security-regression
Skill1 starsChanged 2 months agoMITView on GitHub
Own the security checks that belong to QA rather than to a pentest — authorization and tenant isolation as tests, headers, cookie flags, client-side secrets, injection-safe inputs. Use when asked whether users can see each other's data, about IDOR, security headers, or a pre-release security pass.
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- Distinctive: line 21
Every endpoint that takes an id gets a row.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security Regression
This is not a penetration test. It is the set of security properties a QA suite can assert on every commit, forever, so a regression cannot ship silently.
The authorization matrix (the highest-value tests in any multi-tenant product)
Build the grid once, generate a test per cell:
| Actor | Own resource | Other user's resource | Other tenant's resource | No auth |
| owner | 200 | 403/404 | 403/404 | 401 |
| member | 200 (scoped) | 403/404 | 403/404 | 401 |
| admin | 200 | per policy | 403/404 | 401 |
Every endpoint that takes an id gets a row. IDOR — swapping an id and getting someone else's data — is the most common serious vulnerability in SaaS, and it is trivially testable:
const other = await seedTenant('acme')
const res = await api.as(userFromTenant('globex')).get(`/orders/${other.orderId}`)
expect(res.status).toBe(404) // not 403: do not confirm existence
expect(res.body).not.toHaveProperty('total')Prove each of these with mutation-proof by removing the guard — an authorization test that
stays green without the guard is the most dangerous false positive in the codebase.
Automated sweep
node runner/bin/qa-supreme.mjs security --url https://app.example.comCovers headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, framing), cookie flags (HttpOnly, Secure,
SameSite), client-side secret patterns (live API keys, JWTs, private keys in markup or
localStorage), target=_blank without noopener, and forms posting over http.
Input safety as regression tests
For every input that reaches a query, a template, a filesystem path or a shell:
- SQL/NoSQL:
' OR 1=1 --,'; DROP TABLE,{"$ne": null}— expect a validation error, never a 500 and never extra rows. - XSS:
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>stored and reflected — assert it renders as text. - Path traversal:
../../etc/passwd— expect rejection. - Mass assignment: post
role: "admin"to a profile update — expect it ignored. - Rate limiting: N+1 requests in a window -> 429.
These are regression tests, not exploitation. Report what failed and where; do not chain into exploitation of a system you were not engaged to attack.
Scope boundary
Vulnerability classes requiring active exploitation (SSRF chains, deserialization, auth bypass research) belong to a scoped, authorized penetration test — not to a CI suite. State that boundary in your report instead of implying full coverage.
Output
AUTHZ MATRIX 42 cells, 40 pass, 2 FAIL
FAIL GET /api/orders/:id member of tenant B receives 200 for tenant A order (orders.ts:31)
FAIL GET /api/exports no tenant filter on the query (exports.ts:12)
HEADERS CSP missing, HSTS present, X-Frame-Options missing
SECRETS none found in client bundlesDoes it work?
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