agentleFS
45ck45ck/security-engineering-skills/.agents/skills/input-validation-auditor/SKILL.md

input-validation-auditor

Skill1 starsChanged 8 months agoMITView on GitHub

1 other project uses a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

7 rules. About 0 are common, 7 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈7

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Read the artifact from a security perspective and identify the concrete trust and exposure model.

    line 34
  2. Distinctive:

    Prefer explicit attack paths, assets, boundaries, and failure conditions over generic advice.

    line 38
  3. Distinctive:

    Prefer concrete attack paths and control implications over generic slogans.

    line 54
  4. Distinctive:

    Do not confuse compliance language with real security risk reduction.

    line 59
  5. Distinctive:

    Do not bury critical exposure behind long, unprioritized issue lists.

    line 60
  6. Distinctive:

    Do not recommend controls without explaining the attack or failure they address.

    line 61
  7. Distinctive:

    Do not hide uncertainty when architecture or deployment details are missing.

    line 62

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

input-validation-auditor

Purpose

Audit where untrusted input enters the system and whether validation, normalization, encoding, and rejection paths are appropriate.

Trigger this skill when

  • The current artifact has security implications that need structured review or hardening.
  • You need to turn vague security concerns into concrete findings, controls, or requirements.
  • You want the next security-focused action to be explicit rather than ad hoc.

Expected inputs

  • request/command sources
  • parsers
  • validation rules
  • encoding rules
  • error handling

Deliverables

  • input validation findings
  • untrusted-input register
  • missing validation points
  • encoding/normalization risks
  • recommended fixes

Operating procedure

  1. Read the artifact from a security perspective and identify the concrete trust and exposure model.
  2. Separate facts from assumptions and call out missing information that affects confidence.
  3. Map the highest-risk paths first rather than trying to describe every possible issue equally.
  4. Translate findings into concrete control or requirement language that a builder can act on.
  5. Prefer explicit attack paths, assets, boundaries, and failure conditions over generic advice.
  6. Finish with the most sensible handoff skill based on the dominant risk area you found.

Quality gates

  • Findings are specific to the artifact and threat context, not generic security boilerplate.
  • Output separates facts, assumptions, risks, controls, and recommended next action.
  • Prioritization reflects impact and exposure, not just the number of issues found.
  • Recommendations are implementable and framed in a way that can be tested or reviewed later.

Handoff targets

  • security-requirements-writer
  • threat-surface-mapper
  • abuse-case-writer

Output style

  • Be explicit about uncertainty.
  • Prefer concrete attack paths and control implications over generic slogans.
  • Separate facts, risks, recommendations, and next steps.
  • Make the output usable by engineers, reviewers, and test designers.

Failure modes to avoid

  • Do not confuse compliance language with real security risk reduction.
  • Do not bury critical exposure behind long, unprioritized issue lists.
  • Do not recommend controls without explaining the attack or failure they address.
  • Do not hide uncertainty when architecture or deployment details are missing.

Minimum output skeleton

## Summary
## Findings
## Structured outputs
## Risks
## Recommendations
## Recommended next skill

Download now (ZIP)

Does it work?

Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.

No reviews yet

People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.

  • It worked
  • Partly
  • It didn't
What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.

Your trail

Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.

Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.

Now do this for your own.

Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.