- producing-threat-intelligenceSkill
- recognizing-deceptionSkill
- reporting-security-findingsSkill
- responding-to-incidentsSkill
- reviewing-cryptographySkill
- securing-ai-systemsSkill
- testing-apisSkill
- testing-ics-ot-protocolsSkill
- testing-mobile-applicationsSkill
- testing-web-applicationsSkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- transferring-filesSkill
- triaging-security-alertsSkill
- vetting-agent-extensionsSkill
- writing-sigma-rulesSkill
- writing-yara-rulesSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 50
If you cannot name the discriminator — what makes the malicious instance look different from the thousands of benign ones — the hunt is not …
- Distinctive: line 166
Stop hunting and switch modes.
- Distinctive: line 172
Do not "just check one more thing" on a live suspect host.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Hunting Threats
Hunting starts from an assumption of failure: the controls are deployed, no alert has fired, and the adversary may still be present. The output is not usually a compromise — it is a detection, a telemetry gap, or a documented negative result. Hunts that only count as successful when they find something degrade into confirmation bias.
When to Use
- Proactively searching for compromise that detection missed
- Testing a specific hypothesis about attacker behaviour in your environment
- Operationalizing a threat intel report against your telemetry
- Validating that a control or detection actually works in production
- Baselining an environment to enable future outlier analysis
When NOT to Use
- Working an alert queue rather than a hypothesis — use
triaging-security-alerts; a hunt starts from a question, triage from a queue - Confirmed incident in progress — use
responding-to-incidents - Writing the rule for what you found — use
engineering-detections - Sample analysis — use
analyzing-malware - A packet capture to work through — use
analyzing-network-traffic - A confirmed AWS compromise to investigate — use
investigating-aws-incidents - Pivoting on indicators, tracking an actor, or producing a finished intel
product — use
producing-threat-intelligence; a hunt consumes intelligence, it does not produce it - Offensive testing of defenses — use the red team skills
Hypothesis Before Query
An unstructured search through logs is browsing, not hunting. Every hunt gets a written hypothesis in this shape:
Hypothesis: An adversary with [access level] is using [technique] to [objective], which would produce [observable] in [data source], which is distinguishable from normal because [discriminator].
If true, I expect to see: ... If false, I expect: ... Telemetry required: ... (verified present: yes/no)
If you cannot name the discriminator — what makes the malicious instance look different from the thousands of benign ones — the hunt is not ready. Go find the discriminator first; that research is the hunt.
Hypotheses come from: recent intel on actors targeting your sector, ATT&CK techniques with no detection coverage, crown-jewel assets and the paths to them, anomalies noticed during other work, and post-incident "what else would this actor have done."
Hunting Techniques
Stack counting (frequency analysis)
The workhorse. Aggregate a field, sort ascending, investigate the rare values. Malicious activity is usually rare; commodity noise is common.
-- Splunk: rarest parent-child process pairs
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| stats count dc(host) as hosts by ParentImage, Image
| where count < 10 AND hosts < 3
| sort count// KQL: rarely-seen signed binaries making external connections
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| summarize Count=count(), Hosts=dcount(DeviceName) by InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| where Hosts <= 2 and Count < 20
| order by Count ascStack the right field. Stacking Image finds unusual binaries; stacking
ParentImage, Image finds unusual relationships, which is where living-off
the-land abuse shows up (winword.exe → powershell.exe).
Outlier analysis
Same shape, different axis: what is normal for this entity?
- A service account that has never used interactive logon, now doing so
- A workstation talking to an internal subnet it has never touched
- A user authenticating outside their historical hours and geography
- A host whose process-count baseline shifted after a specific date
-- Elastic ES|QL: first-seen external destinations per host
FROM logs-network-*
| WHERE destination.ip NOT IN CIDR("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16")
| STATS first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), n = COUNT(*) BY host.name, destination.domain
| WHERE first_seen > NOW() - 7 days AND n > 20Grouping and clustering
Cluster on a shared attribute to surface campaigns: same JA3/JA4 across unrelated hosts, same rare user agent, same certificate serial, same working hours, same directory of execution.
Intel-driven hunting
Take a report, extract the TTPs rather than the IOCs, and hunt those. The report's hashes and IPs are dead; its described behaviour is not.
Report says: "uses schtasks to create a task running a DLL via rundll32"
Bad hunt: search for the report's hash
Good hunt: every scheduled task created in the last 90 days whose action
references rundll32, stacked by task name and DLL pathHigh-Yield Hunting Grounds
| Hypothesis area | What to look for |
| Execution via LOLBins | rundll32, regsvr32, mshta, certutil, bitsadmin, msiexec with network or unusual arguments; curl/wget piping to a shell on Linux |
| Persistence | Scheduled tasks/cron/systemd units created recently; WMI event subscriptions (rare and almost always malicious); run keys; new services; authorized_keys modifications |
| Credential access | LSASS handle opens, ntds.dit copies, shadow-copy creation, Kerberos RC4 requests (4769 with encryption type 0x17), DCSync replication rights use |
| Lateral movement | Admin share writes followed by service creation, WinRM/WMI from non-admin hosts, SSH from workstations to servers, RDP chains |
| C2 | Beacon timing regularity, long-lived connections, DNS with high entropy or high subdomain cardinality, TLS with rare JA3/JA4 |
| Exfiltration | Outbound volume outliers per host, archive creation followed by upload, cloud storage domains from servers, DNS TXT volume |
| Identity/cloud | New OAuth grants and consented apps, service principal credential additions, mail forwarding rules, role assignments outside change windows, StopLogging/trail deletion |
| Defense evasion | Event log clears (1102/104), Sysmon or EDR service stops, AMSI/ETW patch indicators, timestomping ($SI vs $FN mismatch) |
The Hunt Loop
1. Hypothesis (written, with a discriminator)
2. Scope (data sources, time window, host population — decided up front)
3. Verify (does the telemetry exist and cover the population?)
4. Query (broad, then narrow — expect several iterations)
5. Investigate (every candidate resolved to benign-explained or escalated)
6. Conclude (found / not found / could-not-determine)
7. Convert (detection rule, telemetry gap ticket, or documented baseline)
8. Document (so the next person can re-run it, not re-derive it)Every hunt produces an artifact, including hunts that find nothing. A negative result is a finding when it is documented with its scope and limitations: "no evidence of X across 4,200 endpoints over 90 days; note that 620 hosts lack the required telemetry." That sentence is worth more than an undocumented clean bill of health.
Scoping and Time Windows
- Match the window to dwell-time reality, not convenience. If you look back 7 days for an actor with a 60-day median dwell time, a clean result is meaningless.
- Confirm retention before you commit: a 90-day hunt over 30-day retention silently becomes a 30-day hunt.
- Record which host populations are not covered by the telemetry you used. This is where the next intrusion will live.
When a Hunt Hits
Stop hunting and switch modes. Preserve first: pull the memory and triage
package before anyone touches the host. Then hand to
responding-to-incidents with the query, the raw results, and the timestamp
of your first look — the response team needs to know what you touched and
when, so your own activity does not contaminate the timeline.
Do not "just check one more thing" on a live suspect host. Interactive commands on a compromised box change evidence and can alert the operator.
Rationalizations to Reject
- "Nothing found, so we're clean." You searched one hypothesis over one data set for one window. Write down all three.
- "Too much data to hunt." That is what stacking is for. Aggregate first; you are looking for the rare, not reading the common.
- "The EDR would have alerted." The premise of hunting is that it did not.
- "That's just noise." Characterize the noise. "Just noise" is where implants hide, and an uncharacterized benign cluster is an unexamined hypothesis.
- "I'll remember what I searched." You will not, and neither will your successor. Undocumented hunts get repeated instead of extended.
- "Let me just log into the suspicious host and look." You are now part of the timeline, and possibly a tripwire.
- "We hunt when we have time." Ad-hoc hunting produces ad-hoc coverage. Schedule hunts against a prioritized technique backlog.
Deliverable
# Hunt: <name> Date: <UTC> Analyst: <name>
Hypothesis: <as written above>
ATT&CK: T####.###
Scope: <data sources, host population, time window>
Telemetry verified: <present / partial — name the gaps>
Queries: <verbatim, so this is reproducible>
Results: <candidates found, how each was resolved>
Conclusion: found / not found / could-not-determine
Outputs: <detection rule ID, telemetry gap ticket, baseline doc>
Limitations: <what this hunt could not have seen><!-- attack:start -->ATT&CK Coverage
Generated from secskills-core/ttp-index.json — edit that file, then run
python3 scripts/sync_attack.py --write. Re-verify IDs against the
current ATT&CK release before citing them in a report.
Persistence (TA0003)
- T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription — see also
establishing-persistence
Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- T1036 Masquerading — see also
establishing-persistence - T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs — see also
responding-to-incidents - T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution — see also
escalating-windows-privileges - T1218.011 Rundll32 — see also
analyzing-malware - T1562 Impair Defenses — see also
responding-to-incidents - T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools — see also
responding-to-incidents
Collection (TA0009)
- T1074 Data Staged — see also
transferring-files - T1560 Archive Collected Data — see also
transferring-files
Command and Control (TA0011)
- T1071.004 DNS — see also
engineering-detections,analyzing-network-traffic - T1219 Remote Access Software
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution — see also
analyzing-malware,analyzing-network-traffic - T1572 Protocol Tunneling — see also
transferring-files
Exfiltration (TA0010)
- T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol — see also
transferring-files,analyzing-network-traffic - T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service — see also
transferring-files
Impact (TA0040)
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery — see also
responding-to-incidents - T1496 Resource Hijacking — see also
exploiting-cloud-platforms
Detection content for any of these: engineering-detections. Proactive search: hunting-threats. Post-compromise: responding-to-incidents.
<!-- attack:end -->Reading External Sources
Fetch public advisories, specifications, and vendor reports as Markdown:
curl -sL "https://defuddle.md/<url>" # scheme in the path is optionalThis strips page boilerplate — roughly 78% fewer tokens on a prose page — and returns the full text rather than a summary, so you can grep it and trust a negative result.
Three things it is not for. Fetch JSON and API responses raw, because readability extraction mangles structured data. Fetch authenticated or JavaScript-rendered pages directly, because it retrieves them anonymously. And never route adversary infrastructure (phishing links, C2, malware hosting), client-owned hosts, or engagement URLs through it — the request leaves your machine to a third party, and for live adversary infrastructure it also tips off the operator.
Some sites block the extractor and return an error blob rather than the page —
{"error":"Failed to fetch: 418 I'm a teapot"} from freedesktop.org, for
instance. That is the fetch being refused, not the source saying the thing
does not exist. Re-fetch the URL directly before drawing any conclusion from
it.
References
engineering-detections— converting a successful hunt into a tested ruleresponding-to-incidents— the handoff when a hunt confirms compromise- MITRE ATT&CK for hypothesis generation; PEAK and TaHiTI hunting frameworks
- Sysmon, Zeek, osquery, Velociraptor, and cloud audit logs as core telemetry
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