sentinel
Skill14 starsChanged 49 days agoMITView on GitHub
Read-only security scan; OWASP Top 10, secrets, injection, dependencies, git history, auth. Use to audit a codebase for vulnerabilities.
- Reads credentials
14 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- fworks-tech/agenthoodtheir own version, first seen Nov 16, 2026
- goulvenclech/dotclaudetheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- xiaomo-agi/xiaomo-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
- mqmalagris/agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 5, 2026
- vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- simota/agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 23, 2026
Other versions14 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 14
- SparkDevNetwork/Rock★ 701same name
- vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills★ 179same name
- simota/agent-skills★ 99same name
- xiaomo-agi/xiaomo-skills★ 28same name
- fhgomes/my-awesome-agents-skills★ 5same name
- goulvenclech/dotclaude★ 5same name
- copyleftdev/palimpsest★ 2same name
- fworks-tech/agenthood★ 2same name
- guihai24/openskills★ 2same name
- soulemike/microsoft-skills★ 2same name
4 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository24 other files it gives its agents.
- accelerateSkill
- almanacSkill
- autopsySkill
- blueprintSkill
- certifySkill
- chronicleSkill
- confluenceSkill
- conjureSkill
- deploySkill
- divineSkill
- inscribeSkill
- jiraSkill
- knowledge-graphSkill
- magicSkill
- manifestSkill
- orchestrateSkill
- portalSkill
- scrutinizeSkill
- sealSkill
- statuslineSkill
- transmuteSkill
- unravelSkill
- wardSkill
- weaveSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
5 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 12 edited versions we read keep these.
2
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 25
Print the active model at start and end: If a fallback notice appears mid-scan, say so in the report and offer /model to return.
- Distinctive: line 57
Run for detected stack:
- Distinctive: line 67
Check for secrets in git history:
- Very specific: line 101
Update the ledger before the report, and put the delta (new, fixed, still open) first (references/cadence-ledger.md, steps 2–3).
- Very specific: line 118
Remove the marker first (rm -f .workspace/local/security-scan.active), so model switches are no longer held.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 12 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
/sentinel — Security Scan
Bundled command: if
magician-scanis not found, run it as${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/tools/magician-scan. If that is missing too (Claude chat ships no plugin tools), skip the static-analysis step, say so in the report, and run the rest.
For very large repos, raise /effort so the analysis stays thorough across the codebase (xhigh; max only as an opt-in for a frontier problem). See lore/models.md.
When to use
To audit a codebase for vulnerabilities: OWASP Top 10, credential and secret detection, injection surfaces, a dependency audit, a git-history secret scan and an auth spot-check. It never modifies code and ends with a severity-ranked report. Trigger phrases: "run a security scan", "audit for vulnerabilities", "check for leaked secrets". Not for fixing findings (/scrutinize) or a general code review (/divine).
The scan can change models under you
Cyber classifiers can move a flagged request to a fallback model, and the session continues there (lore/models.md).
- Frame the work defensively. Audit and report. Never ask for working exploits, attack tooling or evasion techniques: they trip the classifier and are out of scope.
- Print the active model at start and end. If a fallback notice appears mid-scan, say so in the report and offer
/modelto return. - A flag on the first request usually comes from workspace context (
CLAUDE.md, skills, directory names).claude --safe-modeisolates that.switchModelsOnFlag: falseasks before a switch.
Destructive-command hard gate (always on, not part of a scan)
Independent of any scan, magician ships a PreToolUse(Bash|PowerShell) hook, scripts/destructive-guard.sh (self-contained plain bash — no other interpreter), that unconditionally blocks catastrophic commands: recursive deletes of system or home roots, raw writes to disk devices, fork bombs, piping a network download straight into a shell or interpreter, decoding base64 straight into a shell, evaluating a downloaded command substitution, and a Bash command that could expose the secrets saved in magician's plugin options (one that names any of those options or the session environment file, reads another process's environment through the proc filesystem, or prints the whole environment with env, set or one of the other listing commands the guard checks). It exits 2, so the block lands before permission rules are evaluated — it overrides allow rules and fires in every mode (default/acceptEdits/auto/bypass), with no escape hatch. Common command wrappers (sudo, timeout, nohup, command, ...), ( )/{ } grouping and inline sh -c payloads (other shell options before the -c included) are unwrapped before the check. If a Bash or PowerShell call is refused with a magician destructive-guard: refused message, do not retry, rephrase, or obfuscate — the human must run it themselves outside the agent. Honest limit (CWE-78): a denylist can't catch every obfuscation, so this is a deterministic net layered under OS sandboxing + auto-mode's classifier + model judgment, not a complete sandbox.
Cadence and ledger
Findings persist in .workspace/local/security/findings.jsonl, never committed: open rows map unfixed vulnerabilities. A dismiss reason keeps a closed item closed. The first run is the baseline. Scan weekly: Claude Security scheduled scans where available, else /loop 1w /sentinel. Fixes are bounded patches in a reviewed PR. A fixed finding class becomes a scan rule or an eval. Format and steps: references/cadence-ledger.md. The ledger and the scan marker are the only files this skill writes.
Process
0. Mark the scan active
mkdir -p .workspace/local/security && touch .workspace/local/security-scan.activeWhile this marker exists, magician's PreModelSwitch hook (scripts/pre-model-switch.sh) holds any model switch for confirmation, because a safety-classifier fallback would otherwise change the model tier in the middle of the scan. Remove it at the end (rm -f .workspace/local/security-scan.active), and also when the scan is abandoned or fails; .workspace/local/ is never committed.
Then read the ledger (references/cadence-ledger.md, step 1).
1. Static Analysis (via magician-scan)
magician-scan .magician-scan is plugin-provided (on PATH when the plugin is enabled) and makes no network calls. If magician-scan can't be run, note that in the report, skip this step, and continue with the remaining checks.
Reports: hardcoded credentials, private keys, eval() calls, SQL injection via % formatting, innerHTML XSS, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, os.system calls, shell=True subprocess.
2. Dependency Audit
Run for detected stack:
- Node.js:
npm audit - Python:
pip-audit(if installed) orsafety check - Go:
govulncheck ./...(if installed) - Rust:
cargo audit - Java: OWASP dependency-check (if configured)
The audit tools reach the network, and step 2.5 checks the install-time supply chain. What each tool sends, and the supply-chain checks, are in references/dependencies.md. Skip any tool the user doesn't want run.
3. Secret Detection
Check for secrets in git history:
git log --all -i -G'(password|secret|token|api[_-]?key)[[:space:]]*[:=]' --pretty=format:'%h %ad %an' --date=short --name-only -- '*.env' '*.key' '*.pem' 2>/dev/null | head -40This lists commits and files only (it never prints values). Open a specific commit to confirm, but never paste secret values into the report; tell the user to rotate anything found.
4. Auth/Authz Spot Check
For web archetypes: identify all API endpoints and verify auth middleware is applied.
5. Input Validation Check
Scan for user input without sanitization.
Report Format
=== SENTINEL SECURITY REPORT ===
Date: <timestamp>
Target: <path>
CRITICAL: N
HIGH: N
MEDIUM: N
LOW: N
[CRITICAL] src/auth.ts:45 — Hardcoded API key
[HIGH] src/db.ts:12 — SQL query built with string concatenation
...
DEPENDENCY AUDIT: N vulnerabilities found
OVERALL POSTURE: Clean | Needs attention | Requires immediate actionUpdate the ledger before the report, and put the delta (new, fixed, still open) first (references/cadence-ledger.md, steps 2–3).
6. CI Integration Note
For CI pipeline use: magician-scan exits 0 (clean), 1 (issues) or 2 (unknown option or missing path); magician-scan --help shows the usage.
# .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Security scan
run: magician-scan .Obstacles
If this skill runs as a dispatched unit and hits something that blocks or degrades the work, do not wait for a human who is not there and do not silently ship a degraded result — return the Obstacles block from lore/obstacles.md (fields: STATUS, OBSTACLE, BLOCKER, SEVERITY, WORKAROUND, RECURRENCE, SCOPE, NEXT) to the caller alongside whatever you completed; interactively, say the same in prose.
Completion Signal
Remove the marker first (rm -f .workspace/local/security-scan.active), so model switches are no longer held; then:
"Sentinel complete. <N total findings>. Review report above and run /scrutinize for systematic remediation."
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
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Now do this for your own.
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